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THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

OF

THE ATONEMENT.



THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE

OF

The Atonement:

AN HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO ITS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE CHURCH.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

BY

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"Non mors sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis."

S. BERNARD.

SECOND EDITION.

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Mille fois plus vivant, mille fois plus aimé depuis Ta mort que durant les jours de Ton passage ici-bas, Tu deviendra à tel point la pierre angulaire de l'humanité, qu'arracher Ton nom de la monde serait l'ébranler jusqu'aux fondementes. Entre Toi et Dieu on ne distinguera plus."

Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, p. 441.

Impleta sunt, quæ concinit
David fideli carmine,
Dicendo nationibus :
Regnavit a ligno Deus.

Hymn. Eccles.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND
JOHN IGNATIUS VON DÖLLINGER, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH,
PROVOST OF THE CHAPEL ROYAL, ETC., ETC.,
This Volume,
COMMENCED AT HIS SUGGESTION,
AND OWING MUCH TO OPPORTUNITIES OF INTERCOURSE
WITH HIM,
IS, WITH HIS PERMISSION,
INSCRIBED,
IN TOKEN OF GRATITUDE FOR MANY KINDNESSES,
AND WITH EVERY SENTIMENT
OF AFFECTIONATE ADMIRATION AND RESPECT.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE scope of this Essay is not controversial, but historical. It is designed to trace through the patristic, scholastic, and later periods of theology the Catholic doctrine on the Atonement of the Son of God, comparing it also with the principal Reformed systems, to some of which the author ventures to think that the antipathy felt by many not irreligious minds towards the whole idea of Atonement is in great measure due. He has had, therefore, a certain undercurrent of practical aim, in showing that objections urged with more or less reason against what are either doubtful excrescences or erroneous perversions of the doctrine do not apply to it, as part of the Church's faith. But this secondary purpose has never been allowed (he trusts) to interfere with strict fidelity of statement in recording the belief whether of individuals or communities. References are in every case given to the writers or formularies under review, and their meaning is expressed, as far as possible, in their own words.

Of authorities consulted, other than those forming the direct subject of inquiry, the following deserve special mention; for the Fathers of the first three centuries, Bähr's *Die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Sulzbach, 1832); 'Thomasius' *Origenes, Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des dritten Jahrhunderts* (Nürnberg, 1837); Redepenning's *Origenes, Eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (Bonn, 1841); for the later patristic and the scholastic period especially, and partly for the Reformation, Baur's *Die christliche Lehre von der Ver-söhnung* (Tübingen, 1838);¹ for the patristic period generally, Petavius, *De Incarnatione Verbi*; Thomassin, *De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*; Fabricius, *De Veritate Religionis Christianæ*, cap. 41; and for the Reformation period, Möhler's *Symbolism* (Robertson's Trans., London, 1843); Döllinger's *Die Reformation* (Regensburg, 1848), vol. iii.; and Newman's *Lectures on Justification* (Oxford, 1840). Other authorities will be men-

¹ Baur's work requires to be read with caution. He is on the whole reliable as a chronicler of opinions, but with a passion for *systematizing*, which sometimes leads him to give exclusive or disproportionate value to one side of a writer's view, to the exclusion or neglect of others. This is particularly shown in his treatment of the Fathers, which illustrates the criticism that has been made upon his intellect, as "of an essentially negative cast, preternaturally alive to the slightest indications of inconsistency, while unable to recognise the plainest evidences of unity,"

tioned as they occur. The author desires further to put on record his great personal obligations to the kindness of Dr. Döllinger, both for many valuable suggestions, and for allowing him the free use of his extensive library.

It may be as well to observe, that the manuscript was completed before he had an opportunity of referring to Archbishop Thomson's Bampton Lectures on the Atonement, which he had heard preached at Oxford in 1853, but had not seen in print; only two of them, however—the sixth and seventh—deal in part, and from the nature of the case very briefly, with the *history* of the doctrine. As a general rule, direct criticism on contemporary literature has been purposely avoided in this volume, as unsuitable to the character of a work not meant to be controversial; but it has not therefore been composed in forgetfulness of what living writers have said, or of the tone of the serial press on the subject. The treatise is chiefly occupied with recording the opinions of others; so far as it expresses his own, the author need scarcely add, that he trusts it will be found to contain nothing out of harmony with the spirit and teaching of the Church.

LONDON,

Lent, 1865.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE demand for a Second Edition of this work gives me an opportunity of acknowledging the various criticisms it has received, by which I have tried to profit, from whatever quarter they might proceed. My best thanks are due to several of my reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions, and to all (with one marked exception¹) for the uniform courtesy and fairness of their treatment. Comments on particular passages which seemed to call for notice will usually be found referred to in the notes at the foot of the page, and where no special reference is made, I have often re-cast or enlarged statements which had failed adequately to convey my meaning. A new Note on the condition of our Lord's Human Body has been appended to the first chapter, in con-

¹ See *Dishonest Criticism, Some Remarks on Two Articles in the Dublin Review*. Longmans.

sequence of a theological objection against certain statements of mine urged with much force by a friendly critic in the *Ecclesiastic*. The book remains substantially what it was before ; but it has been carefully revised throughout, and considerable additions have been made both to the text and notes, chiefly in the Introductory Essay and the first and concluding chapters.

One of these additional passages, in the first chapter, contains a brief outline of the teaching of Scripture on the Atonement, which it may be useful to bear in mind in connection with the different theories on the subject reviewed in the following pages. More than this has not been attempted here, and would not probably be looked for. Two of my critics, however, have alluded to the subject, and it will therefore be desirable to repeat here more explicitly what was stated in the Preface to the First Edition, as to the general aim and purport of this volume. One of them, already referred to, has censured me in no measured terms for not commencing my work with a complete investigation and harmony of the whole teaching of Scripture on the subject, as illustrated by the traditional theology of the Church and the full resources of modern criticism ; while the other suggests with more show of reason that

a verification of the Church's theology from the Bible should have formed the conclusion of the treatise, and considers that its omission is a *lacuna*, though not one that affects the value of the rest. The same general answer will apply to both these criticisms.

A complete investigation and harmony of the Scriptural doctrine of the Atonement, as gathered from both the Old and New Testament—from prophecies, types, allusions; from the words of our Divine Lord, and the more explicit teaching of His inspired Apostles—would undoubtedly be in itself a most important work, and might, under different aspects, be regarded as a preface or as a supplement to the history of the development of that doctrine in the Church. But it would be quite a distinct work, requiring distinct preparation, and would suffice, if fully carried out, to fill a separate volume. No doubt many of the same authorities would have to be consulted in either case, but the method of using them would be different in an exegetical work from what belongs to a treatise occupied with tracing the history of a particular doctrine in its chronological sequence, while for the former purpose “the full resources of modern criticism,” to adopt my reviewer's language, would of course have to be laid under contribution. Scriptural exegesis,

whether conducted mainly on patristic or critical principles or on both combined, differs both in its methods and its scope from the work undertaken in this volume. Its direct and primary object is to elicit from the sacred text, with the best assistance from ancient or modern interpreters that can be brought to bear on its illustration, that one consistent view of the particular subject or document under consideration, which the writer conceives to be the true one. Authorities, however copiously quoted, are not referred to for their own sake, but in subordination to the leading purpose of the book, and in so far as they serve to promote it. But a writer engaged on the historical development of a doctrine is directly concerned with the systems of the successive schools or theologians under review, and only indirectly with his own estimate of the general outcome of their teaching in its relation to reason or to Holy Scripture. Still less is it his business to engage in the direct interpretation of Scripture himself. He is rather employed in supplying the materials for it. It would indeed be hardly possible to write without indicating any opinion of one's own on these points, and the more light can be incidentally thrown upon them the better, so long as the distinctive character of the work, as an historical

inquiry, is maintained intact. I have not, therefore, thought it beyond my province to lay down and enforce in the opening chapter of this volume certain guiding principles to be kept in mind during the subsequent inquiry, or to gather up in the final chapter what appear to me some of its more important results.

But still it remains true that history is one thing and hermeneutics another. The same work cannot be at once exegetical, dogmatic, controversial, and historical. Something it may include of all these elements, but one or other must predominate, if it is to have any principle of coherence, and not to be a mere confused medley. I explained in the Preface to the former Edition of this work that the method of treatment adopted was "not controversial but historical," and that whatever it had indirectly of controversial or dogmatic aim was meant to be kept strictly subordinate to its original purpose, as a faithful record of successive schools of Catholic theology, and of their relation to the antagonistic systems of the Reformation. It was designed to be, in German phraseology, not *Dogmatik* but *Dogmengeschichte*.¹ To explore and harmonize the whole teaching of Scrip-

¹ See Kuhn's *Einleitung in die katholische Dogmatik*, § 18; and cf. Preface to his *Die Trinitätslehre*.

ture on the subject, and present a definite view of the conclusions thus obtained—in other words, to discuss the true sense of Scripture on the doctrine of the Atonement, and expound my own estimate of it—could only be regarded as *part* of such an undertaking on the assumption that the New Testament writers stand to the Fathers in the same relation as the Fathers stand to the Schoolmen, instead of supplying the inspired data on which all later systems have been professedly based. To analyse and define the teaching of Scripture on a given doctrine is to define the true sense of that doctrine. If this be done at the commencement of an inquiry into its treatment by the doctors of the Church in successive ages, it must be done independently of their judgments. If it is done at the conclusion of such an inquiry, it may include an application of the results obtained; but still it is a supplement to the inquiry, not a part of it. While, therefore, it might have been quite possible to compress into a prefatory or supplementary chapter an abstract of the scriptural argument, it did not fall within my present design to do so, nor can I see that the completeness of that design is at all affected by the omission. To the majority of my readers, indeed, this explanation will probably appear superfluous; but

I am anxious to avoid even the semblance of indifference to the critical examination of the letter of Scripture in regard to Christian doctrine. It is, no doubt, a most important branch of theological inquiry, but it is not what is directly contemplated in this volume. And it is enough to do one thing at a time.

Exception has been taken in some quarters, and especially by one of my critics, the vehemence of whose denunciations is usually in an inverse ratio to the accuracy of his statements, to what I have said in the Fourth Chapter about Aquinas and the Schoolmen. In the present Edition, the passage has been enlarged, and in some measure recast, in order to guard as far as possible against misconstruction, but it remains substantially unchanged. No one, who has any acquaintance with the subject, would deny the keen intellectual acumen and the enormous industry of many of the scholastic writers; and it would be absurd to suppose that the devotion of such talents and labours, combined often with the most ardent piety, to the study of theology, could be barren of results. But, after making the fullest allowance for their real and important services in the consolidation of Catholic doctrine, especially as regards the Sacraments, it still remains true, as I have observed in the text, that the

entire absence of a critical spirit, or indeed of any critical machinery, the want of historical knowledge, and the prevalent ignorance of Greek—to which St. Thomas forms no exception—were very serious hindrances to an adequate treatment of theological science. There was no criterion for distinguishing genuine from spurious authorities, and all alike were accepted and used with implicit confidence. None of the Schoolmen, for instance, entertained a doubt that the so-called works of Dionysius, the Areopagite, now universally acknowledged to be a compilation of the fifth century, and which had been translated into Latin by Scotus Erigena, were genuine; and this forgery, deeply tinged as it is with Neo Platonic pantheism, exercised a considerable, and by no means always a beneficial, influence on their writings. The teaching of the greatest of them, Aquinas, on questions of Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, is mainly based on a series of forged documents, composed by Dominican missionaries in the East, and sent to him by Pope Urban IV., who seems to have been himself deceived by them.¹ His book *Contra Errores Græcorum* is

¹ The forgery was exposed by Launoi, and other French divines of the seventeenth century, and admitted at the time by the Dominican editors of St. Thomas. An edition of Launoi's Epistles was published at Cambridge by Saville.

derived exclusively from this compilation, and his reliance on it, as genuine, has naturally coloured his other writings also, including the *Summa*. He would hardly again have devoted a section of the *Summa* (Sda Sdæ, xi. 3) to an emphatic, though singularly feeble apology for the capital punishment of heresy, had he been aware that the odious system he was advocating owed its origin to the Priscillianist heretics, and that the first attempt to introduce it into the Church was met by the indignant protest of St. Martin of Tours. What he did know was, that the practice had been recently adopted by the Inquisition, and he therefore felt called upon to defend it. Of the many passages in the Fathers condemning persecution, he would of course see nothing in Gratian's *Decretum*, which was the great scholastic text-book, and into which the more important portion of the Isidorian forgeries had been incorporated, but only the few from St. Augustine, written under pressure of the Donatist controversy, which seem to tell in favour of it.

No one can reasonably affect to be shocked at my speaking of the Schoolmen often wasting their time on trifling or incongruous questions. It might be sufficient here to give two characteristic examples from a recent Catholic writer, who certainly has no prejudice

against them. The author of *Christian Schools and Scholars* tell us that they gravely disputed whether a pig driven to market is held by the man who drives it, or by the cord fastened round its leg, and whether the purchaser of a cloak has also purchased the hood fastened to it.¹ On the whole, I do not believe that any impartial reader, who is competent to form an opinion, will be likely to regard my observations on

¹ *Christian Schools and Scholars*, vol. i. p. 476. Examples of this sort of trifling on sacred subjects may be found in abundance in the notes to Gieseler's *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, vol. iv. chap. 4, and in *Discussioni di Constantino Grimaldi*, Lucca, 1725. One comparatively inoffensive instance from a criticism quoted in the latter (p. 266) may suffice here: "Christum propriâ virtute ascendisse in cælum, dogma est fidei; quomodo id factum sit, *an corpori detractâ gravitate, an Christi vi sustentante corpus et sursum tollente*, existimet unusquisque ut volet." Far more objectionable instances might be given from the speculations of the Schoolmen on good and evil angels. In some cases, their refinements led to the adoption of moral heresies, not unlike what Luther afterwards arrived at by a very different road. Thus Amalric taught at Paris, early in the thirteenth century, "quod in caritate constitutis nullum peccatum imputabatur. Unde sub tali specie pietatis ejus sequaces omnem turpitudinem committebant." And his followers said; "Si aliquis est in Spiritu Sancto et faciat fornicationem et aliquâ aliâ pollutione polluat; non est ei peccatum quia ille Spiritus, qui est Deus, omnino separatus a carne, non potest peccare; quamdiu ille Spiritus, qui est Deus, est in eo, ille operatur omnia in omnibus." Cf. Gieseler, *Kirchengesch.* vol. iv. p. 414. Amalric's writings were condemned by the University of Paris, and the Papal Legate forbade the study of Aristotle, which however continued none the less to form the basis of the Scholastic philosophy. Matthew of Paris says of the Scholastics of the second period (1248), "Qui non verentes tangere montes, a gloriâ Dei opprimendi, nitebantur secreta Dei investigabilia temere perscrutari, et judicia Dei, quæ sunt abyssus multa, nimis præsumptuose indagare." Other writers of the period, and notably Roger Bacon, speaks quite as strongly.

the Schoolmen as either depreciatory or unjust. The result may be summed up in the words of one of the first of living divines, who says that, "as the scholastic theology was no new product of the mediæval spirit, but was built up from a diligent and elaborate study of the patristic writings, so it must be the business of the theology of the present to go on building on the foundations of the Christian past, not exclusively of Scholasticism, and thus to bring its acquisitions into harmony with the requirements of the age."¹ It should be remembered, moreover, as the same writer observes, that the Tridentine Fathers studiously adopted Patristic and Biblical in preference to Scholastic language, in drawing up their definitions.² And this holds good also of the language of the Tridentine Catechism, which is the universal manual of instruction in Catholic doctrine, both for clergy and people.

While the present treatise is not in its form dogmatic or controversial, as was observed just now, it is

¹ See Preface to the last volume of Kuhn's *Dogmatik*, p. iv. The whole volume (*Die christliche Lehre von der göttlichen Gnade*, Tübingen, 1868) is devoted to an examination of the Scholastic doctrine on grace, chiefly in reply to Schätzler's attack upon the author, "euphemistically termed criticism," but which appears from his account to be very much the sort of "criticism" we are accustomed to from writers of the same school in England. The book will well repay a careful perusal.

² *Ib.* p. 401.

concerned with the history of dogma, and necessarily cuts across the controversies to which that dogma has given rise. It was, indeed, from what one cannot help seeing of the present result of those controversies in discrediting the doctrine of the Atonement altogether with many thoughtful and even religious minds, that the idea of undertaking it first occurred to me. I thought that the foreign accretions which had gathered round the doctrine in the course of ages, and especially during the period of the Reformation, some of which have so completely changed its whole character as to make it, in fact, quite another doctrine, would be most easily and most effectually discriminated from the truth they have only served to encumber, by an historical statement of their origin and growth. Meanwhile, whatever of light is shed upon that truth by doubtful or one-sided speculations, such as the patristic theory of a ransom to Satan, or St. Anselm's view of the necessity of an infinite payment for an infinite debt, would naturally come out in the course of the inquiry. Even the repulsive and immoral tenets introduced by the Reformers on human sin and divine grace are not without their importance, as illustrating the awful realities they so strangely caricature. On the other hand, while the

negative results of the investigation are valuable in showing what the doctrine is not, it has also its positive value in educing from the consentient voice of Fathers and doctors what they are agreed in regarding as essential to a right understanding of it. Controversy, as a rule, irritates more opponents than it convinces; whereas truth, if it is fairly stated, is more persuasive than the ablest of its advocates. It was impossible to steer clear of controversial discussion altogether in dealing with the divines of the Reformation; but even there I have chiefly confined myself to an exposition of the rival theories, and allowed the contrast to speak for itself. And where, as in the first and final chapters, I have had occasion to speak more directly in my own name, I have studied rather to suggest matter for thought or cautions against error than to be aggressive. Indeed, the nature of the subject would alone disincline one from controversy, whenever it can be avoided. It is the scandal of Christendom that the Atonement should have been turned into a war-cry, that the professed disciples of the Crucified should meet to wrangle beneath the shadow of His Cross. But it is also certain that, if ever the wounds of Christendom are to be healed, and the scornful or unbelieving millions within and with-

out its visible precincts to be re-united to one another, and to Him who died to reconcile all unto God in one body by the Cross, that union can only be consummated through the great attraction of His atoning love, who was lifted up that He might draw all things to Himself. If this little work shall in any degree have tended, however imperfectly or remotely, to subserve that end, it will have abundantly fulfilled the desire which first suggested it.

And here I gladly recognise a certain community of aim in another work on the Atonement emanating from a different quarter, and approaching the subject from a very different stand-point, which it becomes necessary, for special reasons, to notice here. It is devoted to working out the author's conception of the doctrine in accordance with the testimony of conscience and of Scripture, especially of conscience, and with some reference to leading Protestant systems. It is not an exegetical treatise, though the view maintained is of course supported from Scripture; and it is a remarkable view, as coming from a writer nurtured on the traditions of Scotch Presbyterianism. My immediate concern, however, is only with such portions of the volume as come into contact or collision with my own.

When the former Edition of this work was published, I had not seen Mr. Campbell's,¹ to which my attention was first directed by the review of my own in the *Guardian*. I read it carefully and with great interest, and have since had an opportunity of consulting the Second Edition, which contains some comments on my own book, through the courtesy of the author, who sent me a copy of it. I have referred to it as occasion served in the following pages. Mr. Campbell's method of treatment is different from mine, consisting mainly of an exposition of his own belief on the Atonement; and, so far as he examines the opinions of others, he does not go further back than the Reformation. For the most part, therefore, his line of argument does not traverse mine. While approaching the subject from a Protestant stand-point, and betraying in some respects strong Protestant sympathies, his work is remarkable for its emphatic rejection of the ordinary Protestant views of vicarious punishment, substitution, and imputation. He manifests throughout a keen appreciation of the fundamental connection between the Atonement and the Incarnation, and insists on the inner reality of that

¹ *The Nature of the Atonement*. By J. M. Campbell. Macmillan.

justification, which is its result, as no mere fictitious imputation of an alien righteousness, but the actual implanting of righteousness in our natures through union with our incarnate Lord. The former point is prominently brought out in the Introduction to the Second Edition, which starts from the principle that "the faith of the Atonement pre-supposes the faith of the Incarnation," and proceeds to discuss the question, first raised by the Scotists, whether the Incarnation sprung out of the necessity for Atonement, or is to be regarded as itself "the primary and highest fact in the history of God's relation to man," the Atonement becoming necessary to the fulfilment of the divine purpose on account of sin. The writer expresses, if I rightly understand him,¹ a decided preference for the latter (Scotist) view; but the main object of the introduction is to vindicate faith in the Atonement for fallen man, as distinct from faith in the Incarnation only, from certain sceptical tendencies of the present day, which must not be confounded with that view. "To trace redemption to its ultimate root in the Divine Fatherliness, and to regard that Fatherliness as leaving no room for redemption, are altogether

¹ This seems to be distinctly stated at p. xiii., yet his language in p. xviii would point in an opposite direction.

opposite apprehensions of the grace of God." The second theory is indeed practically to fall back on natural religion.

Mr. Campbell has devoted a chapter to the teaching of Luther, and two more to the Calvinist theology, as taught by some of its leading adherents in this country and in America, which he strongly condemns. His censure is just, but does not call for any special comment here. I have no acquaintance with the modern writers referred to, but they appear, from the extracts given, to have faithfully adhered to the system of their Master. The modifications introduced by the spirit of the age into the later Calvinism, have done more to mar its intellectual symmetry than to improve its moral and spiritual character. In his account of Luther's teaching the author seems to me to have insensibly interpreted the Reformer's opinions by his own.¹ Luther had not, like Calvin, the mind of a theologian. He wrote quite as much under the guidance of impulse as of deliberate judgment, and, as he also wrote a great deal, it is not wonderful that he is not always consistent with himself. Considering that

¹ Mr. Campbell, moreover, confines himself to Luther's *Commentary on the Galatians*. No examination of his teaching which leaves unnoticed the portentous treatise *De Servo Arbitrio* can pretend to do justice to it.

he was a man of strong religious earnestness, it is only natural again that much which is true and even edifying should be found in his writings. Whatever spiritual life men have is really nourished, under the least favourable circumstances, by the truths they (often unconsciously) hold, not by the errors they have added to them. But it is not difficult to gather from Luther's writings the leading characteristics of his system, which are summed up in the catechism and other symbolical documents he composed or sanctioned for the standards of his new community. I can understand, and in some degree share, Mr. Campbell's personal respect for the man, but for his novel theory of justification I can feel none, intellectual or moral. Both in itself and in its practical results, which soon began to show themselves, it seems to me most literally to deserve, if I may borrow for once the favourite phraseology of its professors, the name of a "soul-destroying heresy."

In his Second Edition Mr. Campbell has inserted a Note to his Chapter on Luther, which I may be expected to notice, as some parts of it directly cut across statements of my own. While condemning "the forensic character of the systematic theology of the Reformers" as inadequate, he yet insists on the im-

portance of their protest against "the general and doubtful faith of the Church of Rome," though it is admitted that this general and doubtful faith "prevails in Protestant as well as in Roman Catholic countries;" I should have thought much more so. The point insisted upon is, however, that it is "alone *logically* possible" on Catholic principles, because "the doctrine that the Atonement *had special reference to original sin*, while satisfaction for personal sin remained to be made in the form of penance, precluded the possibility of peace with God as an immediate result of faith." He adds, oddly enough, that the fact of our penances being connected with the sacrifice of Christ, and accepted for His sake, "does not alter the case." In another Note he speaks still more strongly, and with express reference to my book, of the Church "*limiting* the relation of the Atonement to sin to original sin," while the Reformers held it to apply equally to actual sins (p. 408). As no authorities are given for this strange version of Catholic doctrine, and it is seldom safe to hazard a universal negative, I will only say that I know of no single Catholic theologian who teaches it, and that it certainly is not the doctrine of the Church.

The Catechism of Trent, in explaining "the reasons

why the Son of God endured His most bitter Passion," asserts that "the principal cause consisted in the crimes and vices which men have perpetrated from the beginning of the world till now, and shall perpetrate henceforth to the end of time; for in His death the Son of God, our Saviour, contemplated the Atonement and obliteration of the sins of all ages, by offering for them to His Father a full and superabundant satisfaction."¹ So little is the Atonement said to have special reference to original sin that original sin is not specifically mentioned at all. The charge might, indeed, with far greater force be urged against the Reformers themselves, and especially Luther, whose novel and highly exaggerated doctrine of original sin, which will be found noticed in its place in this volume, connected the atonement more exclusively with it, and undermined the sense of moral responsibility for actual sins. St Bonaventure and other Scholastic writers say, no doubt, that by atoning for original sin Christ won grace for men, whereby they are enabled to make satisfaction for their own actual sins, and that His Passion accordingly acts more fully in the Sacrament of baptism, which (in the case

¹ *Cat. ad Paroch.* Pars. I. cap. v. Q. 11.

of infants) remits original sin only, than in the Sacrament of penance which remits actual sin. But this simply means that, until the bar placed by original sin had been removed, there was no room for the pardon of actual sin or grace to subdue it; and that what poor satisfactions we ourselves may offer are accepted by virtue of the full atonement for all sin, original and actual, made on the Cross, and in union with it.

This is not the place to enter on the strong arguments from Scripture and natural reason in favour of the Catholic doctrine of satisfaction. Conscience alone would tell us that personal sin deserves personal chastisement, and the instinct of contrition would urge the pardoned sinner to do all in his power to make reparation—even with zeal, indignation, and revenge, as the Apostle words it—to the Love he had so cruelly outraged. What is important to observe here is, that it is a complete misapprehension of the doctrine to suppose that it makes forgiveness and peace of conscience dependent on our own acts of satisfaction, and thus diverts the attention of the penitent from his Saviour to himself. Pardon is complete and instantaneous, whether given in absolution or through an act of true contrition without it, and with pardon is necessarily united the infusion of grace. Satisfaction,

whether voluntary or involuntary, and whatever shapes it may assume, comes afterwards, and is accepted precisely because it is offered by one who has already been reconciled to God. But it is not in this matter that the root of Luther's contention against the ancient theology is to be sought. It lay rather in his substitution of faith, in the sense of *fiducia* or personal assurance—the laying hold of the merits of Christ by an act of trust—for the *fides formata*, or faith working by love, to which alone the Catholic dogma ascribes a justifying power; and the consequent change introduced by him in the meaning of justification, which he regarded as a bare act of acquittal, not as the infusion of sanctifying grace, whereby God does not simply repute but makes us just. And this again springs from his novel and most immoral theory of original sin, and the denial of free will which is its result. The new doctrine had its practical convenience in dispensing with the need for priesthood and sacraments, but it had also its attendant inconveniences, which were not long in displaying themselves, in practically dispensing with the obligations of the moral law.¹ Luther may not

But so did S
Paul's teleg.

¹ Those who wish for evidence of this statement in an easily accessible form, may consult the extracts from Luther's writings given by Hallam (*Lit. of Europe*, vol. i. p. 299,) in reply to Archdeacon Hare. The following well

have intended his teaching to be Antinomian, but he lived to witness in the excesses of the Anabaptists a wild outbreak of the Antinomianism which is its inevitable result. From that day to this, wherever his doctrinal system has been thoroughly accepted and realised, whether in his own country or in ours, it has acted as a deadly narcotic to the action of conscience. Hallam observes that "it is certain that we find no testimonies to any reform of manners in the countries that embraced it." If Lutheranism is powerless for good or for evil in Germany now, that is simply because, among the great majority of its nominal adherents, "the doubtful faith of the Church of Rome," which it was intended to supersede, has long since been replaced by a faith which can hardly be called doubtful, for it does not offer to the revelation of God Incarnate even the homage of a doubt whether it

known passage, from his Letter to Melanethon, is characteristic: "Sufficit quod agnovimus per divitias gloriæ Dei Agnum, qui tollit peccata mundi; ab hoc non avellet nos peccatum, *etiamsi millies millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus*. Putas tam parvum esse pretium et redemptionem pro peccatis nostris factam in tanto et tali Agno? Ora fortiter; es enim fortissimus peccator." It would be easy to multiply similar extracts from his writings. I have no pleasure in throwing stones at a great memory, still less would I attempt to gauge theological systems by the aberrations of individual teachers. But when Luther is again put forward as a great preacher of truth and righteousness, it is well people should understand clearly what his real teaching was.

may perchance be true. There is, indeed, as we shall see later on, a reaction in an orthodox direction among Lutheran divines of the present day, but the most prominent among them, though they may still adhere to the traditional terminology of their formularies, have wandered far from the ideas it was originally intended to convey.

In another Note occurs the following passage, which is probably, from the turn of expression and the allusion to St. Bernard's words which stand on the title page, intended to include a reference to my book, though it is not expressly named. I therefore transcribe it as it stands.

"St. Bernard speaks of the merits of Christ's death being the mind in which He died; and recent Roman Catholic writers dwell on the merits of Christ's satisfaction and sacrifice for sin, speaking of the relation of the excellence that was in Him to us and our demerits in a way that, though free from the charge of legal fiction, has in it the essence of that imputation of righteousness with which they reproach the divines of the Reformation. I have not thus conceived of merit counter-balancing demerit, any more than of penal suffering substituted for punishment. That the self-

sacrifice present in it has been the atoning virtue of Christ's sacrifice is a form of this conception of merit which commends itself to some, though perhaps rather as a part of the *man-ward* aspect of the atonement, than as its power to prevail with God. Love is the life in which the atonement was made, and self-sacrifice, which is of the essence of love (though self-sacrifice is not an adequate definition of love), is the form in which love is seen in the atonement. But the atonement is such, not because of the self-sacrificing love manifested in it, but as that love taking a form determined by our need as God's offspring, alienated from Him by sin." ¹

The latter portion of this extract does not call for much comment here. It is obvious that self-sacrifice is not identical with love, though it is, under the conditions of this life, one of its most essential expressions, and, as the author admits, is *the* form which it took in the atonement. Neither, of course, would it suffice to constitute an atonement in itself, and apart from the method of exercising it. It was not the self-sacrifice but the moral element of the Sacrifice of Christ, to which I ascribed its atoning virtue;² the self-sacrifice

¹ *Nature of the Atonement*, p. 399.

² A few words have indeed been inserted (at p. 6), to bring out this idea

I spoke of chiefly in its relation to man. But Mr. Campbell speaks of Catholic writers dwelling on the excellence of Christ as related to our demerits in a way that has in it the essence of the imputation of righteousness with which they reproach the Reformers. I am not sure that I clearly understand the charge. It is certainly Catholic doctrine, that all human merit is accepted for Christ's sake only, and derives its whole efficacy from His Cross and Passion. But this differs *toto cælo* from the Lutheran view of a transfer or imputation of righteousness, and of merit counterbalancing demerit. It is just the difference between saying that His merit and obedience is taken as a substitute for ours, and saying that He has merited for His brethren, as the Second Adam and Head of the family of the regenerate, forgiveness of the past and grace henceforth to serve God, not as slaves, but sons. It is a real though imperfect righteousness which "the *just* Judge" rewards, yet in bestowing that crown of righteousness, He is, in St. Augustine's words, crowning His own gifts. We can neither be justified *without* the righteousness of Christ, whereby all grace is won for us, nor is it by that righteousness, in the words

more clearly, but they do not add to it, and I wrote them before seeing Mr. Campbell's comment.

of the Tridentine Council, that we are "formally just." A substituted righteousness is even more alien from the Catholic idea of the Atonement than a substituted punishment. The author, I think, misapprehends that idea from failing to realise the infusion of sanctifying grace through sacramental union with our Lord, as an integral part of it. At all events his objections to it seem ultimately to run up into the difficulty, which he elsewhere expressly recognises and dwells upon, in conceiving of any atonement being required at all, rather than a mere announcement of the Divine mercy.¹

It will be seen that I have confined myself to noticing in detail those passages of Mr. Campbell's book which bear directly on my own, and seemed, therefore, to call for a reply. Criticism on living writers does not (as was observed in my original preface) fall properly within the scope of a treatise on the history of doctrine. But it is impossible not to sympathise with the spirit of Mr. Campbell's book and with much of its positive teaching, especially as to what he calls the "expiatory confession of our sins by Christ," which seems to be its leading idea. My criticisms, were I to undertake the task of criticising,

¹ *Nature of Atonement*, pp. 20, *sqq.*

would probably refer mainly to the negative aspects of his theology, partly in the way of denials, and still more of omissions. One conspicuous omission must at once strike every Catholic reader, though under the circumstances it is only natural. No view of the Atonement, either in relation to God or man, can be other than incomplete, which ignores its perpetuation in the Eucharistic Sacrifice,¹ and application through the sacraments to the individual soul.

In the present edition, I have made more frequent use of contemporary English writers in illustration of my argument, both in the Introductory Essay on Development and in the body of the work. It will of course be understood, in such cases, that I do not necessarily commit myself to agreement with every syllable of passages, quoted on the whole with approval, still less to any opinions expressed elsewhere by the same authors; as neither, on the other hand, does my using their testimony imply any agreement with me on their part, beyond what is conveyed in their own words. But it is instructive to observe how

¹ In one place the author seems unconsciously to be touching on this, where he speaks of "the perfection of humanity in Christ" being "a pleading, *even were it silent*, for all humanity." It is such a silent pleading, where He presents it continually in heaven—for in words He prays no more—and on the altars of His earthly Church in the mystery of the Eucharist.

much there often is in common between those who are widely separated in position or belief, and how many differences, long and bitterly cherished, have their root in mutual misunderstandings. There is, perhaps, no theological controversy to which this remark applies with greater force than to that concerning justification. What Luther puts forward as the *articulus stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiæ*, is in reality maintained by no theologian of name at the present day, either in his own country or in ours. Those who most highly honour the Reformer himself, even those who still accept the formularies which bear his name, are often the furthest removed from teaching what he taught. The doctrine of justification preached in the majority of Anglican pulpits is, at least in its main features, the doctrine, not of Luther, but of the Council of Trent. And so, to take a very different instance, it is remarkable how those, who not long ago were strongly opposed to it, are coming to acknowledge, in the words of one of my Anglican critics, and by no means the most favourably disposed to my view, "that every student of theology must admit some kind of development of doctrine," and that "in a certain sense it underlies the theology of all Churches, for wherever there is any action of mind upon truth, there is a development

of the latter.”¹ Some of my reviewers have said much more than this. The fact of such a development has long indeed been familiar to German writers of the most opposite theological schools. But it is satisfactory to find that what was almost unanimously denounced by the religious press in this country hardly twenty years ago, as sheer Rationalism or Romanism run mad, is now beginning to be pretty generally admitted as true in principle, though there is still of course much difference of opinion about the application of the principle.² To come to a better under-

¹ *Guardian*, Aug. 24, 1865.

² My critic in the *Westminster Review* (Oct. 1865) observes that rationalists will consider their own theory of development more consistent, “which does not require the cataclysm of a miraculous incarnation.” But I was not arguing with those who deny the Incarnation. That is a fact resting on its own evidence, which is neither “required” nor capable of being disproved by any theory of development, as such, though for all who regard it as the final and fullest revelation of God to man, it is necessarily the starting point of any theory of development in Christian doctrine. When the reviewer goes on to “object, above all, to that which is a characteristic of the so-called Catholic developments, the deducing logical conclusions from mystical premisses, as of Eucharistic flesh and blood from a figurative victim,” there seems to be some confusion of language. No one dreams of deducing the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist from “a figurative victim”—whatever precisely is intended by the phrase—for no one who believes in Christianity at all, certainly no believer in Catholicism, holds either the Person or the Sacrifice of Christ to be figurative. Nor can St. Bernard’s words, in ascribing the efficacy of His death to His will in voluntarily dying, in any way prejudice “the perpetual sacrifice of the mass.” As both Victim and Sacrifice are in either case identical, whatever explanation is given of the one, applies equally to the other. So far as the word

standing on this point would be a most important step towards the settlement of those doctrinal questions which divide Protestants from Catholics, and the Eastern Church from the West. But I am touching on the confines of a vast subject which cannot be enlarged upon here.

One word only shall be added in conclusion. The Cross may be regarded as the meeting-point of the objective and subjective elements of Christianity. The Incarnation of the Eternal Word is the fundamental verity on which the faith is built, and it is then most vividly brought home alike to the intellect and the conscience, when we are bidden to gaze on that bleeding Form on Calvary, and to remember that the Blood so freely shed for us is indeed none other than the Blood of the Incarnate God. This is the picture suggested to us when we think of the Atonement. And none should dare to contemplate it, even though it be from a distance, and rather for purposes of abstract inquiry than of devotion, but with the deepest reverence and in the spirit of

“mystical” indicates a distinction between the “premisses” and the “conclusions,” it belongs to the latter, not the former, for though both Victim and Sacrifice are the same, the *manner* of offering is mystical on the altar, while it was real on the Cross.

adoring love. If there is aught in these pages tending in any way to lessen that reverence, or to cloud the vision of His Atoning Love of whom they speak, the author would wish it blotted out ere it was written. "*Domine Deus, quæcumque dixi in his libris de Tuo ignoscant et Tui; si qua de meo, et Tu ignosce et Tui.*"

LONDON,

Advent, 1868.

[Since this volume was in type, my attention has been called to a passage bearing on certain statements made in it (p. 279), in the interesting Dissertation on the Christian Ministry, in Lightfoot's *Epistle to the Philippians* (Maemillan). Professor Lightfoot insists that "the Epistle to the Hebrews leaves no place for a Christian priesthood" in the sacrificial sense. He accordingly objects to *θυσιαστήριον* in Heb. xiii. 10, being understood of the Lord's table, and considers that meaning to be excluded by the context, in vv. 9, 15, 16 especially, and inferentially by a comparison with 1 Cor. ix. 13; x. 18, which, however, can have little force, except on the improbable assumption of a common authorship of both Epistles. The reference to Heb. xiii. 9 is hardly relevant; the language of vv. 15, 16 is quite consistent, to say the least, with the Eucharistic application of *θυσιαστήριον* in v. 10, indicating, as it does, what all would admit to be certain aspects of the rite. It is no doubt true that "the Christian Ministry is a priesthood of a type essentially different from the Jewish," or Heathen; and there were obvious reasons for keeping this distinction prominently in view, which would abundantly account for any "*silence*" of the N. T. or other early writers, on the recognised principle of the "economy," sanctioned expressly by our Lord Himself (Matt. vii. 6), and acted on both by Him and His apostles. But the distinction is *not* that the Christian is less really a priesthood than the Jewish, but the reverse. The Jewish priest "stood daily offering often the same [bloody and typical] sacrifices," *i.e.*, a succession of them. The Christian priest presents and pleads on earth the One true and availing Sacrifice, offered once in blood on Calvary, which Christ has entered into heaven to plead continually "in the presence of God for us." This surely explains the contrast drawn out in the Epistle to the Hebrews.]

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CORRECTIONS.

- p. 2, last line. For "*liberas*" read "*libertas*."
- p. 3, note 1. For "*Die christl. Dogmatik*, I. 19, read "*Kathol. Dogmatik*,
vol. i. p. 13.
- p. 19, note 3. For "incomprehensible" read "incomprehensible."
- p. 76, note. For "p. 77" read "p. 475."
- p. 83, line 15 from top. For "predistinction" read "predestination."
- p. 91, note 2. Insert "*ἀπολύτρωσις*" before "in Eph. i. 7."
- p. 93, line 2 from bottom. For "alike" read "alive."
- p. 145, line 13 from top. For "wholch uman" read "whole human."
- p. 204, note 2. For "he" read "the."
- p. 214, line 4 from bottom. For "Reedemer's" read "Redeemer's."
- p. 235, note. For "the word *λυτρώω*" read "the verb *λυτρώω*."
- p. 238, line 15 from top. For "that" read "but that."

INTRODUCTION.

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

It can hardly be doubted, that one of the most important theological questions of the day, on which many of our detailed controversies will be found to hinge, and into which they must ultimately be resolved, is that of developments in Christian belief. From failing to recognise this great law of revealed as of scientific truth, thousands are prejudiced against dogmatic Christianity altogether, while others hold it with but a feeble and uncertain grasp. Nor can we look with any confidence for the return to unity of separated religious bodies, while some rigidly adhere to the principle of a lifeless and unfruitful tradition, and others insist on an exclusive appeal to the bare letter of Scripture. This question will accordingly be found, if I mistake not, to lie at the root of half our religious disputes, and some understanding upon it is an indispensable preliminary for their appreciation or adjustment.

There is of course a broad line to be drawn between matters of faith, and of theological opinion, between what is put before us as a portion of the revealed deposit, and what may be reasonably, or probably, or piously believed as an inference from it. But there are also theological inferences, which come to be so clearly ascertained in the course of ages, that they are at length fixed by authoritative decisions, and accepted as part of the original revelation, which, though not explicitly contained in the words of Apostles and Evangelists, is felt to be involved in the general scope of their teaching, and to supply the right key for its harmonious interpretation.

It is natural, then, to prefix to a work occupied with tracing the history of a particular doctrine some observations on this principle of growth and development in Catholic theology, though all that can be attempted within our present limits is to sketch out roughly some main outlines of thought on the subject. And as the method of the Treatise is not controversial but historical, so will it be my aim in this Introductory Essay to speak as little controversially as the subject admits. A statement of principles cannot be made too clear, but it is never less persuasive than when thrown into a polemical shape. Most earnestly would I desire to take for my motto in all that I may say that noble maxim of Christian antiquity, which, if not verbally stated in the works of St. Augustine, has ever been held to express the mind of that great Saint and Teacher in the Church of God; *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis liberitas, in omnibus caritas.*

The development of doctrine, it can hardly be needful to observe, does *not* mean that there is a constant succession of fresh revelations in the Church to supplement or to supersede the revelations of Christmas and Pentecost.¹ Still less does it mean, as others have objected, that Christian doctrine receives, as time goes on, a series of fresh accessions, from the admixture or fusion of heterogeneous elements. Let me illustrate my meaning by an example. Supposing, as has sometimes been maintained, that the invocation of Saints had originally sprung from a gradual adoption of polytheistic practices, as the converted heathen began to multiply and dominate in the Church, instead of being the natural outgrowth of a deeper view of the Incarnation; or suppose, as others have urged, that the doctrine of the Trinity was imported from Neo-Platonism into the Gospel;—that would, in either case, be an *accretion*, but not a true development. What is meant is simply this—that the Christian revelation once, and once for all, ‘delivered to the Saints,’ through the Incarnation of the Eternal Word, and from the lips of His inspired servants, though fully apprehended from the first for all necessary ends, has grown, and was intended to grow, by degrees on the consciousness of the Church, illumined by the abiding presence of the Divine Comforter.²

¹ Kuhn therefore (*Die christl. Dogmatik* I. 19.) rightly rejects Studenmaier's statement, “dass der heilige Geist als Princip der Weisheit nicht nur das von Christus ausgehende göttliche Wort erhalte, sondern auch durch *fortgehende Inspirationen* Wahrheiten aufs Neue immer erzeuge.”

² I subjoin all the more readily the following apposite passage from the

The question may indeed be asked, though it is quite impossible to answer it, how far the Apostles themselves comprehended in its fulness and its details the revelation of which they were the organs. That they did not teach it in all its details, though they taught it sufficiently for the needs of the Church in their own day, and that not the whole even of what they did teach orally has come down to us, is certain; and that is the only point which properly concerns our present inquiry. That in the light of divine inspiration they appreciated the bearings of what they did teach far more clearly than their uninspired contemporaries, and that they knew much more than they were commissioned to impart, we can hardly doubt. But it does not follow that the whole range of revealed truth in all its future, or all its possible developments, lay open like an illuminated scroll before their gaze, nor does such a view commend itself to one as the most probable. At the same time the principle of a gradual development of doctrine in the Church is no more affected by their possessing such fulness of

Commonitorium of St. Vincent of Lerins, as his famous *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, has been frequently, but most incorrectly, quoted, in opposition to the theory of development altogether; "Nullusne ergo in Ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? *Habeatur plane et maximus.* Nam quis ille est tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectum pertinet ut in semet ipsum unaquæque res amplificetur; ad permutationem vero ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet, et multo vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiæ, ætatum et sæculorum gradibus, intelligentia, sapientia, scientia: sed in suo duntaxat genere, eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia."

knowledge, if they did possess it, than the gradual unfolding of her history is affected by St. John's inspired prevision of its course in the revelation of Patmos. It must be remembered, however, that there are traces of a gradual development even in the New Testament, and that there were some matters, as, for instance, the duration of the present dispensation, on which the inspired writers were not only left in ignorance but in error. Even Scripture has its human side. And this leads to a further and very important observation in reference to the subject of this essay.

In the process of development, as in Scripture, in sacraments, and in everything which concerns our relations with the unseen world, there must be two factors, an earthly and a Divine.¹ The human element is here supplied by the labours of theologians, the meditations of Saints, and even by the external, perhaps antagonistic, speculations of men of science, men of the world, heretics and unbelievers. Even from the Positivist we may have something to learn; when he boasts of the moral superiority of his faith to ours, and points to his conception of an universal brotherhood of mankind, as a new revelation, he is but reminding us—to our shame be it spoken—of our own forgotten lore. All these last are in truth unconsciously serving a common end, as the Gibeonites of old were ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’ to

¹ On the combination of Divine and human elements in the Church, see Möhler's *Symbolism*, Pt. I. ch. v. sect. 36.

the chosen people, whom they hated or despised. Those opposite tendencies of the Eastern and Western mind, which have made ancient Greece the mistress of speculative philosophy, and Rome the fountain of law even for modern Europe, reappear in the history of Christian theology. To the one it was given to investigate the revealed nature and attributes of God, to the other His purposes and His gifts for man. Thus, again, theology took its rise in the third century at Alexandria, the centre alike of the Neo-Platonist revival and of Gnosticism, and had something to learn from both; while afterwards, the accidental introduction, as men count accident, of Aristotle's writings into mediæval Europe by the Crusaders, in an Arabian translation, was the immediate origin of scholasticism, which, beginning with St. Anselm, shaped through four centuries the whole theology of Christendom.¹ And thus, to use the words of a high authority, "gradually, and in the course of ages, Catholic inquiry has taken certain definite shapes, and has thrown itself into the form of a science, with a method and a phraseology of its own, under the intellectual handling of great minds, such as St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas." As a matter of fact, there is probably no single case where the process of doctrinal formation has not been more or less directly

¹ The controversy of Lanfranc with Berengar on the Blessed Sacrament marks the opening of the Scholastic period. But the method of argument which Lanfranc adopted partially and under protest St. Anselm made his own. See Shirley's *Scholasticism*, and cf. *infra*. ch. IV.

promoted by the questionings of heresy. Truth is struck out from the clash of conflicting opinions, to be fixed by theological science, and finally ratified by the sentence of the Church.¹ And this brings us to the second stage in the course of development. So far many would agree with us, who will differ, when we come to the Divine or supernatural element in the process, which is supplied in the Church by the continual guidance of the Holy Ghost, and preserves her in the last resort from giving her authoritative sanction to any development not in accordance with the original revelation and the mind of God. Whether that sanction be expressed through the medium of a Council, as in the case of the *ὁμολούσιος*, or directly ascertained through the *sensus fidelium*, as with the Athanasian Creed, or by the voice of the Holy See, as with the recent definition of the Immaculate Conception, is immaterial to my present argument; nor need any question be raised here as to the proper organ of its

1 "There are those indeed who seem as though they would be glad to divest themselves of the advantage of such decisions. They would rather fall back on the unreflecting simplicity of that early faith, which rested only on the single facts of the Gospel. But this is to be ignorant, that the gradual expansion of Christian doctrines was only the growth of the religious mind as, under the moulding power of the Holy Ghost, it compared the individual truths with which it had been entrusted. *Those truths must have resolved themselves into wrong combinations if they had not been resolved into right ones.*.....Those who seek to regain it (early simplicity of faith) by throwing away what was earned by the religious impulse then given to the age, do but restore the imbecility of childhood without its innocence."—Wilberforce's *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, p. 129. This development during the early ages, as regards the formation of the Canon, is traced by Mr. Westcott in his *Bible in the Church*, (Macmillan, 1864), only he does not seem to recognise the similar operation of the 'divine instinct' of the later Church.

utterance; I am simply concerned with the result. Such, then, is a brief statement of the theory; the chief objections which have been urged against it will be noticed by and by. My present object is rather to explain than to defend it.

First, then, I observe, what is obvious, that the gradual development of Christian doctrine is analogous to the development of Christian history. The grain of mustard seed, which was to grow into a mighty tree, is emblematic alike of the revelation of Christ, and of the Church He established with His Blood. As the one was to expand from a 'hidden sect in the bosom of Judaism,' like an unborn child in its mother's womb, into a 'world-Church,' a 'world-kingdom,' co-extensive with the nations of the earth; so, too, was the original deposit of 'facts, principles, dogmatic germs, and intimations,' afterwards summarized in the Apostles' Creed, not a mere 'lifeless possession ready-made for all times to be taken care of,' but a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰὲν* destined to expand, through the toil of successive ages, and the corporate consciousness of the faithful enlightened from on high, into all the majestic fulness and coherence of Catholic theology.¹ There was to be a growth, incessant, but with no break of continuity, *continuo non vero per saltum*, alike in the Church's intellectual consciousness and her organic life. The primacy of the Roman See was recognised with growing distinctness, as the practical im-

Döllinger's *Christenthum und Kirche in der Zeit der Grundlegung*, pp. 162-164, 219-221. (*First Age of the Church*, 2 ed. pp. 158-60, 212-14.)

portance of a visible centre of unity became apparent in the clash of conflicting interests and diverse nationalities at work within the common fold; and so, too, successive theological controversies were the providential means of bringing out in detail the due 'proportion' and harmony of the faith. The fulness of truth was wrapped up in the apostolic tradition, the world-wide religion lay hid in the upper room at Jerusalem, as the results of mathematical science are involved in its axioms, or the oak is contained in the acorn.

And, next, we may trace a certain historical sequence in the evolution of doctrines running parallel to the order of the Creed. First, in the contest with Greek philosophy, the doctrine of the Trinity had to be evolved and fixed, and this mainly occupied the two first Œcumenical Councils; the four next were engaged in formulizing and guarding the faith of the Incarnation; the first definition on the Eucharist occurs in the seventh (787, A.D.) Later on, and in the West, the subjective questions of grace and free will, first mooted by St. Augustine, and their mutual relations in the justification of man (involving the doctrine of 'merit,' so strangely misunderstood afterwards) presented themselves to the mind of the Church; as also the theology of the sacraments, in their nature, number, and distinguishing characteristics. The results of her judgment on all these points found a luminous exposition in the Catechism and decrees of Trent, from which the later doctrinal symbols of the Greek Church do not

materially differ. It was in the subjective side of their theology that the strength of the Reformers chiefly lay. Luther desired to shift the verdict from the Synod, and the lecture-room, and the cloister, and to make his appeal direct to the hearts and experiences of mankind. He questioned them, not of the nature or mission of the Redeemer, but of how the sinner is made just before God. The controversies of our own day turn principally on the last division of the Creed, which deals with the Person and Offices of the Holy Ghost, and concern more especially His inspiration of Scripture, and His abiding Presence in the Church. What the Protestant movement was to the sixteenth century, that is the Rationalistic movement to our own.

I observe further, that, if the principle of development be denied, only two theories remain on which any positive scheme of Christian doctrine can be maintained; first, that laid down by Chillingworth, and accepted in name, but rejected in practice, by nearly all Protestant communities, 'The Bible, and the Bible only, the religion of Protestants.'¹ His thesis is defended in the famous passage which has passed into a classical common place of Protestant polemics, but which is founded on a radical misconception of the Catholic idea of Church authority and an absolute ignoring, or rather denial, of the whole principle of development, which indeed he elsewhere refers to as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the claims of Catholicism. It

¹ Chillingworth's *Religion of Protestants, a Safe Way of Salvation*, published in 1637.

is as follows:—"I see with my own eyes that there are *Popes against Popes*, *Councils against Councils*, some *Fathers against others*, *the same Fathers against themselves*, and consent of Fathers of one age against a consent of Fathers of another age, the Church of one age against the Church of another age. Traditive interpretations of Scripture are pretended, but there are none to be found; no tradition but only of Scripture can derive itself from the fountain, but may be plainly proved either to have been brought in, in such an age after Christ, or that in such an age it was not. In a word, there is no sufficient certainty but of *Scripture* only, for any considering man to build upon." On this I have to observe; as to "*Popes against Popes*," waiving the question of fact, their judgments when resting on their own authority alone, if maintained by some theologians to be infallible, are as strenuously denied to be so by others; it is a purely open question. Councils are held by no one to be infallible, except in matters of doctrine; and there is no case of doctrinal contradiction between Councils universally received in the Church as Œcumenical. The individual opinions of Fathers are valuable as testimony to prevalent belief, or from the character and position of the writer; but they form no part of our faith, and their contradictions to each other or themselves, do not supply even a plausible argument against the authority of Catholic tradition; neither are "*traditive interpretations of Scripture*" any part of that tradition so far as it is authoritative, though they serve to illustrate and

enforce it. The "certainty of Scripture only" is a perfectly useless criterion, unless we also know the certain *interpretation* of Scripture. *Scriptura est sensus Scripturæ*. It is enough merely to refer here to those perplexing questions about scriptural history and inspiration, hardly dreamt of in Chillingworth's day, but which have led a recent Protestant essayist to observe that "the doctrine of plenary inspiration"—on which, according to Chillingworth, the whole fabric of the Protestant faith reposes—"has broken like packthread before the rising gales of scientific discovery and historical research."¹ On the actual results of the system, when fairly carried out, I shall have something to say, in another connection, hereafter. Suffice it to remark here, that, when attempted to be reduced to practice for corporate purposes, it is obliged to *assume* at starting so much of the Catholic principle as will cover the authenticity and inspiration of the Bible, and also some particular scheme of interpretation; if either of these postulates be denied, the theory falls to the ground as a basis for any definite form of belief.² In the abstract, however, it is intelligible and coherent.

The other theory in fact, though not in words, admits the *principle* of development, but seeks to limit its operation to the early ages. According to this view, we ought to accept not only the Bible, but the Catholic creeds—*i. e.*, the Apostolic, Nicene, and

¹ *Essays on Church Policy* (Maemillan, 1868), p. 39.

² This inconsistency of Protestant systems is dwelt upon in Mackay's *Tubingen School and its Antecedents*. London, 1863.

Athanasian—together with the dogmatic decrees of the earlier Councils, and the judgment of the early Church on the Canon of Scripture, rejecting all later developments, or as they would be called ‘innovations,’ such as Purgatory or Transubstantiation. This principle is professed by the Church of England, and, with more rigid consistency, by the Greek Church,¹ and is acted upon in various degrees, though disclaimed in theory, by the principal Protestant communities of Europe. It has an advantage over the former, or purely Bible theory, in providing, up to a certain point, a definite system of belief; but it is deficient in applicability to fresh circumstances, and in internal coherence. For the question at once occurs, *Where are we to draw the line?* Theological science cannot come to a standstill, and if we are bound to accept the definitions of Nice and Chalcedon, why are we to reject the decrees of later Councils?² If the *sensus fidelium* is enough to guarantee the Athanasian dogmas, and (in the Anglican Church) the *Filioque*, why is it inadequate to guarantee the Invocation of Saints, or Purgatory? The Holy Ghost, who guided the Church during the earlier ages, cannot be supposed to have withdrawn His illuminating gifts; and, since the new

¹ Yet the term *μετουσίωσις* was adopted by the Synod of Bethlehem. Cf. *infr.* note, p. 54.

² So clearly did Jeremy Taylor perceive this, that he does not conceal his dislike to the Nicene Creed, complaining that it has been “made an ill example of, till, by explicating the old, they have inserted new articles.” He adds, consistently enough, that “no one can tell how much is necessary, and how much is not, if they once go beside the Apostolic [Apostles’] Creed.”—*Ductor Dubit*, ii. 13.

forms and varied resources of error are confined to no particular period, so neither should be the Church's capabilities for meeting them, if need be, by fresh definitions, and a fuller exhibition of that portion of revealed truth which happens to be assailed. We can understand there being no development at all—that is the 'Bible only' theory; but it is not easy to understand (if I may be allowed to borrow a political formula) development with a principle of finality. We cannot, with the Danish monarch of old, say to the rising spring tide, "Thus far shalt thou come and no farther." If the stream once began to flow, we clearly have a right to ask *where* it was dammed up, and *why*. That this difficulty is something more than a mere intellectual puzzle is shown by the fact, that both the Greek and Anglican Churches *have* had to frame new formulas since the division, and will appear further when we come to speak of the modern rationalistic school. It may suffice to suggest it here.

There have no doubt been those in other days, when history was less studied and criticism almost unknown, who have supposed, that all now taught as Catholic doctrine could be discovered, not in germ but in detail, in the writings of the early Fathers. Such a view is no longer held by any well-informed man. It is becoming daily clearer, that the real question is, not whether such and such details of doctrine are or are not developments (for the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Confession of Augsburg are no less a development than the Creed of Pius IV.), but what are the right developments. This is quite un-

derstood by Protestant divines in Germany of the more orthodox, as well as of the rationalist school, no less than by Catholic writers.¹ And it involves more than may at first sight appear ; for if the radical principle be denied, we shall find ourselves, sooner or later, compelled to surrender, not only later definitions, but almost every belief which discriminates Christianity from the higher forms of natural religion. None who value any positive belief can afford to be mere spectators, still less aggressors in the fray. *Tua res agitur cum proximus ardet* was never more surely verified than here. It is Christianity itself that is at stake.

And now, as a principle is usually best understood by illustrations, I will proceed to exemplify in some crucial cases the gradual expression of doctrine in the Church.

(1.) Let us suppose a Christian of the first, or second, or third century to have been asked, "How many sacraments are there?" He certainly would not have understood the meaning of the question. The word Sacrament was used by early writers, as the corresponding term *μυστήριον* is used in the New Testament, in a sense which includes indeed our conception of a sacrament, but which includes a great deal more besides. "This is a great mystery," or sacrament, says St. Paul, speaking of Christian marriage; but he also says, "Without doubt, great is the mystery of godliness," speaking of the Incarnation, and here again

¹ See e.g. Thomasius' work on Origen, *Ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des dritten Jahrhunderts*.

the Vulgate reads *sacramentum pietatis*. There is perhaps nothing to which the early Fathers, especially St Augustine, so frequently apply the term *sacramentum* as the Incarnation. But, if our early Christian had been made with great difficulty to comprehend the question addressed to him, he could only have replied, "I don't know." The same sacraments were of course administered from the first, and all are referred to in Scripture. Then as now Christians were baptised, confirmed, absolved, communicated; then as now, there was marriage, and ordination, and the last unction. But, just as for many ages doubtful or spurious Gospels and Epistles were handed down alongside of the genuine, and it was not till the end of the fourth century that the Canon of either Old or New Testament began to be fixed by dogmatic decree;¹ so for centuries other rites were spoken of under the common name of sacraments, some of which we should now call 'Sacramentals' while others, like the agape, or the washing of feet, have almost or altogether passed away.² It was left for a later age to mark out seven, as alone possessing by divine institution an inherent sacramental grace. Hugo of St. Victor enumerates

¹ St. Paul, St. James, and St. Jude, quote apocryphal books, some of which, as the *Revelation of Elias*, are now lost; some, as the *Book of Enoch*, still survive.

² St. Augustine calls the salt and exorcism in Baptism "sacramenta" (*De Pecc. Orig.* 40); St. Bernard, the washing of feet (*Serm. in Cæn. Dom.* § 4); Godefrid, another writer of the twelfth century, the salt, oil, water, ring and staff, used in consecrating bishops. Much useful information on the development of sacramental doctrine, may be found in Professor's Hahn's *Lehre von der Sakramenten in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung bis zum Concil von Trient*. Breslau, 1864.

six, omitting Order; Gratian gives six also, omitting Unction; Peter Lombard was the first to specify seven. But to define two is equally to develop. There were many differences on the subject among the earlier Reformers; Luther admitted three, Baptism, the Eucharist, and Penance. Cranmer, also, at one time, taught that there were three, making Confirmation the third. It would not be difficult to trace out similarly the history of the doctrine of the Eucharist, but it would occupy more space than can be spared here.¹

(2.) Let us turn to another illustration, afforded by the *cultus* of Saints and Angels. Of this no doubt abundant intimations—*φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσι*—may be found both in the Old and New Testament, especially the latter, nor are there wanting clear testimonies in writers of the third and fourth centuries of honour paid to Saints, especially martyrs, and invocations addressed to them.² Still, and this is my point, it was only by degrees that their position was adequately recognised. In every one of the liturgies of which manuscripts remain to us, among the prayers for the departed in the Canon are found special petitions for the Blessed

¹ The earlier stages of the process are exhibited with clearness and candour in the late Archdeacon Wilberforce's book on the *Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*. Its later development, in the definition of Transubstantiation (at the fourth Lateran Council in 1215), and the appointment of the festival and ceremonies of Corpus Christi, is thought to have been partly elicited as a protest against certain pantheistic leanings of the age.

² Thomassin (*De Incarn.* xi. 6) thinks the early Church probably abstained from any *cultus* of Angels through an *οικονομία*, lest it should give occasion for idolatry in converts from heathenism. But this reasoning from the *disciplina arcani* must not be pushed too far.

Virgin and the Saints. Controversialists have sometimes explained these as prayers for the increase of their 'accidental glory,' but the explanation is obviously an afterthought. The very term 'accidental glory,' and the idea it represents, came in centuries later with the scholastic theology. It is better to say at once—what is certainly the case—that the eye of the Christian worshipper was not yet adjusted to the right focus for appreciating clearly the position of the heavenly hierarchy in the economy of grace. The importance of the question, from its bearing on the central mystery of the Incarnation, was gradually brought out in subsequent controversies, especially in the Iconoclastic disputes of the eighth century.¹ It was not till the fourteenth century, that the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision by the Saints before the day of judgment was defined by authority.²

(3.) This leads me naturally to notice a somewhat kindred development, and I do so the more readily because it has been selected as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole theory—I mean the Immaculate Conception. The reasons for defining it at this particular time, and the nature of the defining authority, are separate questions, which lie beyond the limits of the present inquiry. But the doctrine itself is often objected to as neither primitive, nor scriptural, nor reasonable, nor devout; as an addition to the original de-

¹ The first objectors to images were the Phantasiasts.

² On the Invocation of Saints, I may refer with pleasure to an able, and on the whole satisfactory, essay by the Rev. H. Humble, in the third series of *The Church and the World*.

posit; sometimes as ascribing to the Mother the inalienable prerogative of her Son.¹ Waiving the last point, which is founded on a misconception of what is meant, let us see how the case really stands.² The doctrine of original sin was first distinctly laid down by St. Augustine in controversy with the Pelagians in the fourth century, whence it is obvious that Mary's exemption from the general doom could not be explicitly taught earlier than that.³ But we may go further. St. Basil, St. Cyril of Alexandria, and Origen do not scruple to affirm that she sinned by want of faith at the Crucifixion; St. Chrysostom accuses her of ambition; Tertullian of unbelief. To our ears such language sounds shocking, and it would be shocking to use it now, but we must remember that it did not appear so at the time. On the other hand, Tertullian and St. Irenæus contrast Mary's faith with Eve's incredulity, St. Justin and Irenæus her obedience with Eve's disobedience, and St. Ambrose commends her courage at the Cross. Epiphanius says

¹ Even so calm and thoughtful a writer as the Bishop of London goes out of his way, in his Preface to a work on *The Final Court of Appeal*, to speak of 'the idolatrous doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.' Yet, supposing (for argument's sake) the invocation of the Blessed Virgin is idolatrous, that practice is quite independent of the belief in her Immaculate Conception, and existed for centuries before any question on the latter subject was stirred in the Church. Neither does the belief necessarily imply the practice. Adam and Eve were certainly created 'immaculate,' yet we do not invoke them in the ritual, while we do invoke Abel and Abraham, who were not.

² The patristic references in this and the following section are taken from Petavius *De Incarn.* and *De Trin.*

³ Yet the current sneers at the doctrine as "astounding," "impossible," "incomprehensible," and the like, come mainly from those who deny or ignore original sin altogether. On a different class of objections, based on a misapprehension of the true meaning of the doctrine, see Note at end of Introduction.

that she is figuratively called, what Eve was by nature, the mother of the living; and St. Augustine that, out of reverence, he will make no mention of her when speaking of sin, but he is referring to actual, not original sin.¹ Then came the Nestorian controversy, and the Council of Ephesus. And here it is worth while to remark, that much the same *kind* of arguments which are urged now against what its opponents are fond of stigmatising as the 'new dogma' were urged by Nestorians and their allies then against the new definition of *θεοτοκός*. It was novel, it did not occur in Scripture or the writings of the Fathers,² it savoured of Eutychian heresy, and had therefore been denounced from the pulpit of his metropolitan cathedral by the second Patriarch in Christendom. It was certainly needless, and it might be dangerous. Every one knew that Christ was God, and that Mary was His Mother; but the adoption of this new-fangled formula might be taken to imply that she was the mother of His Divinity, which was blasphemous, or that the two natures were fused into one, which was heretical. The term *χριστοτοκός*, which Nestorius was willing to accept, expressed all that was required, and was free from these grave objections. So men argued then; but experience has abundantly proved the necessity of the definition of Ephesus for guarding the honour of our Lord's Divinity. And so the later definition

¹ On the contrast drawn by the Fathers between the first and second Eve, cf. Newman's *Letter on Eirenicon*, pp. 36, sqq.

² This was urged, but was not strictly true.—See Petav. *De Inc.*, v. 15. Alexander, Patriarch of Alexandria, uses the term in a letter to his namesake of Constantinople.—Theodoret, *E. H.*, I. 3.

which our own days have witnessed is designed to exhibit on the one hand the reality of original sin, and on the other the spotless sanctity of that human flesh, hypostatically united to the Godhead, which He took from His Mother's womb. It has been objected¹ that the doctrine has "no *necessary* bearing on her office in the economy of the Incarnation;" but it is, at least, premature to say that it has not, and the fact of its definition, after the mind of the Church has been exercised on the question for some eight centuries, is a strong *prima facie* ground for supposing that it has. And anyhow, natural reason and natural reverence would combine to tell us that such a belief was most congruous to the dignity of the Incarnation; but it shows the caution with which the public ratification of developments is suffered to proceed, that so many centuries should have intervened between its first suggestion and its formal definition.² "The number of those (so-called) new doctrines will not oppress us, if it takes eight centuries to promulgate even one of them."³ The disputes between Franciscans and Dominicans on the motive of the Incarnation had no doubt much to do with the ventilation of the question; for it is obvious how much more readily the Scotist theory adapts itself to the Immaculate Conception than

¹ Liddon's *Bampton Lectures*, 2nd edit., p. 433.

² It must be remembered that the belief in the Immaculate *Nativity* of the Blessed Virgin has prevailed universally for centuries, and was expressly acknowledged by St. Bonaventure, and St. Bernard, though spoken of doubtfully by St. Anselm. A similar belief obtains, though not of faith, as to St. John Baptist, and is indicated by the Feast of his Nativity being observed in the Church. Cf. Luke i. 15.

³ Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, p. 395. Longman, 1864.

the Thomist, though I am of course far from denying that the latter, which is still widely held in the Church, can be reconciled with it. St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas, in questioning the new development, simply represented the conservative element which exists and always must exist in the Church. It is natural and right that every fresh phase of opinion, as it appears, should be challenged and put on the defensive. "*Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?*" is the inquiry it must expect to be greeted with. And it is bound to justify itself at the bar of ecclesiastical public opinion and theological science, before it can make any claim to direct authoritative sanction. There is, perhaps, no subject on which the growth of doctrine has been so gradual as in all that concerns the dignity of the Blessed Virgin in the Gospel dispensation. And this accords with such passages of the Old Testament as are often considered to have a secondary reference to her. We read, on the one hand, "And so I was established in Sion, and in the holy city also I rested, and my power was in Jerusalem. And *I took root* in an honourable people, and my abiding place was in the fulness of the Saints." And again, on the other hand, "I was exalted as the cedar on Lebanon, and as the cypress tree on Mount Sion; I was exalted as a palm tree in Cades, and as a rose plant in Jericho. . . . and I stretched forth my branches as the terebinth, and my branches are of honour and of grace." And, lastly, in the Apocalyptic vision, our Lady is revealed to the gaze of the beloved disciple, "clothed with the sun, and the moon

under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars."¹ Yet it still remains true, that Gabriel's salutation is the measure and the record of her greatness. The importance of the question lies of course in its connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation, whereof she has been the guardian in the history and worship of the Church. It has no proper bearing on particular views, moral or theological (such as those so strongly reprobated in Dr. Newman's Letter on the *Eirenicon*), about her office or prerogatives in the Church. The glories of the Mother are a reflection from the divinity of her Son, and every crown that is wreathed for Mary's brow is laid at Jesus' feet.

(4.) But we must not imagine, that the principle of development applies only to the less fundamental doctrines of Christianity. It is most conspicuously illustrated in the case of those two supreme verities on which all the rest depend—the Trinity and the Incarnation. We are reminded of this, as regards the former doctrine, by two of the greatest names respectively in Anglican and in Catholic theology—Petavius the Jesuit, and Bishop Bull. The *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ* has won for its author a deservedly high reputation, and is quoted respectfully by eminent Catholic divines. But in his controversy with Petavius, though he may have the better of the argument in some detailed instances, he has certainly failed to make out his case as a whole. All impartial judges, on either side, are now agreed that Petavius is right

¹ Ecclus. xxiv. 15, 16, 17, 22. Apoc. xii. 1.

as to the heterodox language, implying often heterodox notions about the Holy Trinity, which many ante-Nicene writers use.¹ The fact that, in an elaborate treatise on the Holy Ghost, written expressly against heretics, St. Basil studiously refrains from giving Him the name of God (which was first done by the Council of Alexandria in 363) would alone indicate this. So again, Justin Martyr speaks of the Son as inferior to the Father, in His Divine Nature. Athenagoras and Theophilus of Antioch use language about His Eternal Generation, which sounds thoroughly Sabellian. Origen, who first brings out the reality of our Lord's Human Soul, teaches also its preëxistence, and the final absorption of His human nature into the Divine; Hilary and Epiphanius deny the union of His Divine Nature with His Body during the period between death and resurrection: St. Ambrose, relying on a mistaken reading of Col. ii. 15, also denies its union with the Human Soul, though both are implied in the Apostles' Creed. Many Fathers, both Greek and Latin, in arguing with the Arians, treat the unity of Persons in the Holy Trinity as specific rather than nume-

¹ Petav. *De Trin.* i, 3-5. No candid critic in the present day would deny the substantial correctness of Petavius's estimate. If he errs, it is rather in exaggerating than in depreciating the accuracy of theological statement in the early Greek Fathers, especially as regards the doctrines of grace. It is no disparagement to the general merits of the *Defensio* to say that the learned author has sometimes allowed himself to become too much of a special pleader,—a common fault of his day among theologians. A recent Anglican writer observes; "I am bound to state candidly, that, while I sympathize with the intention of Bull, I incline practically to the judgments of Petavius. It requires a thorough-going advocate to accept Bull's expurgated edition of Ante-Nicene theology." Owen's *Introd. to the Study of Dogmatic Theology*. London, 1858.

rical. Cudworth not only says this with especial, though not exclusive, reference to Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory Nyssen, Anastasius, Maximus the Martyr, and John of Damascus, but roundly accuses them of teaching a "Trinity no other than a kind of tritheism," while he charges several others with denying a co-equality of Persons.¹

To quote the words of a great living writer, who had not at the time adopted any theory of development:—"Some said that there was but one *ὑπόστασις* (substance) in the Godhead; others three *ὑποστάσεις* (substances or persons), and one *οὐσία* (substance); others spoke of more than one *οὐσία*. Some allowed, some rejected the terms *προβολή* and *ὁμοιούσιον*, according as they were guided by the prevailing heresy of the day, and their own judgment condemning the mode of meeting it. Some spoke of the Son as existing from everlasting in the Divine Mind; others implied that the Logos was everlasting, and became the Son in time. Some asserted His *ἀναρχον*, others denied it. Some, when interrogated by heretics, taught that He was begotten by the Father, *θελήσει*; other, *φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐκ βουλήσεως*; others, *οὔτε θέλοντος τοῦ πατρὸς οὔτε μὴ θέλοντος, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ ὑπὲρ βουλήν φύσει*; others spoke of a *σύνδρομος θέλησις*. Some declare that God is *ἀριθμῶ τρεῖς*; others, numerically One; while to others it might appear more philosophical to exclude the idea of number altogether, in the discussion of that Mysterious Nature,

¹ Cudworth's Intellectual System, vol. iii., ch. iv. See especially, pp. 131, 146—50.

which is beyond comparison, whether viewed as One or Three, and neither falls under nor forms any conceivable species."¹ A late Theological Professor of Cambridge, who had made the early Fathers his special study, has undertaken to illustrate the doctrine of the Athanasian Creed from their writings, mainly from the works of Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Origen, and Tertullian. But what his argument comes to is precisely what is here insisted on, that the Ante-Nicene Fathers on the whole supply a legitimate basis for the Nicene development; to use his own words "so many *elements of evidence* for a Trinitarian creed are *afloat* in patristic theology;" and again, "we must be prepared to see in them (the early Fathers) the doctrine *in the ore*, if I may so speak, encumbered with dross." He himself quotes several passages of an opposite tendency, and his explanation of them is confined to the case of Origen, while he elsewhere expressly admits that "the notions of the early Fathers about the Fall are often even contradictory."² The point I am insisting upon is *not* of course that the Nicene dogma is not a legitimate development from the teaching of earlier Fathers—which it must be if true—but simply that it *is* a development. It is no answer to the argument of Petavius to say, with one of my critics, that the "Arian scheme is inconsistent with their belief," or to speak of their "substantial orthodoxy."³ This is allowed on

¹ Newman's *Arians of Fourth Century*, p. 240.

² Blunt's *Lectures on Right Use of the Fathers*, pp. 490, 509, 585.

³ See *Guardian* for Aug. 23, 1865.

all hands. Unless the Arian scheme had been a wrong development of their belief, the Nicene creed would not have been the right one.

The importance of the point leads me to adduce the testimony of another distinguished Anglican writer, who speaks even more strongly than Dr. Blunt as to the fact of developments in the early Church. Speaking of the Christian dogma in the age of the Apologists, Mr. Merivale says that "the time was not yet ripe for its full and consistent exposition . . . the discrimination of the Persons of the Godhead was as yet unsteady and fluctuating. Christ was commonly regarded as man's champion against the devil, or his raiser from the Fall, rather than his Redeemer from sin and Reconciler with his Judge; *grace was extenuated too much* as a universal inheritance, instead of being proclaimed as the special gift of the Spirit to them that believe." He adds in reference to the Incarnation, what we shall find in a later portion of this work to be substantially correct, that "the utterances of the earlier Fathers were fewer, less distinct, less uniform and consistent. There was as yet no technical language on the subject; the age had not required it, and no one had been impelled to offer it. The Church, in its corporate capacity, had been content with its implicit belief, shadowed forth in prayers and liturgies, not embodied in dogmatic treatises." But when, in the fourth century, "circumstances led to a full and anxious appreciation of the texts bearing on Christ's divinity, the way had been prepared, the Church . . . could speak

the thoughts that were in her, imbued with the deep-felt teaching*of her immemorial traditions.”¹

It would not be difficult to add further evidence that the *ὁμοούσιος* of Nice was fully as much an epoch in the development of doctrine as the Lateran definition of the Eucharist. And we have seen that many early writers are equally vague, to say the least, on other matters besides the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, no Greek Father, before the rise of the Pelagian heresy, speaks of grace in terms that would necessarily discriminate it from aids of the natural order, and all before St. Augustine are silent or indistinct on the nature of original sin. To come to the special subject of this volume, St. Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo* is the first systematic attempt to explain the Atonement in its relation to the Divine Attributes. The question has indeed been asked whether the Ante-Nicene writers were really heterodox in their belief. If this refers to their formally and consciously holding opinions inconsistent with Catholic doctrine, the answer must of course be in the negative. But if it is intended to inquire whether they had the same clear and accurate conception of truths brought into controversy by the heresies of the fourth and fifth centuries, and finally settled by the definitions of the contemporary Councils, which subsequently became the common heritage of the faithful, it is impossible to give any general reply. The question is one of detail, and each separate case must be considered on its own merits. Nor is it im-

¹ Merivale’s *Conversion of the Northern Nations*, pp. 19, 20.

portant for our present argument to discuss it. So much, however, is obvious on the face of it, that many early writers were materially, though not formally, heterodox in their notions on points not as yet authoritatively ruled, while many more had failed to realize distinctly how much was implied in the truths they firmly believed. When floating notions, which had been loosely held, at variance with those truths were accentuated by Arius or other heretics into positive denials, those whose real *animus* was Catholic, shrunk back instinctively from results they had not foreseen, and recognised the need for developments in a right direction as the only security against developments that were wrong. While there is much that is doubtful, or more than doubtful, mixed up with the details of Ante-Nicene theology, its legitimate outcome, as a whole, is the Nicene Creed.

A distinction is, however, sometimes drawn between the earlier developments ratified at Nice and Ephesus, and the later definitions of the Lateran or Tridentine Councils, or, still more, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. We are told, that in the former case, the Church was simply explaining her previous belief, while in the latter she was adding to it, and thereby claiming not so much to be the guardian of the original deposit as the organ of a continuous revelation.¹ That

¹ For a clear and temperate statement of this line of objection, the reader may be referred to Liddon's *Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of Christ*, p. 426, sqq., 2nd edition. It is one of the very few passages one is obliged to regret in so admirable and masterly a vindication of the central verity of the Gospel.

there is some distinction in the circumstances rather than the principle, of these different developments, may be readily admitted, but it certainly is not such as to show that there is no real correspondence between them. In the first place, we must distinguish between implicit and explicit faith. From the beginning, the Church explicitly believed in and worshipped Christ as God, for without that belief there could have been no Christianity. It follows that from the beginning the *ὁμοούσιος* was implicitly believed, for it is a necessary corollary from the doctrine of His Divinity, and is seen to be such when once it is clearly apprehended. But abundant evidence has been already adduced to prove that it was not always clearly apprehended. The Nicene definition not only put an end to a great deal of doubtful or heterodox language, but served to dispel much haziness and confusion of thought, which must have ultimately led to positive misbelief on the central verity of the faith. The dogma of Transubstantiation is a strictly parallel case. From the beginning, the Church had recognised and adored in the Holy Eucharist her present God. From the beginning, therefore, she had implicitly believed in Transubstantiation, for that belief is logically involved in the Real Presence.¹ But with the doctrine of the Eucharist, as of the Trinity, the need for precise definition was first elicited by the assaults of heresy. And, whereas Arianism arose in the fourth century, there

¹ See Wiseman's *Lectures on the Eucharist*, and cf. Cobb's *Kiss of Peace*, on the necessary connection between Transubstantiation and the Real Presence.

was no dispute about the Real Presence before the ninth. When Paschasius Radbert was attacked for speaking of change of substance in the Eucharist, he replied, as the Nicene Fathers had replied to Arius, that he was only putting into words the ancient and universal belief of Christendom on that sacred mystery. And, accordingly, when Berengar two centuries later reproduced the opinions of Scotus Erigena, the general sense of the Catholic world was felt at once to be against him. He was not only answered by Laufranc, but condemned by several local Synods; and finally, in 1215, the fourth Lateran Council, in defining Transubstantiation, set its seal to the faith which had been all along implicitly held. But we need not be surprised if we come across language in earlier writers difficult or impossible to reconcile with that definition, as we often find language in Ante-Nicene writers impossible to reconcile with the ὁμοούσιος though in either case no other result from the revealed premisses is really conceivable. It was by degrees that the Consubstantiality of the Eternal Son, and the Transubstantiation of the Eucharist, passed from the region of implicit into the region of explicit faith. But the process was sooner completed in the former case, partly because heresy busied itself with the mystery of the Divine Nature long before it speculated on the Eucharist; partly because the one doctrine touched more closely than the other on the foundation of all Christian belief. The question of our Lady's Conception stands on somewhat different ground. It has no immediate

bearing on the centre of Christian faith or of Christian worship. The Church could afford to wait for a definition of it. Accordingly, for many centuries, the subject was not mooted at all, though there is no reason to suppose that the exemption of Mary from the doom of original sin may not have been implicitly or even explicitly believed by many, and the language of St. Augustine goes far to prove that at all events such a belief would not have been out of harmony with the habitual tone of men's thoughts in his own day. When at last the question was raised, there were naturally different views about it, and its final settlement no doubt adds something to the subjective belief of the Church. But it does not, therefore, add anything to the original deposit from which that belief is deduced, or imply the claim—which every Catholic theologian would absolutely repudiate in her name—to the possession on the Church's part of a fresh or continuous revelation. If it is urged that the doctrine cannot really be a portion of the revealed deposit because it has taken so long to discover it there, or because, when stated, it is not at once seen like the Nicene dogma to be a logical corollary from it, the answer is twofold. The longer and more profoundly the body of revealed truth is subjected to the devout meditation and scrutiny of the faithful, the greater fulness of meaning is likely to be deduced from it. Nor is it any proof that a given deduction is not legitimate because it does not immediately commend itself to this or that individual thinker or school. On the

other hand, it must be borne in mind that a large and increasing succession of theologians for many centuries past have professed to recognise this doctrine as contained in the revealed deposit, while none of them ever dreamed of its resting on a new revelation. To say that a doctrine was "unknown to the Church of the Apostles," is not to say that it is no part of the Apostolic deposit, unless the paradox be maintained—for such it really is—that the Apostles not only perfectly comprehended, but openly proclaimed in its minutest details the full significance of the message they were inspired to deliver to the Church. This is not the place to discuss the nature of the defining authority which ultimately fixes a development as an article of faith. Those who say with a recent Anglican writer,¹ that they would be ready to admit the Immaculate Conception if propounded like the *θεοτοκος* on the word of "the undivided Church," have in fact admitted the principle which is here contended for. Their difficulties belong to a different subject matter, and must be met, not in a treatise on development, but in a treatise on the Church.

And here it may be well to guard against a possible misconception. The growth, or even universal prevalence, of an opinion in the Church is no necessary evidence of its truth.² There are no doubt spurious

¹ See review of *Eirenicon* in *Chr. Rem.* for July, 1866.

² Still less, of course, is the Church, as such, committed to the belief in any particular miracle or miracles, however widely spread, and however strong may be the evidence. It is worth while to remark this, when even so accomplished and candid a writer as the Dean of Westminster speaks of the tradition about

as well as genuine developments, and what are sometimes called "corruptions," that is, exaggerations of true ideas.¹ There are developments based on the acceptance of spurious authorities, which are of course themselves spurious. Opinions have flourished for centuries, though without receiving any authoritative sanction, and have passed away. Such, for instance, was the once universal belief in a millennial reign of Christ on earth, founded on an expectation of His speedy return, which, for wise reasons doubtless, the Apostles were suffered to entertain. It was not till this belief had gradually died out, that room was left for the doctrine of Purgatory to occupy men's thoughts. St. Paul had spoken of the fire that should try every man's work, four centuries before the full significance of his words began to be apprehended. We have the first intimations of the doctrine, as now held, in St. Augustine's *De Doctrinâ Christianâ*, but stated only as a conjectural view. So, again, as regards the state of the lost, St. Augustine felt no scruple in consigning unchristened infants to endless torments. No theologian holds such an opinion now. In the fifteenth

Loretto as "bringing to an issue the assumption of a particular Church to direct the conscience of the world," (Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 443); and Lord Macaulay could use "a believer in the blood of St. Januarius," as a synonym for a Catholic. That miracles were to continue in the Church, and cannot therefore be *rejected wholesale* on *à priori* grounds, though no point of faith, is a direct inference from such passages of the New Testament, as Mark xvi. 17, 18, John xiv. 12, Acts ii. 17, *sqq.*, not to insist on Old Testament prophecies. Probably Dean Milman is right in saying, (*Hist of Jews*, p. xx.) "Men believe in miracles, because they are religious. I doubt their becoming religious through belief in miracles."

¹ See an article in the *Christian Remembrancer*, for Jan. 1847.

century the Council of Florence defined, that those who die in actual or only in original sin will be eternally, but *unequally*, punished. Later theology teaches, that the punishment of the latter consists solely in their not attaining to the Beatific Vision, for which they have no capabilities, and is consistent with the highest enjoyment of natural beatitude. Balmez applies the same principle to the case of adults, especially among heathen nations, who die with their moral and intellectual faculties feebly developed, and may be regarded as children in character and responsibility. The extreme predestinarian theory, into which St. Augustine was finally driven in his controversy with the Pelagians, but which he would probably have modified had he lived longer, remained for twelve centuries a floating opinion in the Church; it was not till it had been formulized into a system by Jansenius, and had become the rallying cry of a powerful theological party, that it was authoritatively condemned.¹ Another opinion which has widely prevailed among Catholics, though borrowed originally from Protestants, but which is now known to be untenable, is a belief in the verbal inspiration of Scripture, first dogmatically laid down in the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* in 1675, but previously maintained by the great body of the

¹ I am not forgetful of the controversy raised as to St. Augustine's real meaning; but there can be no doubt that the language of his *later* writings gave, to say the least, very plausible support to such views as those of Gotteschalk in the ninth century, and of the Jansenists afterwards. Sainte-Beuve, in his *History of Port Royal* (vol. ii. p. 129), quotes "one of the most eloquent of the Catholic orators of our age," as saying; "Il est vrai qu'il ne pouvait s'empêcher de croire que sur tout un ensemble de points le grand docteur, tout grand qu'il était, avait poussé à l'extrême et avait sans doute erré."

Reformed. Biblical criticism is yet in its infancy, and discoveries like that of the *Codex Sinaiticus* (now established beyond dispute) may seriously affect it. Should the controversies of our own day ultimately lead to some definition of the meaning and limits of inspiration, or the nature of future retribution—subjects on which the Church has hitherto been silent—this in its turn would open out fresh sources of speculation in other directions. Thus, even a false or imperfect development may have a relative importance, and fulfil a providential office in the evolution of divine truth. There are opinions, again, which prevail, and have prevailed for centuries in the Church, but which have been expressly excluded from a place among articles of faith. Such is the very common belief in a material fire of Purgatory, which, though frequently ranked by Protestant controversialists among Catholic doctrines, was declared, at the Council of Florence, to be matter of opinion only, and has never obtained in the East.¹

A further contrast may be drawn between development of doctrine and development of practice, though there is, of course, a close analogy between them. Here again my meaning will be best explained by illustration. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven," is the statement of a principle of which the Franciscan and Cistercian Orders were a natural and legitimate expression; yet more than a thousand years intervened between the utterance

¹ See Bellarmine *De Purg.* Lib. II. c. 11, who expressly denies, on this ground, that it is any article of faith.

of those words from the sun-crowned brow of Tabor and the time when Francis of Assisi drew up his rule of 'holy poverty,' or Bernard, in the flower and prime of youth, turned his back on all the endearments of a happy home to bury himself in the solitude of Citeaux. Or take the famous passage (Matt. xix. 12), which contains in germ the idea of celibacy as a Christian grace, and consider how gradual was its institution as a rule of life. At the close of the fourth century, Pope Siricius censured the marriage of the clergy in the Western Church; but though forbidden, it was not made invalid till the time of Gregory VII., and in many parts of Europe, especially in England and Wales, it continued to be very common. So, again, sacramental absolution was ordained by our Lord for the remission of post-baptismal sin; but the rule of annual confession was first laid down by the Lateran Council in 1215, and accordingly from that time forth we find frequent mention of 'confessors' in royal or noble households, whereas before, 'chaplains' only had been spoken of. Kneeling at elevation in the Mass, and when the Blessed Sacrament is carried to the sick, was not ordered till the close of the thirteenth century, and the procession of Corpus Christi, first instituted by Urban IV. in 1264, only came into general use after the Council of Vienne, in 1311, though the belief in the Real Presence had, of course, prevailed all along. In the early ages, again, it was customary for all the clergy to communicate at the bishop's mass; the practice of every priest saying his own mass after-

wards became universal in the West, but the doctrine of the Holy Sacrifice remains unchanged.¹ So far the analogy between doctrinal and practical developments seems complete; but there is an important distinction. A dogmatic development, once authoritatively sealed by the judgment of the Church, can never pass away, except as being merged in a higher and fuller realization of the same truth.² But practical developments are from their nature variable, though the principles they spring from are not. The religious consecration of virginity, as a state of life, is a principle implied in the words of our Lord and his inspired Apostle, but particular rules about vows of celibacy may vary with variations of time and circumstance. The adoration of Christ in the Eucharist follows immediately from the belief in His Presence, but the methods of external worship need not always be the same. Absolution

¹ When daily celebration became general is a disputed point. The language of Acts ii. 46 seems to imply that it was the custom of the Apostolic Church, but Dr. Döllinger understands the passage differently (*Christenthum*, p. 351), from there being no later evidence of such a rule for some centuries. Wilberforce (*Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*), argues the other way. Attendance at the Holy Sacrifice on Sundays and festivals was undoubtedly of universal obligation from the first.

² It is quite possible, of course, for the same theological *language* to be at one time accepted, and at another rejected by the Church, according to the sense in which it is understood, as happened with the term *ὁμοούσιος*. Thus again, St. Cyril's famous dictum, *μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, was received by the fifth General Council, and is explained and defended at length by Petavius in its orthodox acceptation, as used by the writer against Nestorius; but it was abused by the Eutychians in the service of their opposite heresy, and could not safely be adopted in public teaching now. So the formula, "One of the Trinity suffered in the flesh," was condemned by Pope Hormisdas, and accepted by his successors, but in different senses.—See Petav. *De Incarn.* v. 2, 3.

and communion are divine ordinances, but special rules about the manner and frequency of their ministration are left to the discretion of the Church. The same practices may not be equally adapted to every age and condition of society; and what the Church has solemnly sanctioned at one time, she may, with equal wisdom, alter or abrogate at another. Thus, rules about fasting have varied according to time, climate, or other circumstances. Communion in both kinds was expressly enjoined by Pope Gelasius in the fifth century, in opposition to a current heresy; it began to be discontinued in the West in the thirteenth, and the later practice has lasted on, with certain exceptions, to our own day.¹ Daily Communion was the ordinary practice of the early Church, but by 1215 the love of Christians had waxed so cold, that it was found necessary to enjoin at least an annual reception under pain of sin.² The same rule continues, but in our own day it would be thought little short of scandalous for any one professing to lead a religious life to communicate so seldom. To take a different case; the whole legislation of the Church, as regards the intercourse of Catholics with those without, was pretty well revolutionized by the Council of Constance, acting under a just appreciation of the altered conditions of

¹ In the early ages, those who communicated *at home*, as was then very common, received under the form of Bread only; infants were communicated with the chalice only, as is still the custom of the Greek Church.

² A recent writer states that "the generality of the Russians receive the Sacrament and confess once a year during the great Fast, but some go twice." Romanoff's *Sketches of the Greco-Russian Church*. (Rivington, 1868, p. 136.)

European society. These are but a few instances, selected almost at random, of the various or seemingly contrary applications of a common principle, according to the exigencies of time and place, of which Christian history is full. It has been well observed that "to transfer a form of one age unaltered into another is in most cases to be faithless to that very principle of continuity by which we claim to be children of the first century, or the fourth, or the ninth, or the thirteenth. We are the children of the men who lived then; *we cannot be the men themselves.*"¹ The mystical Bride was not only to be all glorious from within, but also "clothed in raiment of many colours," and it is no paradox to say that she is ever changing while still the same. To her we may apply the poet's words—

"Mother of form and fear,
Dread arbitress of *mutable* respect."

A still closer analogy, in some respects, may be traced between the development of doctrine and the growth of what are called special devotions in the Church, which are themselves the corollaries of doctrine.

¹ Rev. B. F. Westcott in *Contemporary Review* for July 1868. It is the converse error to make the circumstances of our own day the criterion for judging of historical personages or events. Nothing *e.g.* is commoner than to hear St. Thomas of Canterbury spoken of as having died for a trivial or positively mischievous object, which has long since been tacitly abandoned in all Catholic countries, viz., the exemption of ecclesiastics from trial for civil offences in the civil courts. As a matter of fact Becket was actually put to death for something quite different. But if the popular version of the story were correct, it would not at all follow that what is needless or inexpedient in the nineteenth century may not have been worth contending for in the eleventh. If this obvious truism were steadily kept in mind in the study of history, many of our traditional verdicts would have to be revised.

To revert to doctrinal developments; this may seem the place for saying something of the antecedent tests by which their value is ascertained, but the subject is too wide to be more than glanced at here. It is obvious, at first blush, that every true development must be in harmony with the original revelation, and the mind of God; and thus any theory, for instance, which should trench on the Incarnation, or Divinity, or mediatorial office of the Eternal Son, or, again, on the moral principles of Christianity, would be at once self-condemned. It is clear, on the other hand, that no development could be admitted, which should conflict with truths already known from other sources, as from natural reason, science, or history. God cannot contradict Himself. His word in revelation must be in perfect accord with His word written in the heart of man, or on the crust of the earth, or on the firmament of heaven. Hence no development which should exalt what are usually called the Evangelical virtues—those first introduced by Christianity—to the exclusion or disparagement of the so-called natural virtues—those which Christianity did not introduce, but most certainly adopted and sanctioned—could be a true one. There may have been periods in the history of the Church when purity, humility, and other graces of the Gospel had almost come to be regarded, in some quarters, as a substitute for candour, justice, manliness, and other virtues of the natural order; or, again, when Manichean notions as to the impurity of matter were implicitly, though not consciously, enter-

tained. But these could be no more than passing phases of opinion, and have never been absorbed into the texture of her inner life. Hence again, as we observed just now, the theory of literal inspiration, so dear to one large school of Protestants, is untenable, being disproved by facts. I will mention but one other test, which is implied in the very term development, and is expressly noticed by St. Vincent of Lerins, in the passage quoted above, viz., that it means progress from less to more; it must be an accession to our knowledge, and must enlarge, not narrow, the boundaries of religious thought. The collective mind of the Church, gazing from age to age at the orb of Divine truth, using all available appliances from without, and enlightened by the Spirit from within, grows continually in wisdom as in strength, and her path is as the shining light which increaseth continually unto perfect day.

This part of the subject may be fitly closed with the account of the limits, within which the developing authority of the Church is exercised, given by one eminently qualified to speak on the subject: "The great truths of the moral law, of natural religion, and of Apostolical faith, are both its boundary and its foundation. It must not go beyond them, and it must ever appeal to them. Both its subject-matter, and its articles in that subject-matter, are fixed..... It must ever profess to be guided by Scripture and by tradition. It must refer to the particular Apostolic truth which it is enforcing, or (what is called) defin-

ing.....The new truth which is promulgated, if it is to be called new, must be at least homogeneous, cognate, implicit, viewed relatively to the old truth. It must be what I may even have guessed, or wished, to be included in the Apostolic revelation; and at least it will be of such a character that my thoughts readily concur in it, or coalesce with it, as soon as I hear it.”¹ It is of course implied here, as the author expressly states elsewhere in reference to the Immaculate Conception, that a ‘new truth’ may not always be recognised till after ages of controversy, and may even for a time be strenuously opposed. The divine illumination vouchsafed to the Church does not supersede or anticipate the historical development of her thought.

And now, before proceeding to consider objections, let me notice, in passing, one or two practical corollaries which follow from what has been said. First, it is clear that we have no right to be hasty in rejecting new developments in theology simply because they are new. Very often, indeed, the novelty is of appearance only, and we are but welcoming ‘old friends with new faces.’ But, if not, let us remember that every fresh definition, from the *ὁμολούσιος* of Nicæa downwards, has been branded in turn with the charge of novelty. It was superfluous because it contained nothing new, or it was dangerous because it did. But wisdom is justified of all her children. There is no fear of new deductions from the revealed deposit being prematurely incorporated into the creed. Every fresh definition has been

¹ Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, pp. 392, 393.

the slow growth of centuries, and well-informed Protestants have by this time learnt to smile at the controversial sciolists who say they can put their finger on the date when this or that doctrine was invented. The Church is patient because she is eternal. She can afford to wait. Meanwhile, if we choose to be startled or scandalized at what we do not immediately comprehend, the course of theological science will not therefore stand still for us, like the sun and moon in the valley of Ajalon.

Neither, on the other hand, must we carp at scientific discoveries, which seem to trench on received opinions. In such cases it has been very common, first to say that the new theory is untrue; and then that it is dangerous to religion; and when at last it is proved to be both true and innocuous, that it is unimportant, for every one knew it before. But this is neither wise nor altogether honest. If there is a danger in offending the prejudices of the ignorant, there is also a danger of shaking the faith of the learned, when we insist on denouncing as irreligious what they perhaps know to be a demonstrated fact. *Noli æmulari*. Either our opinion was merely an opinion, and no part of revealed dogma at all, or the alleged discovery will turn out to be only a conjectural hypothesis, serviceable for the moment but destined to pass away, or the two do not really clash. In any case, the cause of truth is safe. He who made all things beautiful, handed over this material universe to the investigation of man, and the fulness of time will not suffice

for the study of His wondrous works.¹ A Catholic, firm in his belief, will have as little desire to check the free course of science, as doubt that its results will ultimately tend to the confirmation of faith. He may, indeed, complain of random assertions, hasty generalizations, of treating hypotheses as conclusions, and identifying difficulties with disproof; and no honest student of science will quarrel with him for doing so.² When we remember how it was once imagined, by friend and foe alike, that revelation itself was at stake in the discussion of the solar system, we can afford to smile at the ignorance, or the impatience, or the unbelief, which welcomes or dreads, as the case may be, in the results of geology or physiology, a probable death-blow to our Christian faith.³

I pass on to notice, in conclusion, two leading objections, one of a theoretical, the other of a practical kind, which are frequently urged against the principle of development, though, in fact, they only require to be thoroughly sifted to be conclusively disproved.

¹ "Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniatur homo opus quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem." Eccles. III., 11.

² The office of the apologist is to trace from time to time the "*Connection of Science and Revealed Religion*," as Cardinal Wiséman expresses it, not to contrast them as antagonistic systems.

³ Supposing, for instance, the Darwinian theory of the 'origin of species,' were ever to be recognised as a scientific truth (which I am very far from saying that it will be), the Catholic doctrine of the Fall would remain untouched. For after all we must draw the line somewhere; there must be a point in the series of animal developments, where man, in the language of Scripture, 'became a living *soul*,' unless the existence of the soul be denied altogether, and then would begin those relations of the human soul with God comprehended under the terms 'original justice,' and 'original sin.'

It is objected, then, often not without contemptuous acrimony, that to maintain a development of doctrine is a dishonour to revelation, and an implicit denial of the faith once delivered to the Saints; that Scripture can have no place in a religion which is one thing yesterday, another to-day, and may be a third quite different to-morrow; and that it is an accident, whether the journey lands us in the blasphemies of Strauss, or the decrees of Trent. Now, if this is anything more than a simple misconception of the whole question, sufficiently met by the passage quoted just now from the *Apologia*, it is not only untrue, but the precise reverse of the truth. Instead of development being a dishonour to revelation, so far as we are capable of forming any *à priori* judgment on the subject, it would be a great dishonour to revelation to deny it. If it is certainly a law of the human mind in relation to every other kind of truth, philosophical, moral, or scientific, that our mental no less than our bodily muscles are developed by use, it would be a *primâ facie* objection to any professed system of revealed truth, that it did not repay by a fresh accession of knowledge the labour and attention bestowed upon it. Or shall we say, that in the highest subject-matter of all the mind is forbidden to energize, or must energize with no results? While development is the law of all God's natural dispensations, are we to predicate an exceptional stagnation of the kingdom of grace? To imagine that, because the Gospel was God's last word to man, theology, as we now possess it, sprung full-

grown from the mind of the first century, like Pallas from the head of Zeus, is but to transfer to the moral what we have learnt to discard from our conceptions of the material world, a succession of miraculous cataclysms with another succession of supplementary miracles to obliterate all traces of them.

But, perhaps, our opponents will join issue on the fact. Let us therefore appeal to facts. And here I will not refer to the obviously gradual education of the Gentile world, in God's Providence, till the 'fulness of time' for the Incarnation had arrived. I will appeal to the more decisive analogy of the Old Testament dispensation. There, if anywhere, we might expect the law of development to be suspended, for the commandment, written on tables of stone, was a letter rather than a spirit, and the Jewish Church, while possessing a Divine revelation, had no infallible authority. But was it so? Most surely not. Nowhere is the 'increasing purpose' of revelation more conspicuous than throughout the Old Testament dispensation, from Patriarchs to Prophets, from Prophets to writers later still. Not to insist here on the growing tone of higher spirituality as we advance from the earlier to the later books, as is seen in the marked change from the ritualism of the Pentateuch to the more spiritual tone of the Canticles or Isaiah, I will confine myself to what is strictly doctrinal.¹ We are all familiar with the argument of Warburton's famous work on the

¹ As to the gradual development of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity both in the Old and New Testament, see Newman's *Arians*, pp. 165 *sqq.*

Divine Legation of Moses, where he undertakes to prove the inspiration of the Pentateuch from the absence of any direct teaching contained in it of a future life. No impostor, he urges, would have neglected so powerful an engine of influence as that belief supplies; certainly all, with whose history we are acquainted, have availed themselves of it. Whatever becomes of his argument, the fact is beyond dispute, though what is never directly taught is often indirectly implied. But if we turn from the Mosaic record to the Deutero-canonical books, or the Psalter, or the Prophets, the expression of spiritual truth becomes clear and significant enough. "What have I in heaven but Thee, and what beside Thee do I desire upon earth? My flesh and my heart fail; God is the strength of my heart, God is my portion for ever." Still more explicit is the assurance of Daniel that those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall wake, some to everlasting life, some to shame and everlasting contempt, and they that convert many to righteousness shall shine as stars for ever and ever. So, again, instead of the curse of sterility and blessing of longevity we read the praise of virginity and the happy lot of the man who "being perfected in a short time hath fulfilled many times," and is "taken from the midst of iniquities, lest malice should change his understanding or guile deceive his soul." Or turn from Solomon's saying that "old age is a crown of glory" to the utterance of later inspiration that "venerable old age standeth not in length of time,

nor is computed by number of years, but wisdom is the grey hair of man, and an unspotted life is old age." The Maccabean martyrs died amid cruel torments, "being mindful of the resurrection" and surely trusting that He for whose laws they suffered would raise them up in glory, for they knew that it is a good and holy thought to pray for the dead and that "the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their departure was taken for misery, and their going away from us for utter destruction, but they are in peace..... We fools accounted their life to be madness, and their end without honour. Behold how they are numbered among the children of God, and their lot is with the Saints."¹ And so completely had this doctrine of a future life become part of the national creed, that the Sadducees, who denied it, and on that account rejected all the later books of the Old Testament, were regarded, in the time of our Lord, as little better than a sect of heretics.² Nor let it be replied that, under the Old Law, the fount of inspiration never ran dry, but was sealed up in the first century of our era. For, not to dwell here on the partial inspiration which many have ascribed to such men as St. Bernard, or Savonarola, or Thomas à Kempis, we possess in the Divine illumina-

¹ Ps. lxxxii. (E. V. lxiii.) 24, 25. Dan. xii. 2, 3. Wisd. iii. 1—3, iv. 8, 9, v. 4, 5. 2 Macc. vii. 9, 29, 36, xii. 43—5.

² The author of *Ecce Homo* speaks of this (p. 37) as "the greatest revolution the human mind has ever experienced."

tion of the Church of all ages—*ἡ αἰὲ ἐκκλησία*—a surer guarantee against error than could be found in the intermittent utterances of holy men of old.¹ The same Spirit, who once ‘spoke by the Prophets,’ abides for ever in the mystical Body of Christ. Now indeed, as then, whenever some special crisis occurs, we need not doubt that a special prophet or preacher of righteousness will be raised up to meet it, from whose lips a fresh energy may be caught for the enlightenment or regeneration of them that come after. Thus, amid the collapse of ancient philosophies, and fabrics of political greatness tottering to their fall, the form of Socrates is revealed against the dark background of heathen antiquity clothed in the radiance of an ideal purity, and, as he conquers by the sacrifice of his life the right to teach a nobler wisdom than his people cared to listen to, giving dim surmise of a Higher Presence yet to come. Thus, in the deep decline of the fifteenth century, with its hideous moral depravities and terrible burden of secret unbelief, the white-robed monk of Florence stands forth, annealed in martyr-flames, to bear witness to an outraged holiness, and give warnings, little heeded, of the judgments

¹ The Hebrew Prophets discharged an office somewhat analogous to that of the *sensus fidelium* or public opinion of the Church among ourselves, standing to the Levitical priesthood in the relation of the earnest and intelligent laity to the clergy. This analogy, however, must not be pressed too far, as the ritual and prophetic offices, separated under Judaism, are united in the Christian priesthood. In another way the Prophets may be compared with the Hermits of the earlier, and Monks of a later age, as contrasted with the secular clergy.

that were coming upon the earth.¹ But it is our privilege, as contrasted with our Heathen or Israelite forefathers, that we are not mainly dependent on such exceptional interpositions raised up for an emergency, but can assimilate and utilise the intellectual acquisitions of every age as it passes, from whatever school they may be derived, knowing how to separate the dross from the genuine ore, to refuse the evil and choose the good.² If, then, all systems of ancient philosophy, so far as they had any truth in them, contained not mere arbitrary axioms, but germs to be developed in the thinking mind; if the light of divine inspiration, handed down through a long line of Patriarchs and Prophets, like the fire of a Greek torch race, kindled more and more continually towards brighter day—there were little reason and less reverence in denying, that the words of Christ and His apostles are instinct with an exuberant fulness of life, with capabilities of infinite expansion, of which our creeds and theologies are a true but inadequate expression, which the science of eighteen centuries has fed upon but has not exhausted. Who does not recognise the manifold teach-

¹ Savonarola has often been claimed as a forerunner of Luther. He has actually had a niche assigned him in the Luther monument at Worms. It may be worth while, therefore, to observe, that his writings, after a rigorous scrutiny at Rome, were pronounced entirely free from doctrinal error. St. Philip Neri had a special reverence for him.

² Certainly, therefore, "all the devout thought of Protestant Christendom" is not to be ignored, as one of my critics has strangely supposed me to imply. On the contrary, as Döllinger has observed, the greatest Catholic theologians will be the first to acknowledge their obligations to their Protestant rivals, especially in Biblical criticism. But the results can only be finally authenticated by the judgment of the Church.

ing of the Psalter, as its thunderous echoes roll from age to age along the aisles of our stately Cathedrals, and its whispered music cheers the lonely deathbed, and its tones of awful supplication call 'out of the depths' of human misery on that unwearied compassion which watches over the Christian dead? The very form of the New Testament, which contains not dogmas but principles, narratives and letters instead of creeds, is itself a confirmation of our view. Its very "half sentences, its overflowings of language, admit of development; they have a life in them which shows itself in progress."¹ What more unlike in form than De Lugo's *De Incarnatione*, and the Gospel of St. John? Yet the great Jesuit does but formulise the Apostle's belief. It took centuries to draw out the full significance of those few verses that are read in the Gospel at the end of the Mass, as it took centuries to exhibit in practice the meaning of the commission addressed to Peter, on the shore of Gennesaret, "Feed My sheep." Consider, again, all that is involved in the idea of *personality*, which, though not new in itself, must have come almost like a new revelation on St. Paul's Greek and Roman converts. The heavenly message is addressed to the Church, like the words of Christ to His blessed Mother in the temple of Jerusalem, not merely to be received with devout acquiescence, but to be laid up and pondered in the heart, to become

¹ Newman's *University Sermons*, pp. 317, 318; see also pp. 337, 338.

the source of growing knowledge, a seed springing up continually into higher forms of life.¹

The second and last objection requiring notice here proceeds from a class of thinkers deserving of deep sympathy and respect. They would say in effect that this theory, however plausible it may look on paper, is, after all, nothing but a theory; that, whatever intellectual difficulties may be started, their own system holds water practically; that the three creeds, and the great verities of Christianity, have been accepted by thousands who indignantly rejected all later 'additions;' that the Bible, whatever criticism may object to its authenticity or inspiration, has, in fact, been to thousands a rule of conduct, a guide in perplexity, an unfailing source of strength in life and solace on the bed of death. The Greek Church, it will perhaps be added, has never admitted the principle of development, but has none the less maintained intact its inheritance of orthodox belief. I have no wish to dispute the facts, but they are no real objection to my argument. The Eastern Church presents certainly the nearest existing approach to a crystallized, or undeveloped form of Christianity; and the explanation is not far to seek. Having adopted the developments of

¹ Alphonsus de Castro is quoted in Harper's *Peace through the Truth* (p. 202), as saying, "The Church daily progresses in her members, since God enlightens her daily more and more. Wherefore she is compared to the morning, *Quæ est ista quæ progreditur sicut aurora?* But the morning at its commencement has a more feeble light, which increases as time goes on. So it is with the Church. Hence I doubt not but that many matters will be more clearly and plainly discovered by those who come after us, which are utterly unknown to us at present."

the first eight centuries, and kept clear of all later Western definitions, she has been able thenceforward to maintain her *status quo* almost unchanged; but only because for the last thousand years, owing to circumstances it would take too long to specify here, she has stood aloof from the whole course of European thought, and has advanced neither in dogmatic nor moral theology, in Biblical criticism, or historical research. Once bring her into contact with the criticism, the questionings, the doubts of the day, and she will be compelled either to advance or to recede, either to sacrifice what she jealously retains, or to recognise new applications of her ancient faith. There has been too little temptation to fall into error, to suggest the necessity for harmonizing truth.¹ In England there has of course been more freedom of thought, but the strong conservative instincts of the national character have combined with the Catholic elements of written or verbal tradition retained in the national Church, and which discriminate her broadly from continental Protestantism, to sustain in the hearts of the people a large inheritance of orthodox feeling and belief. They have accepted the Bible, and have (often unconsciously) accepted with it a traditional interpretation of its meaning on many points, partly because it has never

¹ The Greeks, however, did put forth a confession of faith in 1643, in consequence of the Calvinistic tendencies of Cyril Lucar, under the title of "Orthodox Confession of Faith of the Catholic and Apostolic Eastern Church," which was confirmed by the Synod of Bethlehem in 1672. With this may be compared the English articles and formularies. The term transubstantiation (*μετουσίωσις*) was adopted by the Synod of Bethlehem.

occurred to them to question the one or the other. And we may rejoice that it has been so.

But this period of unthinking acquiescence is rapidly passing away. A School, long powerful in Germany, has, of late years, made its way into England, which, from the far more general interest felt in religious questions in this country, may be expected to exercise a ten-fold greater influence here over popular Christianity. Of its more prominent members all would wish to speak with that respect which their character, their learning, and their abilities deserve; in their generosity of tone, and in some of their detailed opinions, they excel many who profess a more orthodox belief. But there can be no doubt that their teaching, logically carried out, would disintegrate the whole received system of Christianity, however little they may contemplate such a result, or be prepared to face it. They make no secret of their absolute hostility to dogma, as a mischievous excrescence on the simpler 'faith of the Incarnation,' which, in some not very intelligible sense, they profess their desire to retain. And their line of argument can be met successfully only by a bold and ungrudging assertion of the Catholic as opposed to the rationalistic principle of development. For the champions of dogmatic Christianity to ignore it, is as though an astronomer should ignore the laws of motion, or a physiologist the circulation of the blood. The Christ of the Gospels, they would tell us, was gradually formulated, through the action of ecclesiastical dogmatism, into the Christ of later theology, till we pass from the

simplicity of the evangelical narratives to the technical subtilities of the creeds.¹ "To attribute," says the greatest writer in the well-known volume of *Essays and Reviews*, "to St. Paul or the Twelve the abstract notion of Christian truth which afterwards sprung up in the Church, is the same sort of anachronism as to attribute to them a system of philosophy." This may be true, in a sense, but when the same writer goes on to suggest that the *ὁμοούσιος* of Nice was only a less misfortune to the Church than would have been caused by an opposite decision, and we are justly bidden to observe that the traditions of the first century, without any notion of development, are an insufficient basis for the theology of the nineteenth, we are practically reminded that the same scythe which lops off the doctrinal 'innovations' of Trent is ready to include in its ruthless sweep the definitions of Nicæa, and the Athanasian Creed. There are many, again, who would shrink from the extreme opinions of Strauss, but who desire with him to detach Christian morality from its basis in Christian dogma, and, in strange oblivion of the facts of human nature and the witness of history, expect that the flowers will continue to blossom when the root is dead. Nor let the mere Protestant, who cares nothing for creeds and controversies, console himself with the fond belief that, at any rate, the cause of

¹ An able sketch of the leading characteristics of the Tübingen School (suggested by the Colenso controversy) will be found in an article by M. Edmond Schœrer, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, for March, 1863, entitled 'Confessions d'un Missionnaire.'

'Bible Christianity' is safe.¹ One of the most brilliant, if not the most profound, of living French writers, himself once a Catholic believer, has lately taught us how possible it is to accept nearly the whole framework of the Gospel narrative, while rejecting, without even the poor compliment of refutation, the Divinity of Him of whom the Gospel speaks, written though we had deemed it as with a sunbeam on every page. Another writer of the same nation, the greatest of living novelists, when describing his ideal of a Christian death-bed, makes his hero expire, gazing indeed on the crucifix, to remind him of the 'example of the Great Martyr,' but neglecting the sacraments, as neither appreciating the reality of guilt nor the need of atonement. A third has aspired to found not only a philosophy, but a religion and a Church, based on a negation of theism, and of the future life, and has found among our own countrymen some of the ablest and most ardent apostles of his dreary creed.² Positivism, indeed, bids fair, if left to itself, to become in the future both the bitterest and most formidable rival of the Christian faith; philosophical theism, which seems to bar the way, will not long serve as a break-

¹ To quote M. Guizot's words, in the Preface to his first vol. of *Meditations on the Christian Religion*, "It is, in fact, the whole Church of Christ, and not this or that Church in particular, which is at the present day the object of attack in its fundamental principles. When the supernatural world, the inspiration of the Sacred Books, and the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ are denied, the blow falls upon the shoulders of the whole body of Christians, whether Roman Catholics, Protestants, or Greeks."

² The reader may be referred to the *Essays on International Policy*, by some of the principal English adherents of this school.

water against it. It can but give us an intellectual abstraction in place of the Living God. Views similar in tendency, though differing considerably in detail from each other, have been advocated by such writers as Gregg and F. Newman among ourselves, Emerson and Theodore Parker in America.

Let it be well remembered that opinions of this kind, and I have but cursorily noted their bearing here, are steadily on the increase, that they have already gained the public ear, and meet with something more than acquiescence from the rising intellect of the day. What future may be in store for the Church, or for the world, I know not, nor do I presume to meddle with vexed interpretations of prophetic lore. There are those who deem the reign of Antichrist is at hand. Be this as it may, in one sense he is always near, and it needs no prophet's eye to discern to-day on the spiritual horizon many of the predicted signs of his coming, written so that he who runs may read. There is, indeed, much in the present condition of Christendom to suggest such an expectation. If we are to seek the characteristic temper of Antichrist, not in the wild speculations of modern Apocalyptic dreamers, but in the words of the beloved disciple who lay on the bosom of Jesus, we must recognise it in that direct or indirect dishonour of the Incarnation, that perverse determination expressed in various forms to "dissolve" the unity of Christ's natural Body on the altar and His mystical Body in the Church, of which there are so many indications

among us; we find it in "every spirit that dissolveth Jesus."¹ And if it be true that the rival hosts are marshalling now for the last great conflict, it gives to the controversies of the present a deeper and more solemn significance. I am far, of course, from forgetting how much there is in the religious temper of the day to encourage as well as to alarm us, distinguishing it most honourably from many former periods of Christian history. Our very scepticism is other than it was. We have little now of the coarse exultant blasphemy of Tom Paine and Voltaire; there is a tone of diffidence, almost of sadness, in avowedly infidel literature, and those who doubt seem loth, not eager, to disbelieve. They share the feeling expressed by our representative poet, of "an infant crying for the light." One of the keenest observers of modern society has lately remarked that, what strikes him most prominently both in its religious and secular aspects is, on the one hand, the general sense of weariness and uncertainty, and on the other the grandeur and unexampled complexity of the problems which are pressing for solution.² At the same time, a conscious or unconscious yearning for unity is gaining ground among those estranged by centuries of strife, and there is a growing conviction that the unprofitable bitterness of mere negative controversy is treason

¹ The Vulgate, following the Vat. MS., reads in 1 John iv. 3, "omnis spiritus qui solvit Jesum," and thus the third verse supplies a further illustration of the statement in the second, instead of being merely a repetition of it.

² Preface to third series of Guizot's *Meditations*.

against the majesty of truth.¹ Ours is an age of uncertain and conflicting tendencies, powerful alike for good or for evil, suggesting the gravest anxieties, yet brightened with the dawning promise of a second spring. One thing, at any rate, is clear enough—that we are on the eve of a crisis, such as for the last three centuries the Church has not witnessed. The Reformation was but the first act of a drama which has yet to be played out; and it may be expected that our own age will see questions stirred more searching even than any that were mooted then. *Nullum tempus occurrit Ecclesiæ*. But it is of the last importance that, at this supreme crisis of her history, her children should be closely united, and well equipped to meet the coming foe, not with the blunted or misshapen implements of a ruder warfare and a coarser age, but with weapons forged and polished fresh in the armoury of wisdom, of justice, and of truth. Once, in the iconoclastic controversy, Christian art and civilization sued for admission before the portals of the Eastern Church, and were rejected; and she sank for awhile into a sterile petrification of her former self. John of Damascus, in the eighth century, was her last theologian. The Renaissance stood before the gates of

¹ The existence of a 'deep and all-possessing desire for unity' is insisted on with startling emphasis in Mr. Maurice's 'Few Words on the Pope's Encyclical' in *Macmillan's Magazine* for Feb. 1865. See also Mr. Westcott's paper on Positivism in the *Contemp. Rev.* (July, 1868), already referred to, both on this point and on the principle of development, as inherent in the nature of Christianity.

Rome, and was admitted. The Reformation rent half Europe from her obedience, and resulted in the decrees of Trent. Science, philosophy, and criticism are knocking at our doors to-day. We must accept or reject them, and to reject their aid is to hand them over to the service of error. Now, as ever, the Church must go forth to conquer in the might of that Gospel which she, and she alone, is divinely commissioned to proclaim; but now too, as ever, like a good householder, she must bring forth from her treasures things old *and new*.

At such a time the desire, which can never be far from the heart of an earnest believer, for the perfect fulfilment of the Redeemer's dying prayer is brought home to one with a peculiar urgency. To adopt the eloquent words of a great living prelate, we gaze on the face of Europe miserably divided by three centuries of theological strife into the hostile camps of her Catholic and her Protestant peoples. Yet the laws, the institutions, the habits of all alike, and the whole framework of their civil and social life, bear abiding witness to the Christianity they still profess in common; they are still alike ennobled by the indelible character of baptism imprinted on their brow.¹ Would, indeed, that all who name the Name of Christ in sincerity might be once more united in prospect of a common danger round the altars of a common faith! For this blessed consummation the loftiest intellects and the saintliest souls are yearning with a passionate

¹ *Pastoral of the Archbp. of Paris.* Lent, 1868.

desire both within and without the limits of Catholic Communion. "At the bare thought of this vision of peace," it has been touchingly said "the pulse quickens and the eyes fill with tears." I have spoken elsewhere at length on the subject, and it must suffice only to refer to it here.¹ But none who honestly believe that the highest interests of the human race are bound up with the revelation of God, Incarnate and Crucified, can watch the course of events, or the tendencies both of religious and irreligious thought, without feeling a profound conviction, deepened by every year's fresh experience, of the supreme importance of visible union among Christians. For lack of it the action of dogmatic truth on the world is paralyzed, missionary energy is sorely crippled, there is weakness within, restlessness and uncertainty without the fold, and the moral condition of Christian countries and Christian capitals finds its parallel in the Rome of the later Empire and the cities which sank under the avenging flood of fire. Meanwhile, intellectual energies are frittered away on the barren labours of a controversial warfare between those who should be brethren, which under happier auspices might be combined in the common task of eliciting and exhibiting, in all its majestic harmony, the fulness of wisdom and of knowledge wrapped up in the living oracles of God.

Truth, indeed, like Him whose voice she is, is one and indivisible, and knows, "in her deep self," nothing

¹ See *Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon Considered in Relation to Catholic Unity*. Longmans.

“of transient form.” Yet the shadow varies, though the substance cannot change; the earthly reflection grows from age to age, but the Word of the Lord “endureth for ever in heaven.” The whole revelation of God, all spiritual truth that has been or shall be known on earth from the beginning to the day of doom, was latent from the first in the Church’s spiritual consciousness, but it existed there as the universe, visible or invisible, existed before creation—an unbreathed music, an unspoken poetry, deep within the Heart of God. One by one, in their fulness and their detail, its manifold glories were to dawn on her inner apprehension, and become part of her organic life, as the stars are painted one by one on the darkening azure of the sunset sky. There can be no stint to her growing knowledge, no stay in the kindling path of her divine illumination, till the fires of Pentecost are quenched in the brightness of the everlasting sunshine. It may be said that all the articles of the creed are summed up in its opening clause, *Credo in unum Deum*, as all musical tones are summed up in the seven notes of the scale. His omnipotence is the origin of creation; the Incarnation, the Passion and the Eucharist are the expression of His boundless love; justification is the work of His wisdom; His mercy is the measure of our endless beatitude; His justice is revealed in the fiery chastisement of sin. And so it would scarcely be too much to say, that the whole circle of revealed truths is wrapped up in the very letter of the Scriptural record, but then that record

(if I may be pardoned a homely simile) is like the handkerchief written over with sympathetic ink, which must be held to the fire for the characters to come out to view; or as the faculties nascent in the human mind, which require to be elicited by influence from without, and fixed by mental analysis; or rather, let me say, it is like the dry bones in the valley of the Prophet's vision, which await the breath of that Spirit who inhabits and illuminates the Church, to quicken the dull clay with power from on high, and make it a living soul.

NOTE TO INTRODUCTION.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.

It is a very common, but very ignorant, objection to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, that it places the Blessed Virgin beyond the need of redemption; and I have even known of sermons being preached against it on the text, "My spirit hath rejoiced in God my *Saviour*." Those who so argue can never have read the decree of Dec. 8, 1854, which expressly affirms, "that the most Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception, by a singular privilege and grace of God, *in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ the Saviour of the human race*, was preserved exempt from all stain of original sin."¹ Nor is it more to the purpose to object, as is also frequently done, that her conception was not, like that of our Divine Lord, *miraculous*. An Oxford writer, of deserved theological reputation, seems almost to think it a sufficient disproof of the doctrine to quote some words from a sermon of St. Leo's, to the effect that Christ alone was born innocent, because His birth alone was not through the ordinary laws of generation.² But that is not the point. Without entering here on the vexed question of the manner of its transmission, it is obvious that original sin affects directly the soul, not the body. And the soul is created immediately by God, though its creation is dependent on certain physical antecedents. The body of the Blessed Virgin (as in all probability our Lord's also) was subject to the conditions of infirmity introduced by the Fall.³ But we hold that her soul was, by a singular grace vouchsafed for the merits of her Son, perfectly sanctified at the moment of its creation, as ours are in the sacrament of baptism.⁴ It is, further, a pious and universal belief (though not matter of faith)

¹ Bishop Ullathorne's *Immaculate Conception*, p. 198. Richardson 1855.

² Bright's *Sermons of St. Leo with Notes*. Note I. Masters.

³ See Note to ch. I. Her death therefore is no argument against her sinlessness, as is urged by the clever but very one-sided author of *Quelques Mots sur les Communions Occidentales*, p. 84. Leipzig, 1855. Cf. *Encore Quelques Mots*, p. 29. Leipzig, 1858.

⁴ Cf. Ullathorne, ut *supr.* pp. 58—60. Ffoulkes' *Christendom's Divisions*, vol. I. p. 105.

dating at latest from the time of St. Augustine, that she was preserved through life by a special grace from all defilement of actual sin. To call such a belief derogatory to the grace of God, or the merits of our Redeemer, is unmeaning. Rather it commends itself to the instinctive feelings of a religious mind. And accordingly we find the great English poet of the last generation exclaiming:—

“Mother, whose virgin bosom was uncroft
By slightest shade of thought to sin allied,
Woman above all women glorified,
Our tainted nature's solitary boast.”¹

It is of course true, as Mr. Bright observes, that St. Leo “knew nothing of the Immaculate Conception,” as it is true, in the same sense, that a host of early Greek fathers knew nothing of the doctrine of original sin. But it is a confusion of thought to suppose that he intended to *contradict* an opinion not brought into debate in his day. There were later writers, as St. Bernard, who did oppose it, partly from misapprehension of its precise meaning, partly on grounds proved, after being sifted through some eight centuries, to be inadequate. Arguments of this kind are two-edged swords. Those at least who defend the present form of the Nicene Creed (and there are very few Anglican divines who decline to do so) may be expected to remember for how many centuries the definition *Filioque* was unknown, and what high authorities have rejected it.

I have had occasion more than once in the course of this volume to point out, that the Scotist view of the Incarnation, which naturally allies itself with the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, is most accordant with the general *spirit* of patristic teaching, though not expressly maintained by any early writer. The whole doctrinal question is elaborately discussed in Passaglia's *De Immaculato Deiparæ semper Virginis Conceptu Commentarius*, 3 vols. folio; and is exhibited in a more concise and popular form, but with great lucidity of statement, in the Bishop of Birmingham's book already referred to.

¹ Wordsworth's *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*. A distinguished Anglican divine very justly observes, that “to imagine that even for one moment the Blessed Virgin, by a wilful sin, was hateful to her Son, or that by a deliberate evil wish she took the part of Satan against her Son, and conspired to dethrone him (both which notions are bound up in the idea of sin), is a thought revolting to the pious instinct.” Bp. Forbes' *Explanation of the Articles*, vol. I. p. 224.

THE ATONEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SUBJECT, AND THE METHOD OF TREATING IT.

THAT Jesus died, the Just for the unjust, to redeem mankind from the bondage of corruption, and restore the broken communion between earth and heaven, is, and ever has been, a fundamental verity of the Christian faith. From that uplifted cross, for eighteen centuries, He has been drawing all men by the 'cords of Adam' to Himself. Round the altars where that one true Sacrifice, offered once in blood on Calvary, is presented perpetually in a bloodless mystery, from the rising to the setting of the sun, has been gathered through those eighteen centuries of her chequered history the faith, the penitence, the devotion of the Church He purchased by that greatest pledge of love.

Yet, even as then among the spectators of the crucifixion there were some who worshipped and some who doubted, and its stillness was broken by the questionings, or the jests, or the mockeries of those for whose

sake it was endured, so it has been till now. And doubts have multiplied tenfold since the first controversies of the Reformation period involved the whole subject in the confusions of a theological warfare, where men darken counsel with many words, and strive rather for a party triumph than for simple truth. Forgetting or greatly underrating, for the most part, the significance of the Incarnation as the centre-point of all Christian belief, the first leaders of the movement in the sixteenth century dragged forward into disproportionate prominence, and often in connection with an erroneous theory of 'imputation,' one side and one only of that Divine mystery, namely, the doctrine of the Atonement. And hence there has grown up in many quarters a way of looking at the doctrine, and speaking of it, full of difficulties to the devout believer, and offering abundant opportunities for the cavils of the sceptic. In our own country this has been partly due to the theological influence of *Paradise Lost*, which had become for a large number of Englishmen a kind of supplementary Bible. The Arian opinions of Milton on our Lord's Person, have strengthened the hold obtained over the national mind by what is in fact an Arianizing conception of His work.¹ It has been so represented as to cloud

¹ See Preface to Benson's *Sermons on Redemption*, from which I quote the following apposite passage:—"The act of redemption is not the mere act of the love of the redeeming Person, but *the manifestation of the love of the Triune God*. God the Son came upon earth to satisfy His own justice, as much as to satisfy His Father's, and for the accomplishment of His Father's love to man, as much as for His own. If this truth is often lost sight of, it is *because the consubstantial Godhead of the Father and the Redeemer is ignored.*"

our most primary conceptions of the attributes of God; and to imply, or seem to imply, a division of will between the Persons of the undivided Trinity, in whom being and will are one. And so men have come to complain that they cannot believe in a justice which strikes the innocent, while it spares the criminal; that they cannot understand a love which waits to forgive till it has exacted rigorous compensation; or recognise the holiness of that displeasure against sin which is content to exhale in displeasure against the Sinless One. Such objections may often be urged in a tone of mockery, or disbelief; but it is not always so. It will not then, I trust, be an unprofitable task to show that the doctrine of atonement held and taught from the beginning in the Catholic Church is open to no such criticism. An investigation of her teaching, as laid down by the Fathers and later theologians who are the accredited interpreters of her mind, will prove that the opinions fairly open to objection are no part of it, but are either those of particular writers or schools only; or such as have prevailed for a season and then passed away, like the notion of a ransom paid to the Evil One; or were put forward from the first with an heretical animus, and have never found a home within her pale; or are the doctrines of those who have formally renounced her creed. Meanwhile, it will not be out of place to premise some explanations, at starting, in reference to certain leading misconceptions on the subject.

First, then, let me repeat distinctly what has already

been implied, that no division of mind or will is even conceivable between the First and Second Person of the holy and undivided Trinity. The Atonement was not, if one may put such blasphemy into articulate words, a device of the Son to avert the wrath or appease the justice of His offended Father, as when He is said in a well-known hymn to have "smoothed the angry Father's face." Sin is equally displeasing to the Father and the Son, and to the Father as much as to the Son belongs the love which by the mystery of redemption "devised a way to bring His banished home." The Father *sent* the Son in likeness of sinful flesh, and by the Eternal Spirit was He conceived in Mary's womb, and offered on the Cross. The atonement is the work of the whole Trinity, and the sacrifice of the Cross, like the sacrifice of the Altar, is offered to the whole Trinity. To conceive of the Father being angry with His sinless Son, and inflicting on Him the punishment He would else have inflicted on us, is to forget that "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet They are not Three Gods but One God." The justice which required satisfaction and the mercy which provided it, are the justice and the mercy of the Triune God. In the language of St. Leo, which will be quoted again further on, "One is the kindness of Their mercy as the sentence of Their justice, nor is there any division in action where there is no diversity of will." It is only necessary to insist upon this, because it is so frequently forgotten.

In the next place, it must be always borne in mind that in speaking of the avenging justice, or the wrath of God, we mean by such language, which is necessarily more or less metaphorical, simply to express His holiness, in relation to sin. Righteousness is the best equivalent in our language for the theological term *justitia*, which has a far wider scope than is ascribed in ordinary usage to the English word justice, or giving everyone his due, though it of course includes it.¹ It is not that we have done an injury to God for which He requires a *quid pro quo*, as in a case of injustice between man and man, or that He was angry as though we had defrauded him, and required to be appeased; it is no such unworthy and anthropomorphic conception as this that we mean, when we speak of a satisfaction to His justice, or a sacrifice to appease His wrath. It is the perfect holiness of God, which is one with Himself, that is outraged by sin, and then becomes what is frequently called in Scripture His indignation or anger, and expresses itself in the righteous chastisement of the sinner. It is that holiness which is satisfied by the spotless sacrifice of His Son; not, as St. Bernard says, by His death, but His will in voluntarily dying. In His perfect life, enduring meekly the contradiction of sinners, while He

¹ 'Justice,' in its narrower sense, as applied to the Incarnation, is generally used by the Fathers in reference to Satan. Thus e.g. St. Augustine says, "Non autem diabolus potentia Dei, sed *justitia* superandus fuit." (*De Trin.* xiii. 13.) On the other hand he says, soon afterwards, "Quid enim *justius* quam usque ad mortem Crucis pro *justitia* perseverare?" (*ib.* c. 14.) where obviously "what greater evidence of righteousness or holiness?" is meant.

sternly rebuked their sin, He manifested the name of God to the world by revealing God's estimate of evil. In His bitter sorrow for the transgressions of mankind, His brethren after the flesh, He offered to God an act of perfect contrition, which He alone could offer, for the sins of those who slew Him, but whose nature He had made His own, as though He were Himself the criminal, not the victim.¹ That act was consummated on the Cross. We need not doubt that He might, had He so willed, have pardoned us on our repentance, without any sacrifice at all; nay, the sacrifice offered was itself the provision of His mercy. But He preferred a method of reconciliation which exhibited alike His holiness and His love. We had fallen away, not by any arbitrary external accident, but by a moral perversion of our will; and He therefore chose to redeem us through a moral act, through the perfect oblation of a will obedient to His own. It was a consequence of the Fall, and it is so still, that obedience could only be exercised through suffering; that the right to benefit mankind could only be purchased through enduring their persecution:² and Jesus submitted for our sakes to that law which was the fruit of our sin, and which, while He has not repealed it, for all who love Him He has turned from a curse into

¹ Cf. Newman's *Disc. to Mixed Congregations*, p. 359. "His agony takes the form of guilt and compunction. *He is doing penance, He is making confession, He is exercising contrition* with a reality and a virtue infinitely greater than that of all saints and penitents together, for He is the one Victim for us all, the sole Satisfaction, *the real Penitent, all but the real Sinner.*"

² 1 Tim. iii. 12.

a blessing. As, in this life, others suffer for our sins, so also do they benefit by our suffering for righteousness' sake.¹ It would be superfluous to illustrate this in detail from the familiar history of the Jewish, or the Christian Church. We know full well how the shadow of His Cross has more or less deeply fallen on all who prefigured Him under the Old Law, on all who have been preëminent as His followers under the New; making them, after their measure and degree, partakers of His sufferings. That was no unmeaning record inscribed on the luminous cross which converted the first Christian emperor to the obedience of faith: *In hoc signo vinces*. It sums up in four short words the work of the Redeemer, and the mission of His earthly Church. On that I need not dwell.

It is more to the purpose to observe, that, even without the limits of His visible kingdom, the same principle had been perceived and exemplified. The well-known passage in Plato's *Republic*, which sounds almost like an echo of inspired prophecy in its thrilling description of the perfectly righteous man, whom, notwithstanding his righteousness, his fellows will scourge and crucify, is in fact but a summary of the whole experience of mankind.² Of the two most religious heathen of whom history tells us, it is re-

¹ "It is a truth, always new from its strangeness, that the prophet must be a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; despised and rejected of men; that the consoler must be one who feels all that is human keenly, but who is unfelt for himself by men." *Life and Letters of F. W. Robertson*, vol. i., p. 104. This aspect of the Passion is strikingly brought out in Robertson's sermon on Vicarious Sacrifice.—*Sermons*, vol. i., Sermon ix.

² Plat. *Rep.* ii. 362; cf. Isaiah liii.

markable that one was a persecutor and the other a martyr. Socrates died, because he would not purchase safety at the price of his convictions of truth; and his words before his judges, "I must obey God rather than you," are the key-note of his character and his life. Marcus Aurelius, who, if he had been a Christian, would surely have been a Saint, was born into a corrupted atmosphere, and brought himself to believe it a duty to the Empire to persecute the Church. But, if his position exempted him from suffering at the hands of others, his *Meditations* contain abundant evidence of inward struggles, and leave us no room to doubt that he would more willingly have borne, had it been his lot, that oppression which he unwillingly consented to inflict. To die for mankind, like Prometheus, who so strangely combines the characters of a rebel and a redeemer, the Miltonic ideal of *Paradise Lost* and *Regained*; or for one's country, like the popular heroes of Roman and Athenian legend; or for the sacred duties of kinship, like Antigone; or for one's friend, like Nisus for the young Euryalus in the *Æneid*, was the highest ideal of Pagan virtue.¹ And it foreshadowed, however imperfectly, a higher truth. It was, far more than the usage of animal sacrifice, so often quoted, the genuine though unconscious witness of the natural conscience, that "without shedding of blood there is no remission." For sacrifice, apart from

¹ Origen (*Contra Celsum*) uses this analogy. Whether the usage of animal sacrifice was originally derived from revelation or from natural instinct, is a further question, not touched upon here.

direct revelation, was little more at best than the rude expression of a want dimly felt. It told, indeed, of sin, but it might mean, like the ring of Polycrates, that too much happiness is not safe for man; or it might be the mere unreasoning fear of a superior power, or the perplexed sense of obligation to a law imperfectly fulfilled; or it might be degraded to the horrible conception of human sacrifice, as an offering acceptable to the Deity. It scarcely touches the *moral* element in the death of Christ. *Oblatus est quia Ipse voluit*; "He was *obedient* even unto death." Yet in this lies the very essence of the atoning Sacrifice. Thus, in what may be regarded as a classical passage, we read, "Lo I am come to fulfil Thy will, O God . . . by which will we have been sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ." And our Lord sums up his redemptive work in the great Eucharistic prayer, saying, "I have glorified Thee on the earth, I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do."¹ And, accordingly, the Fathers regard even the Jewish ritual of bloody sacrifice chiefly as a temporary concession to human infirmity, ordained through Moses, to withdraw the people from the service of devils; depreciated by the Prophets, to remind them of its intrinsic worthlessness. The mystic offering of Melchisedeck is, in patristic theology, the great type of the sacrifice of Christ.

¹ Heb. x., 9, 10; John xvii., 4. There are some very thoughtful observations on this point, especially in reference to the "expiatory confession of our sins" by Christ, in the sixth chapter of Campbell's *Nature of the Atonement*.

It will not of course be imagined for a moment, that I suggest these illustrations as more than illustrations, or as in any sense adequate parallels of that which they nevertheless serve to adumbrate. So much at least they may prove in reply to objections, that there is no *prima facie* incongruity in the doctrine of redemption, from its having to be wrought out by the Redeemer's death. Christianity has not contradicted but endorsed the presentiments of natural religion, when it teaches by the acts, even more than by the words, of its Founder, that self-sacrifice for the good of others is the measure of our perfection, our highest law of life. "Pain," it has been truly said, "is the deepest thing we have in our nature, and union through pain has always seemed more holy and more real than any other." By those 'cords' of the first Adam the second bound us to Himself. Even those who believe Him not have owned their power;¹ how much more those who love Him! Would such a life as that of Eugénie de Guérin, to take no extreme case, be conceivable without the Passion?

It is further evident that if our redemption was to be not simply conceded, but purchased by sacrifice, it could not be won by any of the redeemed themselves. Prophets and just men under the Old Law did and suffered much, to bear testimony to the truth; but

¹ Thus Renan (*Vie de Jésus*, p. 77): "His religion will for ever grow young again. His sufferings will soften the best hearts; all ages will proclaim that among the sons of men there has not been born a greater than Jesus." Similar expressions abound in the book.

their obedience, like their testimony, was imperfect. They were lifted up from the earth, but they did not draw all men to themselves. He alone could offer to the Creator a perfect oblation of the human will, to whom holiness belonged of inherent right. He alone, as Man, could make an act of perfect contrition, who knew, as God, the fulness of the Eternal Love, and saw, as God sees it, the reality of the contradiction to that love involved in human sin. If, again, men were to be delivered from their 'vain conversation,' from that thralldom of sense by which the corruptible body presses down the incorruptible spirit, not merely by external teaching or threats of future judgment, but by the living witness of a nature identical with their own, yet with every motion of flesh or spirit brought into subjection to a higher law, then He alone could deliver them who was perfect Man, yet 'did no sin.' And if the very method of deliverance was to be a measure of the ultimate consequence and tendencies, because a measure of the true character of sin, of the real and living energy of that evil principle from which men required to be set free, then He could only deliver them through submitting to their injustice, through bearing in His own Body that death which was itself the fruit of the creature's apostasy from his Maker, while its infliction on the Sinless One was the culminating act and typical expression of the collective sins of mankind.¹ It is no answer to this to say,

¹ "As our Lord alone truly tasted death, so to Him alone had death its perfect meaning as the wages of sin, for in Him alone was there full entrance

that we might have been delivered without any sacrifice at all. I have already admitted that, so far as we know, it is so; what I am urging now is that, if there was to be a sacrifice, we can conceive but one, because one alone is perfect. And it is in this sense, as we shall see, that those Fathers are to be understood who speak of the sacrifice of Christ being *necessary*. They always imply, what most of them expressly state, as do also the great majority of Scholastic writers, that God might have delivered us by some other means; but they affirm that no other sacrifice could be adequate.¹ St. Anselm was the first to lay down a law of absolute necessity, and he does so on the professed ground, usually held to be untenable, that it was the most fitting means of effecting our reconciliation, and therefore God was bound to adopt it.

And here it may be well to repeat more distinctly, what was implied just now, that the atonement of Christ, even in its fullest sense, and still more in the narrower sense of satisfaction,² is part, and part only,

into the mind of God towards sin, and perfect unity with that mind . . . the tasting of death in full realisation of what it is, that God who gave life should recall it, holding it forfeited, was only possible to perfect holiness."—Campbell's *Nature of the Atonement*, p. 302.

¹ Petav. *De Incarn.* ii. 13. In the words of a modern Catholic theologian, "It was no *necessity* which drove God to the redemption of the world by the Precious Blood. He might have redeemed it in unnumbered other ways. There is no limit to His power, no exhaustion to His wisdom.....The shedding of His Blood was part of the freedom of His love. It was, in some mysterious reality, the way of redemption most worthy of His blessed majesty, and also the way most likely to provoke the love of men."—Faber's *Precious Blood* (Richardson, 1860), pp. 27, 28.

² The word "atonement" is often popularly used as synonymous with satisfaction. In its broader and more primary sense, as the at-one-ment, it is of

of the great work wrought out through the 'sacrament,' or as the Greek Fathers are wont to call it, 'economy' of the Incarnation. "The Word was made Flesh." That is the mystery which is the life and light of the Church, the centre of her worship and kernel of her creed; the mystery which angels desire to look into, and which sinners are permitted to adore in the abiding miracle of the Eucharist. Theologians usually make a threefold division of the causes or motives of the Incarnation.¹ As one motive they assign the glory of God, in the manifestation of His attributes of power, sanctity, wisdom and goodness, which broke forth in the Person of Jesus through their veil of flesh. A second motive is the benefit of man, and that in three ways; by redemption and sanctification, by teaching, and by example. A third motive is the triumph over Satan. It will be observed, that both the first motives would have held good, under certain modifications, if men had never sinned. And accordingly one great school of theologians in the Church, whose theory receives a fresh sanction from the recent definition of the Immaculate Conception, and is also the most natural inference from the spirit if not the letter of patristic teaching, hold that if there had been no Fall, the Second Person of the Trinity would yet have taken our nature upon

course co-extensive with the whole work of redemption, which includes not merely what was due to the Divine Majesty, but what is needed to make us the children of God, *θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως*. It might even, under this latter aspect, have a meaning independent of the need for redemption.

¹ *Petav. De Inc.* ii. 5.

Him, and become our Brother. He would have come, of course, other than he actually came. He would not have taken a passible body; He would not have come to die.¹ But He would have been, as now, our Teacher, our Pattern, our Mediator, the Second Adam, and Source of Grace; we should still have seen mirrored in His perfect Humanity the mind of God.² And thus, while the Incarnation formed part of the Divine purpose from the beginning, and the predestined Manhood of the Eternal Son was the archetype and model on which ours was formed, the Passion, so to say, was an afterthought, added because of transgressions; it was not the original motive of the decree, but affected the manner of its fulfilment.

As this question will frequently come before us in the following pages, and is moreover one that cannot but affect materially our view of the Atonement, or rather of the Christian dispensation altogether, it will not be out of place to say a few words on its origin and significance here. Though what is called the Scotist view of the Incarnation was first formally stated as its name imports, by Duns Scotus in the thirteenth century, it harmonises better with the general tone of earlier teaching than the opposite or Thomist view. This will appear more fully in the

¹ "Passible" has been substituted for "corruptible" (in the former edition) not to express any change of view, but to avoid implying by an *obiter dictum* an opinion on a controverted point which has been called in question. See Note at the end of the Chapter.

² On the Mediation of Christ, as necessarily involved in the very fact of the Incarnation, see Wilberforce's *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, ch. vii.

sequel, when we come to examine the treatment of the Atonement by the Fathers and to contrast it with the systems of the Reformation. But the question in its technical shape was not one likely to be raised in their age. It is sometimes, indeed, spoken of as a mere scholastic subtlety which can have little interest for us, or at best as a legitimate subject for devout speculation which can have no real influence on our belief. I cannot so regard it. Certainly the Scotist theory is no point of faith, and probably never will be. Its acceptance or rejection depends mainly in individual minds on an original difference of *ἦθος*. But on the view taken of it, hinges to a great extent our whole way of regarding the Redeemer's life and work. It colours insensibly, perhaps, but not less truly, the habitual temper of our devotion and belief. And it is remarkable that we find some of the most thoughtful among Protestant writers both in England and Germany again recurring to what the Reformers repudiated, so far as they knew of it, as a scholastic corruption of the Gospel. Some examples from the works of Lutheran divines will be given further on in the volume.¹ The late Mr. Robertson has very happily expressed the leading idea of the Scotist view when he says, "God's idea of Humanity is, *and ever was*, Humanity as it is in Jesus Christ."² The same conception seems to lie at the root of much that would otherwise be scarcely intelligible in the theological

¹ See Note I. at end of ch. vi.

² Life and Letters, vol. II., p. 121.

speculations of another well known writer of the day.¹ Nor need this fact surprise us. The Scotist view, while it clears up some difficulties about the Atonement which harass thoughtful minds, opens out to us both a wider and a deeper appreciation of the love of God to man, by representing our personal nearness to Him, and participation of His nature, as included in the eternal purpose of creation, not as a consequence of the Fall.

It may, indeed, be said that to speak of the motive of the Incarnation as antecedent to the prevision of sin is a perversion of language, for with the Divine Mind there is neither past, present, nor future. No doubt such language is an accommodation to the exigencies of human thought, but this is no peculiarity of Scotism. All theological language about God, and His relations to us, is more or less a condescension to our limited faculties. It conveys to us, as we can bear them, through a human medium truths which in themselves transcend the utmost range of human comprehension.

¹ See especially the remarkable chapters on the Incarnation and Atonement in Maurice's *Theological Essays*. The author says in the former: "First we receive the fact of the Incarnation, because we feel that it is impossible to know the Absolute and Invisible God as man needs to know Him, and craves to know Him, without an Incarnation." I subjoin with pleasure the following eloquent passage from the author's *Doctrine of Sacrifice*, (p. 119), which points in the same direction; "If sacrifice is implied in the very Original of the universe—if it is involved in the very nature and being of God—if it was expressed in the divine obedience of the Son before the worlds were—if the manifestation of it in the latter days was to take away sin, because sin and sacrifice are the eternal opposites—then, indeed, we may believe that the telescope will only give us another sense of the truth which the microscope has already revealed, that every conceivable multiplication of worlds, and of spiritual creatures, will only manifest some aspect of that love which was gathered up in the Cross of Calvary."

But the idea conveyed to us is true as far as it goes, though it is inadequate. There is no change in the Divine Mind, yet Scripture speaks of the wrath and the forgiveness of God: to Him all His works are known from the beginning, yet He waits to be gracious and listens to His children's prayer. And so in saying that the Incarnation was or was not predestined independently of the Fall, we are referring to a real distinction, though any form in which it may be expressed is sure to be open to criticism. And it makes all the difference whether the Humanity of Jesus was the original archetype of our own, and to be conformed to it our predestined end; or whether, like His Sufferings, it resulted from the Fall, and was from the first included in the Divine predistinction for the remedy of human sin. Of objections to the Scotist theory as dishonouring the redemption of Christ, as also of its Scriptural bearings, something will be said later on. It is enough to observe here that such objections are really a relic of the habits of mind engendered at the Reformation, when the Incarnation came to be looked upon simply as a necessary incident of the Atonement. Whether or not, however, the theory be accepted—and it certainly seems most in accordance with the tradition of the Church, and with what revelation would suggest to us of the love of God—it remains equally certain, that the Incarnation had objects not necessarily connected with the Fall, and even as regards our present fallen state had further ends besides that of satisfaction. Some of these are elaborately worked out by

writers strongly opposed to the Scotist view, such as Thomassin, who devotes the greater part of his first book on the Incarnation to setting forth the exhibition in the Person of the God-Man of the eternal law and the Divine attributes. The mediatorial office of Christ includes, besides and even before the notion of intercession and sacrifice, that of reconciliation, or 'making peace,' on which Scripture so constantly dwells; uniting man with God, giving peace from the internal conflict of passion in the human soul, and joining together those who are no more strangers and foreigners, Jew or Gentile, Greek or barbarian, but united in His one family, of whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named.¹

The doctrine of the Atonement is of course closely connected with the kindred doctrines of Justification and Original Sin. But on these points there was little direct discussion before the Reformation, putting aside the Pelagian controversy, which turned rather on the necessity of grace than on the conditions and methods of its application to the human soul. Original sin, it has been truly said, "is no perplexity that a man may get rid of by ceasing to be a Christian, and which has no existence for the philosophical deist."² It is a fact as well as a doctrine, and a fact which experience can hardly fail to bring home to the most thoughtless. We cannot but confess that to be, to use the words of Jeremy Taylor, which we feel and groan under, and

¹ See Petav. *De Inc.* xii. 6, 7.

² *Aids to Reflection*, p. 228.

through which the whole world is miserable.¹ The origin of evil is one of those insoluble problems which philosophy can never hope to master. We must be content to know that the All-wise permitted though He never willed it, whose mercy is over all His works, and wait to read in the light of the Beatific Vision what is obscure to us now in the ordering of His Providence. Revelation does not solve the mystery, but it explains the fact of the introduction of sin into the world, and points out the remedy. The promise of redemption followed immediately on the Fall. Man was created after the image and similitude of his Maker, and the grace of original righteousness, which the first Adam forfeited for himself and his descendants, the Second Adam won back for us on the Cross. Justification is the free gift of Christ, whereby He restores to us our lost inheritance of grace, and in restoring it cleanses every stain whether of actual or original sin, though concupiscence still remains for our trial. But it is more than a simple restoration of our forfeit birthright, for we are raised by justification to a higher state than that from which Adam fell, and made through union with the Redeemer partakers of the Divine nature, whence the Church sings, *O felix culpa quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem*. We receive the Spirit of adoption whereby we become joint heirs with Christ and sons of God. Such is a brief statement of the relations of justification to the

¹ The reader will hardly need to be reminded of the wonderful passage on the witness of history to this "terrible aboriginal calamity" in the *Apologia*, Ch. 7.

Atonement ; we shall have to enter into details more fully by and by, when the controversies of the Reformation come under review.

Meanwhile, two cautions against popular misconceptions of the doctrine may be added here, though for theological readers they will be superfluous. The notion of 'imputation,' in the sense of a transfer, by a kind of juridical fiction, of our sins to Christ and His righteousness to His members, was first started in the sixteenth century, and must be kept quite distinct from the doctrine of Atonement, on which it has been engrafted. It is quite a different thing from saying that He suffered for our offences, and that His Sacrifice is the ground of our forgiveness, as we shall see when we come to examine the teaching of the Reformers. The word may no doubt be used, and has even been sometimes used by Catholic divines, in an innocent and orthodox sense. But in its natural and historical meaning, as fixed by the Lutheran controversy, it marks a wide departure from the doctrine of the Church on righteousness, not imputed but imparted, which is expressed by the Council of Trent in language borrowed from St. Augustine, to the effect that in crowning our merits God crowns His own gifts.¹ The Passion of Christ was not to be the substitute for our personal obedience, but the source of it. To justify is to *make*, not simply to account men just. Neither again do we find the slightest hint in any Father, ex-

¹ *Cond. Trid.* Sess. vi. cap. 16 ; cf. Can. 11, 12, where the imputation of Christ's merits is denied to be the cause of our justification.

cept St. Augustine and Fulgentius, of the notion that Christ died for some, or for the elect only, not for the whole race of mankind. There are no doubt traces of such a view to be found in St. Augustine's later writings, during the Pelagian controversy; and he was the first to explain St. Paul's words (Rom. ix. 21) of the 'mass of perdition' (φύραμα) from which only the predestined would be taken out. This idea of Christ dying for a chosen few re-appears, to support an argument which is however complete without it, in one passage of Abelard; it found distinct expression later, among the Reformed in the heresy of Calvin, among Catholics in the heresy of Jansenism. That God is no respecter of persons, but wills all men to be saved, that Christ died for all, and that to all sufficient grace is offered to work out their own salvation, is, on the other hand, the constant teaching of the Church.

This reference to St. Augustine, who is usually regarded as the greatest among uninspired teachers, leads to a remark, which must be borne in mind throughout the ensuing examination of the writings of Fathers, Schoolmen, and later Catholic theologians. While the 'unanimous consent of the Fathers,' so far as it embodies the faith of the universal Church, is affirmed by the Council of Trent (Sess. vi.) to be an authoritative rule for the interpretation of Scripture, the individual opinions of any one, or of a majority, of them, however valuable as testimonies to the opinion of their day, can never constitute more than a strong *prima facie* presumption in favour of the view adopted.

And as regards later writers also, we may expect to find much variety in their way of handling points not defined by authority, and shall gain light from their very differences. To use the words of the great leader of the Catholic revival in Germany, "For a time even a *conception of a dogma*, or an opinion, may be tolerably general, without however becoming an integral portion of a dogma, or a dogma itself. There are here eternally changing individual forms of an universal principle, which may serve this or that person, or a particular period, for mastering that universal principle by way of reflection and speculation, forms which may possess more or less of truth, but whereon the Church pronounces no judgment; for the data for such a decision are wanting in tradition, and she abandons them altogether to the award of theological criticism." This is said with special reference to "Augustine's and Anselm's exposition of original sin, and the theory of the latter respecting the vicarious atonement of Christ."¹ The Church of God was to be clothed in raiment of many colours (*circumamicta varietatibus*), and unity in diversity is among her predicted glories. The different and even mistaken or imperfect aspects under which the same truth may present itself to different minds do but serve to bring out the more clearly, in the long run, its vital unity and coherence.² It must

¹ Möhler's *Symbolism*, Eng. Tr. vol. i. p. 11.

² "Dass aber in dieser nur durch Irrthümer hindurch der Weg zur Wahrheit führe, ist ein Gesetz, welches in der Zukunft eben so gelten wird, wie es in der Vergangenheit sich bewährt hat."—*Die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der katholischen Theologie*, von J. von Döllinger. Regensburg, 1863.

be remembered, too, as one reason why this particular doctrine of the atonement has not been so fully treated as many others by Catholic writers, that it never formed the subject of any specific heresy before the Reformation, and did not even then become in itself a prominent topic of controversy, partly from internal differences among the Reformers themselves about it, partly from the more immediate practical interest at the time of questions about Church authority and the Sacraments. We shall have occasion, however, to notice the treatment of the question in its bearings on justification by the leading Protestant divines, with the earliest of whom it acquired a new shape and significance, and became a fruitful source of misconceptions.

To investigate and harmonise the teaching of Scripture on the Atonement does not fall within the scope of the present inquiry. The result of such an undertaking, if adequately carried out, would indeed fill a separate volume. All that can be attempted here is to give such a rapid summary of the general bearings of the Scriptural argument as may help us to appreciate more clearly the various interpretations put upon it by successive writers and schools in the Church, which it is the object of this work to examine. I need hardly say that this, like the other great verities of Christianity, is not laid down with dogmatic precision in the letter of Scripture as in the Articles of a Creed. It has, like them, to be gathered inferentially, however direct may be the inference, from anticipations in the Old Testament, from the historical statements, implications

and allusions of the New, and from the general drift and tenor of the whole. We cannot, perhaps, do better than take as a groundwork Coleridge's four-fold division of the forms under which the mystery of redemption is presented to us in the New Testament, and especially in St. Paul's Epistles, as sacrifice, reconciliation, ransom and satisfaction.¹ The *word* sometimes rendered atonement, only occurs in four passages.² But the idea is conveyed through different metaphors, each of which has its peculiar force and significance. Sometimes it is regarded as a sacrificial expiation cleansing us from sin, as ceremonial defilements were cleansed by the Mosaic offerings. This is the idea running through the Epistle to the Hebrews.³ Sometimes it is treated as a reconciliation or atonement, as the prodigal son is reconciled to his father. This is the notion conveyed in some of the Parables, and in such passages as speak of those who were once enemies and aliens being reconciled to God by the death of His Son, or of 'peace' as the result of His atonement, or His gift, or of His being Himself our Peace.⁴ It is part of the same idea when union with God, or 'life' in union with Him, is spoken of as resulting from the Pro-

¹ Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*) is speaking of St. Paul's Epistles only. I have modified and enlarged his classification so as to include the N. T. generally, and added the special references.

² καταλλάγη, in Rom. v. 11, xi. 15, 2 Cor. v. 18, 19. Coleridge gives the first as the only passage. The cognate verb occurs elsewhere, as in the kindred passages, 2 Cor. v. 18. Col. i. 21, 22.

³ See especially Heb. ix. 19—28. Cf. 1 John i. 7.

⁴ See Rom. v. 11; 2 Cor. v. 18; Col. i. 20, 21, 22; Eph. ii. 14.

pitiation of Christ. This language is most frequent in St. John's writings, though by no means confined to them.¹ Elsewhere, both in the Gospels and Epistles, the image of redemption or ransom from slavery, is adopted, both with reference to the bondage of sin and its punishment. To this category may be referred those passages which speak of our being purchased or bought with a price.² And, lastly, there is the reference to the notion of satisfying a creditor by payment of the debt, though the word satisfaction, it need hardly be said, does not occur. It has, in fact, no precise equivalent in the Greek language. But this idea is implied in passages which speak of sin as a debt, of death as the wages of sin, of our being debtors to keep the whole Law, and, on the other hand, of Christ being made sin for us, and bearing our sins in His Body on the tree.³ It is also the leading idea of the Epistle to the Romans, as gathered from its general drift. Of these four aspects of the Atonement we shall find the first three chiefly dwelt on by the Fathers, the third with especial reference to the ransom from Satan. The Schoolmen devoted themselves principally to working out the idea of satisfaction. It

¹ See, e.g. John iii. 16, xv. 4—7, John i. 3, iv. 9, 10. and the Epistle *passim*.

² The verb *λυτρόω* occurs in Luke xxiv. 21; Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18; in the two latter with special reference to the bondage of sin, in Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14, it is immediately connected with remission of sin. Both ideas seem to be combined in Heb. ix. 14, 15. In 1 Tim. ii. 6, we have the stronger term *ἀντίλυτρον* (*Cf. infr.* p 113, note). In 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23, Gal. iv. 5, as also in the Apocalypse, *ἀγοράζω* or its compounds is used to signify that we have been bought from the slavery of evil to be free to serve God as adopted sons.

³ See Gal. v. 3; 2 Cor. v. 21; 1 Pet. iii. 24.

may be added that our Lord is described in the New Testament as the Good Shepherd, who giveth His life for the sheep; the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world, and who was predestined before the foundation of the world and slain; as our High Priest, our Advocate, our Peace and our Propitiation.¹ His atoning sacrifice is prefigured under the Patriarchal dispensation by the sacrifice and death of Abel, the sacrifice of Noah, Abraham's intended offering of his son Isaac, and by the offering of Melchisedec with especial reference to the Eucharist. The Passover and the various oblations of the Mosaic ritual are its types under the Law, to which the Psalms and the Prophecies assign their Evangelical application. In the great prophecy of Isaiah, as in the New Testament, the Divine Victim is described under the figure of the Paschal Lamb. The last of the Prophets announces in express terms the coming cessation of the legal sacrifices, and the substitution throughout the world of the pure oblation of the Eucharist. This is of course but the barest outline of the Scriptural treatment of the subject. But it may serve to indicate the main sources of the different lines of thought which from time to time Fathers and theologians have pursued in handling it. It will be my aim in the following pages to exhibit their respective theories in detail, and in their mutual relations with one another and with the

¹ John x. 11; i. 29; 1 Pet. i. 19, 20; Apoc. v. 6, xiii. 8; Heb. iv. 14; 1 John ii. 1, 2; Eph. ii. 14. In Rom. iii. 25, it is doubtful whether we should render "propitiation through faith in His Blood" (as in E.V.) or "propitiation in His Blood through faith." See Vaughan *in loc.* who adopts the latter view.

received doctrine of the Church, while contrasting them with the foreign or antagonistic systems of those beyond her pale.

Thousands and tens of thousand, I know, have knelt in loving adoration before the Crucified, who never attempted to reason about the crucifixion; they felt what it meant, though they could not put their meaning into words, or were content to use such words only as those of a popular English hymn :

"I cannot understand the woe
Which Thou wast pleased to bear :
O dying Lamb, I do but know
That all my hopes are there."

Far be it from us to blame them. Doubtless there is more to be learnt from the crucifix than all the wisdom of all the theologians can teach us. Yet the mysteries of revelation were given to be food for the intellect, as well as for the heart; and, moreover, the questionings of heresy which have helped to fix the form, have troubled the unconscious simplicity of our early faith. Such scriptural statements as that "the good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep," or that "the Son of Man came to give His life a ransom instead of many," or that "we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins," or that "God having sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh," or that "as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alike;" "as by one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, by the obedience of One the many shall

be made righteous;”¹—these and the like passages contain a depth and richness of meaning which no meditation can exhaust. But they also suggest many difficult questions which successive writers and schools, as well within as without the Church, have variously answered. Such an inquiry as the present is not, therefore, a needless one. Only let us never forget, amid the maze of theological speculations, the one grand lesson of the Passion, *Amor meus crucifixus est*.

¹ John x. 11 ; Matt. xx. 28 ; Eph. i. 7 ; Col. i, 14 ; Rom. viii. 3 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22 ; Rom. v. 19.

NOTE TO CHAPTER I.

ON THE CONDITION OF OUR LORD'S HUMAN BODY.

A FRIENDLY reviewer in the *Ecclesiastic* took exception at the time to my speaking, in the first edition of this Volume, of our Lord's assuming a "corruptible" body, or, as it is expressed in a previous Note, a body "subject to the conditions of infirmity introduced by the Fall," that is to decay and death; and insists that our Lord's bodily constitution was modelled in all respects on that of our first parents *before* the Fall, not on that which they transmitted to their posterity.¹ The discussion of the question belongs properly to the theology of the Incarnation; having occasion to refer to it incidentally in a work on the Atonement, I did not profess to do more than give what appears to me the most probable opinion, and what is certainly that most generally adopted by theologians. And I must content myself here with noticing very briefly the reviewer's objections to it. Those who wish to pursue the subject, may be referred to the Treatises of Petavius and Thomassin on the Incarnation, especially the latter, where it is discussed at length, and the conclusion in which I have acquiesced, is maintained.²

The reviewer's opinion is chiefly based on the perfect sinlessness of our Lord, and the fact of the hypostatic union. He relies chiefly on the former argument; "Our Blessed Lord was perfectly sinless, and therefore His flesh *could* see no corruption." And from this it is inferred that our Lord's Body "was *never* subject to the laws of

¹ See *Ecclesiastic* for Aug. and Dec., 1865.

² Petav. *De Inc. Verb.* x. 3—6. Cf. Thomas. *De Inc. Verb. Divin.* iv. 12. Thomassin speaks of the notion that His Body was impassible as Eutychian. It is conceivable, of course (as the Tridentine Catechism observes, in reference to the future condition of the wicked), for bodies to be incorruptible without being impassible, but there is no reason for assuming this of our Lord's Body before the Resurrection. Petavius distinguishes between the two, and denies that it was incorruptible in any other sense than that it was to be preserved by Divine power from actual corruption.

the material creation," though "He chose by an economy to *make* Himself subject to the conditions of our fallen world." The Transfiguration represented "the normal condition of His human nature," to which He "simply returned at His Resurrection." In a second notice, the writer explicitly admits that "in one sense our Lord's Body was not only corruptible, but did actually corrupt," inasmuch as it went through the ordinary processes of growth and decay during His earthly life; and he does not, of course, deny that it was actually subject to hunger, thirst, pain and weariness, which are "laws of the material creation." But he says this was not by necessity but by condescension, and denies that our Lord's Body was naturally subject to death at all. For this view, he alleges some authorities, which shall be noticed presently.

There is, of course, no controversy as to our Lord's having assumed *voluntarily* whatever kind of body He did assume, or that, if man had never fallen, He would have been incarnated (on the Scotist hypothesis) in an impassible and incorruptible body, like theirs whose nature He was taking upon Himself. The question relates simply to the human nature He actually did assume, when He came in fact as the Redeemer of a fallen race. Did He take a mortal and corruptible body, like theirs for whom He came to die, or a body immortal and incorruptible, like that of Adam before he fell, and which was only liable by a separate act of will—in other words, by a separate miracle, in each case, for this is what the reviewer implies—to pain, hunger, weariness or death? Was His Body really in a different state, as the bodies of His redeemed are, before and after the Resurrection, though, on special occasions, like the Transfiguration, He anticipated its future glory; or was its normal condition the same before and after the Resurrection, though during the former period that condition was, so to say, normally suspended, and only at rare intervals suffered to exhibit itself, as at the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor? The former view appears to me incomparably the most probable in itself, and most in accordance with the language of Scripture, and the facts of the sacred narrative, while it has also the highest theological sanction. It brings out most fully the entire *κένωσις*, which is so endearing a characteristic of the Incarnation, and enables us best to realize that our Elder Brother is indeed "flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone." It also materially

strengthens the evidence of His Resurrection as a pledge of ours. And if it be admitted, as it must be, that the Body of our Lord was subject through life to the physical processes of decay and growth, and to hunger, pain and weariness—no doubt through His merciful condescension in assuming a human body at all—why should we scruple to admit that it was subject also to the law of death and the physical incidents of dissolution? Scripture does not say, with the reviewer, that “His Flesh *could* see no corruption;” but that, for the honour of His Sacred Humanity, it should not and did not see corruption. When, therefore, he quotes Dr. Newman’s words in the *Atlantis*, that our Lord’s Body “was different in fact from ours, as regards corruptibility, as would appear from Acts ii. 31, xii. 35,” it is clear from the passages referred to that what is meant is not that His Body was in its nature incorruptible, but that it was in fact exempted from corruption. Thomassin quotes these very passages to prove that it was naturally corruptible. Nor does the contrast drawn out by St. Paul in 1 Cor. xv, 44—49, which the reviewer quotes and dwells upon, appear to me to have any direct bearing on the physical condition of our Lord’s Body during His earthly pilgrimage. On the other hand, the recorded facts of the Gospel narrative, taken in its obvious sense, certainly point to a real distinction in His bodily condition before and after the Resurrection; and St. Paul’s language, when he speaks of the Son being sent “in likeness of sinful flesh” (ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας), seems to mean that He assumed our flesh under the conditions of the Fall.

For the patristic argument on the subject, I must be content to refer to Petavius. Of the three passages from the Fathers quoted by the reviewer, two—from St. Athanasius and St. Leo—seem to me to tell against him, while a third, from St. Hilary of Poitiers, which denies that our Lord had any need to take food, except out of conformity to custom, is, to say nothing of other objections, very difficult to reconcile with His hunger after the fast in the wilderness and other portions of the sacred narrative.¹ St. Leo is quoted as saying that “He willed His Flesh to be mortal up to the Resurrection,” which is exactly the view I am defending. If mortal, it

¹ Both Petavius and Thomassin refer to the passage, and the latter observes that Hilary is not always consistent with himself, and may perhaps be differently understood.

was liable to corruption. St. Athanasius says that "the Word took a body that could die, in order that it might die for all, while through the indwelling Word it remained incorruptible."¹ This appears to mean that He took a mortal and corruptible body, in order to die, while through His indwelling Divinity it was preserved in death from actual corruption. And the reviewer admits that there are many passages in the Fathers which speak of our Lord's Body as corruptible before the Resurrection, and incorruptible after it. It may be added, that the time of His Resurrection, occurring as it did within less than forty hours after death, would alone suffice to account for the actual preservation of His Body from corruption. "His Soul was not *left* in hell, neither did His Flesh see corruption." And, again, the bodies of some of His Saints are thought to have been miraculously preserved from corruption, though they certainly were not in their own nature incorruptible.

It remains true, of course, whatever view we take on this point, that He had power, who was God as well as Man, to lay down His life or to resume it, for all laws of the material creation are subject to His will; and He did in fact choose the *time* of His death. But He used His omnipotence, not to dissolve a body naturally immortal, but to arrest, till He had drained to the last dregs the predestined chalice of agony, the dissolution which must otherwise have been an earlier result of the physical sufferings and exhaustion He had endured, and which would in any case have sooner or later taken place had nature been left to itself.²

¹ The passage will be found quoted, *infr.* p. 142, note.

² The view advocated in the *Ecclesiastic* is contrasted in the following passage of Thomassin with that taken in the text:—"Illis ergo nobisque hoc interjacet discriminis, quod cum passum esse Christum carne et esurisse et sitisse vere consentiamus, *illi carne incorruptibili, sed ex dispensatione Verbi passum esse garriant; nos autem carne passibili passum*, sed ita ut penes ipsius animæ Deitatisque potestatem esset, præstare ne quid pateretur. Illi impassibilitatem ex carne, passionem ex Verbi omnipotentia repetunt; nos passionem passibilitatemque in carne, non patiendi potestatem in Verbo et mente Verbum complexâ collocamus. Illis et nobis vere passus est, et fuit in Ejus potestate pati vel non pati; eó concordamus; sed hóc discordamus quod illis passus est carne impassibili, nobis carne passibili; *illis potuit non pati ob impassibilitatem carnis, nobis potuit non pati ob omnipotentiam Verbi; illis potuit pati ob omnipotentiam Verbi, nobis potuit pati ob passibilitatem carnis et conniventiam Verbi.*" He, therefore, expressly insists that our Lord's Body was modelled on that of Adam *after* the Fall, though it may be questioned whether Adam's body was ever, strictly speaking, incorruptible.

CHAPTER II.

THE ANTE-NICENE FATHERS.

As a general rule, the rise of successive heresies is the occasion and measure of dogmatic statements of the faith. We do not, therefore, look in the Ante-Nicene Fathers for any elaborate discussion of questions not yet brought into controversy. Even on the central doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, we know how halting and inadequate, to use the mildest terms, their language frequently is, before the Arian, Sabellian, Monophysite, and Nestorian heresies had forced out into bolder relief the contrary definitions of the Church. This has been conclusively shown by Petavius, and not disproved though disputed in the *Defensio Fidei Nicenæ* of Bishop Bull.¹ Neither, again, can we reasonably expect to find in earlier writers that precision of theological statement which only came into vogue when theology, partly in the conflict with error, partly through the influence of Greek phi-

¹ Cf. *supr.*, p. 24.

losophy at Alexandria, began to be formed into a science. On the subject of the Atonement, the Ante-Nicene Fathers do not, with the exception of Irenæus and Origen, propound any definite theory. The word 'Satisfaction' they never use, or use, if at all, of the satisfaction of the penitent, not of Christ;¹ nor was the idea, as afterwards explained, familiar to them. But they speak, in connexion with the Incarnation, and in general terms, often borrowed directly or indirectly from the language of Scripture, of the sufferings, the death, the blood, the obedience, and the sacrifice of Christ, as being offered for us, and being the means of our redemption. It is from passages of this kind that we must gather their teaching on the subject; and, to present a clear and consistent view of it, a fuller employment of detailed references and quotations will be needful than in the case of more systematic writers, whose opinions can be fairly summed up in an analysis. I will do my best, however, to avoid burdening the reader with more of lengthened quotations than is really requisite, and to select such passages only as will in each case give a fair and adequate specimen of the writer's method of handling the question. We shall afterwards be in a position to draw some inferences, as to the general drift of patristic teaching as a whole, and its relations to later theology.

First in order come the apostolic Fathers, St. Clement of Rome, Barnabas, Hermas, St. Polycarp,

¹ It is used in this sense by Tertullian and Cyprian. There is no *word* for it in Greek.

and St. Ignatius; but their writings will not detain us long.

We have two *Epistles of Clement*, to the Church at Corinth, on practical disputes which had arisen there, only dealing quite incidentally with any questions of doctrine. He is distinct in asserting, that the blood of Christ is the means of bestowing on us redemption and grace, and that by the will and through the love of God. "In love the Master received us; through the love He had for us Christ our Lord gave His Blood for us, by the will of God, and His Flesh for our flesh, and His Soul for our souls." And again, "Let us look then to the Blood of Christ, and behold how precious is His Blood to God, since it was shed for our salvation, and has procured for the whole world the grace of repentance."¹ Clement makes the scarlet cord let down by Rahab a type of the Blood of Christ; and speaks of Him as our High Priest, according to the constant usage of the Fathers. The universality of redemption, and the death of Christ as the source of grace, are here clearly laid down.

Let us turn to the *General Epistle of Barnabas*, which, though not by the apostle of that name, nor indeed a writing of the first century, appeared early in the second, at Alexandria.² We read, in the seventh chapter, of Christ offering the vessel of His Soul (*i.e.* His Body) as a sacrifice for our sins; and of Isaac's

¹ Clem. Rom. *Ep. ad Cor.* l. xlix. 7.

² The Epistle was defended as genuine by Vossius, Hammond, Bull, Usher, and perhaps by Pearson.—See Blunt's *Right Use of the Fathers*, p. 72. It is, however, undoubtedly spurious.

sacrifice as a type: the writer also dwells, as do others afterwards, on the type of the two goats, one of which was sacrificed, and the other made a scape-goat, being accursed, as Christ was accursed, by the people, not by God. He speaks again of Christ suffering that the strokes inflicted on Him may give life to us, and "that we may be sanctified by the remission of sins, that is, the sprinkling of His blood," of which the blood of the Passover was a figure. In one passage of the fourteenth chapter, we seem to have the first notice of the conquest over Satan, where it is said, in manifest allusion to Col. i. 13, "He ransomed from darkness our souls, given over to death and lawless wanderings;" but of this theory we shall have to speak later.

The *Shepherd of Hermas*, which used at one time to be ranked with the New Testament Scriptures, contains but a single reference to the redemption wrought by Christ, occurring in a parable about a vineyard, representing the people of God, where His Son is set to work as a servant, and is said to have "laboured much and suffered much that He might do away their sins," and afterwards to have "pointed out to them the way of life by giving them the law, received from His Father;"¹ thus connecting the forgiveness of sins especially with His obedience and His teaching.

In the *Epistles of Ignatius* there are several references, in general terms, to the sufferings of Christ for us. In the *Epistle to Smyrna* the writer says: "Christ suffered for us (δι' ἡμᾶς) that we might be saved, and

¹ *Pastor.* lib. iii., Sim. 5.

suffered really;" and he elsewhere calls the Eucharist "that Flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ which suffered for (*ὑπὲρ*) our sins, which the Father in His goodness raised."¹ In the account of His martyrdom there is a distinct reference to the triumph over Satan by the Cross of Christ, as alluded to by St. Paul,² when he is made to speak of our Lord as "Him that crucified my sin *with him who invented it*, and condemned all demoniacal error and wickedness, putting it under the feet of those who carry Him in their heart." He also calls Christ a High Priest.

The last apostolic Father to be noticed here is St. Polycarp. In his *Epistle to the Philippians*, he says that Christ "persevered even unto death for our sins, whom God raised, having loosed the pains of Hell;" and again, in language moulded on St. Peter's, that "He bore our sin in His own Body to the tree, who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth, but He endured all for our sakes, that we might live in Him;"³ thus connecting the gift of life with His sufferings for us. Further on he calls Christ "the eternal High Priest."

One more document of the first century may be quoted, the *Epistle to Diognetus*, which has been erroneously ascribed to Justin Martyr. It contains a passage of importance, as showing that the writer had no notion of that divergence of will between the

¹ Ignat. *Ep. ad Smyrn.* i. 7. *Ep. ad Ephes.* i.

² Col. ii. 15; *cf.* Heb. ii. 14.

³ Polycarp. *Ep. ad Phil.* i. 8.

Persons of the Holy Trinity, which has sometimes been so strangely imported into the doctrine of the Atonement; as though the mind of the Father towards us were actually changed by the Sacrifice of Christ. I will give it in full, translating from the Greek; "God, the Master and Maker of all things, who created all things and disposed them in order, was not only a Lover of man, but also long-suffering; and He, indeed, was always such, and will be, gracious and good, and without anger (*ἀόργητος*), and true; and He alone is good, and conceived the great and ineffable design which He communicated only to His Son." And again; "When our iniquity was full, and it was perfectly manifest that punishment and death were the expected recompense . . . He did not hate or repulse us, or think evil of us, but was long-suffering and bore with us, and took our sins upon Him (*ἀνεδέξατο*); He Himself gave up His Son as a ransom for us, the Holy for the unholy, the Sinless for the sinful, the Righteous for the unrighteous, the Incorruptible for the corruptible, the Immortal for the mortal. For what else but His righteousness could cover our sins? by whom could we, the lawless and impious, be justified, but only by the Son of God? O sweet change! O unsearchable work! O unexpected benefits! that the wickedness of many should be covered by one Righteous One, the righteousness of One justify many sinners!" I will merely observe, to preclude a possible misconception, that it would be to ignore the whole tenor of patristic theology, if we supposed the

imputation theory was intended in the concluding words. It is clearly a real change *in ourselves* that is spoken of, from sin to holiness, through the imparted grace of Christ.¹

St. Justin Martyr, the great Christian apologist of the second century, is naturally led in his dispute with the Jew Trypho to enlarge on the death of Christ. He does not, however, construct any systematic theory on the subject; but his statements are important as incidentally contradicting some later theories. He speaks generally of Christ being incarnated, that He might be partaker of our sufferings, and heal them; but, in commenting on the great prophecy of the Passion he does not, like Luther afterwards, explain Isaiah's words, "The discipline of our peace was upon Him,"² of Christ being punished by God for our sins; and, so far from understanding St. Paul to mean that the curse of God rested upon Christ,³ he says expressly that it was by the Jews He was accursed: "Ye maintain that He was rightly crucified, and an enemy of God and accursed, which is a work of your unreasonable judgment." And again, more definitely: "The curse of the law lies upon crucified men, but the curse of God *does not lie upon Christ*, through whom He saves those worthy of curse;" and the Jews are reproached with calling Him ac-

¹ As this statement has been called in question, I may refer my readers to Bähr *in loc.* (see Preface) for the proof of it.

² In the Septuagint, which Justin uses, *παιδεία ειρήνης ἡμῶν*, "disciplina pacis nostræ," *Fulg.* The references are to the *Dialogue against Trypho*, and the *Apologia*.

³ Gal. iii. 13.

cursed whom God willed to take our curses upon Him, meaning to raise Him from the dead. There are other passages to the same effect; and the example of the scape-goat is explained, as by Barnabas before and Tertullian afterwards, of the curses of the *people* being laid upon Christ. Justin frequently alludes, as do nearly all writers after Ignatius, to the conquest over Satan as a consequence of the Passion, and in one passage, where he speaks of Christ having acquired possession of men (κτησάμενος) by blood and the mystery of His Cross, he may even seem to hint at the view of a price paid to Satan, which we shall have to notice later in the writings of Irenæus and Origen. He speaks of the restoration of our fallen nature through Christ, who suffered "to deliver us from the wickedness in which we were born," and of His Blood "delivering those who believe on Him," quoting the usual types of the Paschal sprinkling and Rahab's scarlet thread; and calls Him "a chosen Priest and eternal King," fulfilling the type of Melchisedec.

Clement of Alexandria may be regarded as the forerunner of that great theological school, taking its name from his native city, of which Origen was properly the founder. He does not, however, speak on this question with any special fulness or precision, and adds little to what had already been said by others. The sufferings of Christ are attributed to his exceeding love for man; He is "a Sacrifice acceptable to God;"¹ and is else-

¹ Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7, *Pædag.* 5.

where called "the Passover sacrificed (*καλλιερευθεῖς*) by the Jews." The conquest over the serpent, whose form is taken to symbolize sensual pleasure, is spoken of in language which deserves to be quoted: "How did pleasure prevail? Man, who had been set free by simplicity, was found bound to sins; the Lord wished to release him again from his chains; and being bound to flesh (a Divine mystery) in this He overcame the serpent, and took captive the tyrant and death, and, what is strangest, with hands stretched out [on the cross] showed man set free who had been led astray by pleasure and chained to corruption. O mystical wonder! The Lord lay down and man rose; and he who was cast out of Paradise receives heaven, a greater prize than his obedience could have won."¹ The last words, which sound like an echo of the *O felix culpa* chanted in the Paschal anthem, are the earliest distinct intimation, so far as I am aware, of our having gained more by the Incarnation than we had lost by the Fall. It will be observed, that the *obedience* of Christ is the point here chiefly dwelt upon, and to which the victory over the Evil One and our redemption is ascribed. Elsewhere the writer says that He "changed the sunset to the sunrise, and by His Cross turned death into life;"² and again, that "the Blood of the Lord is twofold; the fleshly, by which we were redeemed from corruption,

¹ *Ib. Protr.* 69.

² οὗτος τὴν δύσιν εἰς ἀνατολὴν μετέγαγεν, καὶ τὸν θάνατον εἰς ζωὴν ἀνισταύρωσεν.

and the spiritual, by which we were anointed;"¹ and, lastly, Jesus is said to pray for men as the Great High Priest of God.

Some fragments only remain of Claudius Apollinaris, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia in the second century.

He calls our Lord, "the Great Sacrifice, the Son of God instead of the Paschal Lamb, who was bound and bound the strong one (Satan), who was judged being Judge of quick and dead, who was delivered into the hands of sinners to be crucified, who poured from His Side the two things which cleanse, water and blood, mind and spirit" (λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα). This accords, as far as it goes, with contemporary writers, but obviously the passage is rather rhetorical than dogmatic.

There is nothing specially bearing on our subject in the writings of the apologists Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus. And so we pass from the second to the third century, and from the Eastern to the Western Church. I have purposely omitted Irenæus, whose treatment of the question shall be examined with Origen's, to which it bears a close resemblance, at the end of this chapter.

Tertullian was the great Latin writer of the early part of the third century. And it may be worth observing, that, from his having before his conversion been famous as a jurist, he, if any one, would be likely to put forward the juridical theory of satisfaction which at a later period commended itself so

¹ *Ib. Paed. 2.*

strongly to the legal mind of Grotius. That he does not even allude to it, is a crucial evidence of its being as yet unknown. And this is made clearer by his frequently using, and being the first to use, the word 'satisfaction;' but always, as has been already stated, in reference to the acts of the penitent, not the work of Christ. On the other hand, in disputing with the Jews, he is careful to explain the Apostle's language,¹ like Justin Martyr, of the curses laid on Christ by His people, not by God. He insists that those hung on the tree are said in Deuteronomy to be cursed only on account of the sins for which they are hung there, which cannot apply to Christ, who spoke no guile and displayed all righteousness and humility.² He says, again, that Christ was made a sacrifice for all nations, being led as a sheep to the slaughter, quoting also the types of Isaac, and the scape-goat, which latter he explains in the same sense as Barnabas and Justin had done before him. Moses, stretching out his arms during the battle against Amalek, is given as a type of Christ's triumph over Satan, and also the brazen serpent. The Origenist notion of a ransom paid to

¹ Gal. iii. 13.

² Tertul. *Contra Judæos* 10. He elsewhere says (*Contra Præx.*) that the apostle would have blasphemed had he called Christ cursed in any other sense. On the other hand, Luther remarks, with characteristic bluntness, "Every one hung on the tree is cursed of God; Christ was hung on the tree; therefore Christ was cursed of God." I do not refer to the interpretation put upon this much-controverted passage by Justin Martyr and Tertullian to pronounce any opinion on its exegetical correctness, but as a crucial disproof of their holding the later theory of vicarious imputation.

Satan is perhaps hinted at when it is said, "The Lord redeemed him from the angelic powers who hold the world, the spiritual things of wickedness, the darkness of this world, from eternal judgment and perpetual death;" but it may be merely a reference to Eph. vi. 12. The bestowal of a new life and restoration of the lost image of God, through the crucifixion, is clearly laid down; "What plainer than the sacrament of this wood.....that what had perished in Adam might be restored by the tree (cross) of Christ." His obedience, persevering to the last moment of life, is dwelt upon, and His being "the Pontiff of the uncircumcised priesthood, after the order of Melchisedec."¹

There is not much of special importance for our subject in the writings of Hippolytus. He speaks of Christ's priesthood and sacrifice of Himself as a sweet-smelling savour to God; of His perfect obedience and fulfilling all the righteousness of the law; of His enduring the cross by the consent (*συγχωρήσει*) of God; of His priesthood and royalty. Two passages may be given here. The first seems to point to Irenæus' theory; "For this cause the God of all things became man, that by suffering in passible flesh He might ransom our whole race which was sold to death; and, working marvels through the instrumentality of the flesh, by his impassible Godhead, might bring it back to His pure and blessed life from which it had fallen by obeying the Devil."² The other passage is a com-

¹ Ib. 13, 14, 10. *De Fuga*, 12. *Contr. Jud.* 13. *Contr. Marcion.* iv. 42, v. 9.

² Hippol. *De Theol. et Incarn.* ii.

ment on Prov. ix. 1; "He has given us His Divine Flesh and precious Blood to eat and drink, for the remission of sins."

St. Cyprian's treatment of the question follows Tertullian's more closely than that of any other writer. There is no attempt to theorize; the word satisfaction is used, as by Tertullian, of the penitent, not of Christ.¹ The following passage expresses the writer's general view of the work of redemption; "This grace Christ imparts, this gift of His mercy He bestows by subduing death through the triumph of the Cross, redeeming the believer by the price of His Blood, reconciling men to God the Father, giving life to the mortal by heavenly regeneration." He speaks elsewhere of our sins being cleansed by the Blood and the sanctification of Christ, of His eternal priesthood after the order of Melchisedec, and of his earthly priests representing Him and offering a true and full sacrifice in the Church to God the Father, in allusion to Prov. ix.² He quotes Moses prevailing over Amalek as a type of our Lord's victory over Satan, and repeatedly speaks of our being redeemed and vivified by His Blood.

One passage shall be quoted here from the *Homily on the Cross*, by Methodius, bishop of Tyre, who was martyred in the Diocletian persecution. It speaks of the victory over Satan as achieved through Christ's

¹ Cypr. *Ep.* vii. 5. *Ad Demetrium*. "Tum demum per ipsum (Dominum) Deo satisfacere debemus."

² *Ib.* lxiii.

obedience unto death, and His arming us to overcome him in our own persons; "For this cause chiefly was the cross introduced, being set up as a trophy and terror against iniquity, that from henceforth man might be no more subject to wrath, having conquered back (*ἀναπαλαίσαντα*) what he had lost by disobedience, and having lawfully overcome the powers below and been made free of all debt by the gifts of God. For this the first-born Word of the righteous God, having armed man, in whose nature He tabernacled, put down the powers which had enslaved us, through the form of the cross, as has been said, and with outstretched hands set free man who was in the bondage of corruption."¹

Before proceeding to notice the special theories of Irenæus and Origen, the only writers of this early period who can strictly be said to have constructed any theory on the subject, we may pause to sum up briefly the main points of teaching on Christ's work of redemption to be gathered from the patristic literature of the first three centuries as a whole. And first, as to what it does not contain. There is no trace, as we have seen, of the notions of vicarious satisfaction, in the sense of our sins being imputed to Christ and His obedience imputed to us, which some of the Reformers made the very essence of Christianity; or, again, of the kindred notion that God was angry with His Son for our sakes, and inflicted on Him the punishment due to us; nor is Isaiah's prophecy interpreted

¹ *Hom. de Cruce, Fragm. 1.*

in this sense, as afterwards by Luther; on the contrary, there is much which expressly negatives this line of thought. There is no mention of the justice of God, in the forensic sense of the word; the Incarnation is invariably and exclusively ascribed to His love; the term satisfaction does not occur in this connection at all, and where Christ is said to suffer for us, ὑπὲρ (not ἀντί) is the word always used.¹ It is not the payment of a debt, as in St. Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, but the restoration of our fallen nature, that is prominent in the minds of these writers, as the main object of the Incarnation. They always speak, with Scripture, of our being reconciled to God, not of God being reconciled to us. On the other hand, they are far removed from the modern Socinian or Rationalistic view, which sees in the death of Christ *only* an attestation of His teaching, or an exalted model of heroic virtue, or a practical evidence of the love of God. They ascribe, with one voice, a real and most vital efficacy to the 'sacrifice' of Calvary in restoring us to life and immortality, but without attempting any precise explanation of *how* the result is brought about. Tertullian says that, if His death be denied, as it was implicitly by the Docetæ (for a phantasm could not really suffer) the whole work of God would be overturned, and the whole meaning and benefit of Christianity rejected.² The obedience of Christ is emphatically dwelt upon, as an integral part

¹ We shall find the two, however, used interchangeably in one passage of Irenæus, as they are also by St. Paul, in Tim. ii. 6; ἀντιλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων. Cf. Matt. xx. 28. Mark x. 45.

² Tert. *Contr. Marcion*. iii. 8.

of His redeeming work, but a special virtue is assigned to His 'death,' and His 'Blood,' the latter being occasionally, as by Hippolytus and Irenæus, mentioned in connection with the Eucharistic chalice. His abiding priesthood in heaven is continually dwelt on, while St. Cyprian, with some others, insist also on its earthly realization, through the ministry of his appointed representatives. Barnabas and Ignatius are the first to speak of His conquest over Satan, which assumes an increasing prominence in subsequent writers. In the hands of two it becomes the basis of a distinct theory of satisfaction, and to these we must now turn our attention.

St. Irenæus treats the question mainly in connection with two passages of the New Testament: Rom. v. 19, "As by one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the obedience of One shall the many be made righteous," and Heb. ii. 14, where "destroying him that hath the power over death, that is the Devil," is set forth as the object of the Incarnation. And he accordingly makes the work of redemption consist principally in two points: the restoration of our corrupted nature through the gift of a new principle of supernatural life, and the triumph over Satan. It is in the exposition of the second point that his teaching goes beyond that of his contemporaries, and contains the first explicit statement of an opinion which continued for a thousand years to influence Christian theology, till it was finally sifted and discarded by Anselm (who has been followed by later writers, with a few exceptions) on the obvious ground, that, though we had

justly incurred punishment at the hands of the Evil One, he could have no rights over us but by the permission of God.¹ The original suggestion of this theory came from the Gnostic heresy. Irenæus ascribed to the Evil Spirit that power over men, as their seducer, which Gnosticism gave him as their Demi-urgus or Creator. They had voluntarily placed themselves under the Devil's power; and, though God might have delivered them by force, it was more accordant with justice to compensate, by a perfect obedience, that original disobedience from which all his rights over them were derived. I will extract, at length, the passage in which Irenæus introduces his view;

"The powerful Word and true Man reasonably redeeming us by His Blood, gave Himself a ransom for those who had been led into captivity. And since the apostasy (*i. e.* Satan) unjustly ruled us, and when we belonged by nature to Almighty God, alienated us against nature, and made us his own disciples, the Word of God, being all-powerful and not wanting in justice, dealt justly even with the apostasy itself, buying back from it that which was His own; not violently, as he (Satan) had first gained dominion over us, by snatching greedily what did not belong to him, but by persuasion [by a method which convinced Satan his rights were at an end²] as it became God to receive

¹ "Quamvis enim homo juste a diabolo torqueretur, ipse tamen illum injuste torquebat." Anselm. *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 7.

² This seems to be the obvious meaning, and not, as some understand it, "by persuading men."

what He willed by persuasion and not by force, so that neither might justice be violated, nor God's ancient creation perish. The Lord, therefore, redeemed us by His own Blood, and gave His Soul for (ὑπὲρ) our souls, and His Flesh for (ἀντί) our flesh, and poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and man, bringing down God to men through the Spirit, raising men to God through His Incarnation, and firmly and truly giving us incorruption in His advent, through communion with God"¹ For this redemption from Satan's mastery there was required a perfect obedience; "compensating our disobedience through His obedience;" and hence in one passage Irenæus says, that the price of our disobedience in Adam was paid by Christ's obedience in the Three Temptations; a statement which, I think, stands alone in patristic literature.² This perfect obedience could only be rendered by Him who was both God and man: "For if man had not conquered the adversary of man, he would not have been justly conquered. And, again, if God had not given salvation, we should not have

¹ Lib. v. 1.

² "Et tertio itaque vincens eum de reliquo repulit a semet ipso quasi legitime victum; et soluta est ea quæ fuerat in Adam præcepti prævaricatio, per præceptum legis quod servavit Filius hominis, non transgrediens præceptum Dei." Ib. 21. An anonymous correspondent has called my attention to the fact that "prævaricatio" is a law term, having a peculiar sense, from the time of Cicero to Ulpian, which is thus explained by the latter, "Prævaricatio est ejus qui falsas rei excusationes admittit." He thinks that "soluta" may be rendered "explained" or "settled," and thus the passage may simply mean that "the injury done to the law by Adam was set right by the obedience of Christ." The interpretation seems to me to be more ingenious than natural, but I give it for what it may be worth.

had it securely; and unless man was united with God we could not partake of incorruption.”¹ Hence the Incarnation was necessary, that a perfect obedience might be offered, but the obedience of a man. Yet this obedience was not the means but the condition only of redemption; that had to be won by the Redeemer’s death.² But how the Devil, to whom this death is ascribed, came to accomplish an act so fatal to himself; whether, as the Gnostics held, it was from being deceived as to who Christ really was, or not; and again, what exactly was the connecting link between the Redeemer’s conflict with Satan and His death, and how this last brought about our redemption—all this Irenæus leaves unexplained. He certainly regards Christ’s death not as a punishment inflicted by God, but as the work of Satan, and temporal death itself rather as a blessing than a curse, introduced at the fall of man, in order to limit his opportunities of sin.³ On our deliverance from death, and him who has power over it, follows the restoration of our corrupted nature: “In His incarnation and manhood He recapitulated in Himself the long series of mankind.....that we might recover in Christ what we had lost in Adam, being made after the image and similitude of God.”⁴ There is no

¹ Lib. iii. 18. 6. Cf. also v. 1. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀληθῶς σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐσχηκώς, δὲ ὧν ἡμῶς ἐξηγοράσατο εἰ μὴ τὴν ἀρχαίαν πλάσιν τοῦ Ἀδὰμ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεφαλαιώσατο.

² “Pro nobis mortuus est et Sanguine Suo nos redemit.” iii. 16, 9.

³ “Prohibuit autem ejus transgressionem, interponens mortem, et cessare faciens peccatum, finem inferens ei per carnis resolutionem, quæ fieret in terra.” iii. 23, 6.

⁴ iii. 18. 1. Cf. v. 16, 1. There is an allusion to the distinction drawn be-

need to dwell on those aspects of the author's teaching which are shared by his contemporaries.

Where Irenæus had left the question in the second century, Origen, who, notwithstanding his eccentricities, is justly styled the 'Father of theology,' took it up in the third; and what before had been an uncertain and fragmentary hypothesis assumes, under his creative touch, shape and consistency. With his peculiar views on the præexistence and successive metempsychoses of souls, on the final absorption of all bodily natures (including apparently our Lord's)¹ into the Divine Essence, the extension of the efficacy of redemption to the whole creation in heaven and earth, and the ἀποκατάστασις, or ultimate restitution of all fallen spirits, human or angelic, we need not here concern ourselves. Nor is it necessary to dwell on those parts of his teaching about redemption which do not materially differ from what has been already noticed in previous or contemporary Fathers. And in dealing with so voluminous a writer, it will, of course, be impossible to point out all, or nearly all, the passages bearing on our more immediate subject; it must suffice to refer to such critical statements as supply an adequate exhibition of his manner of handling it.

tween the *image* and *likeness* of God; the former representing the perfect type of humanity (or what the Schoolmen call the 'integrity of nature'), the latter the superadded gift of grace, or 'original justice.' (See Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii., 180, and the Fathers *passim*.) There is also a reference to the idea of Christ's predestined Humanity being the image on which ours was modelled; "Ad imaginem Dei fecit hominem, scilicet Christi." Tertull. *Adv. Præx.* 12. cf. Petav. *De Trin.* vi. 6.

¹ Orig. *De Princip.* iii. 6, 1; ii. 3, 3.

Origen regards the redeeming work of Christ, as a whole, under five aspects. It includes His teaching, as the revelation of absolute truth; His works, as cleansing the temple, and especially His miracles, to which a symbolical meaning is attached; His life, as the great Example; His sufferings and death, to which is ascribed a threefold efficacy, in our redemption from the power of Satan, our reconciliation with God, and the purification of our corrupted nature; and, lastly, His continual priesthood in heaven, which is constantly and emphatically dwelt upon, and whereby He who on earth poured out His material Blood for us, is said "to offer the vital virtue of His Body as a kind of spiritual sacrifice."¹ Origen's views under the fourth head, as to the efficacy of Christ's death, are what contain the specialities of his theory on the Atonement. He considers that death a necessity, both for our ransom from Satan and as a sacrifice for sin.

Let us take each point in order. It was left unexplained by Irenæus how the Evil One came to undermine his own kingdom by procuring the death of Jesus; in Origen's system this is clear enough. It was, in fact, but part of that great conflict between good and evil, of which this world had from the first been the theatre, and which found its consummation in the death of Christ. From the Fall onwards, the dragon and his angels had fought with man, and had

¹ ^r ¹ Ib. *Ia. Joann.* i. 2: *ἐαυτὸν γὰρ ἐπαγγελλίσκεται ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ.* *Hom. in Matt.* xvi. 20; xii. 36. *Contr. Cels.* i. 68. *Hom. in Rom.* iii. 7-21. *Hom. in Levit.* i. 3.

seemed to prevail against him. Again and again prophets and righteous men had risen up, to bear witness for truth and holiness; and again and again the world, at the instigation of Satan, had crucified its benefactors. But he had overreached himself. The fathers slew the prophets, and the children built their sepulchres; the blood of the martyrs became the seed-plot of the Church. Within and without the immediate sphere of Divine revelation this contest had been carried on.¹ The crisis came at last, and once more the Evil One deceived himself. He had obtained rights over men: a price, an equivalent (*ἀντάλλαγμα*) was due to him, to free them from his power; and they had none to pay. "Man has nothing to give as an equivalent for his soul;" and therefore, "One alone was able to pay a price for our lost souls, He who bought us with His own precious Blood."² Origen sometimes speaks of this as a kind of bargain with Satan; but he does not mean, as we shall see, that the bargain was made or accepted willingly. To the question suggested by our Lord's own saying that He would be given up into the hands of men,³ By *whom* was He delivered up? Origen replies, "Not all gave Him up with the

¹ See *Contr. Cels.* i. 31; vii. 17; viii. 44.

² Cf. *Tom. in Matt.* xiii. 581. Origen speaks sometimes of Christ's Blood as the price paid, sometimes of His *Soul*, the reality of which he was the first to bring prominently forward. But he here distinguishes, in what sense is not very clear, the Soul of Christ from His Spirit, which He commended into the hands of His Father. He certainly does *not* mean by soul, as Thomasius thinks (*Origines*, p. 223), the blood or physical life, for he speaks expressly of its going down to Hades. See *Tom.* xvi. 8.

³ *Matt.* xvii. 22. Cf. *Mark* ix. 31; *Luke* ix. 44, xviii. 32.

same design. God delivered Him out of love for the human race (Rom. viii. 32). But others delivered Him up with evil intent, each according to his own wickedness, Judas for avarice, the priests for envy, the Devil from fear, lest by His teaching the human race should be snatched out of his hands, *not perceiving that the human race was to be still more delivered by His death than it had been by His teaching and miracles.*"¹ Here and elsewhere Origen expressly asserts what Irenæus had left doubtful, that Satan was deceived, and thought by slaying our Lord to get possession of His Soul, and secure the empire over man which he thus by his own act unwittingly dissolved; for the Soul of Jesus he could not hold in Hades.² This deceiving of Satan is even directly ascribed to God, who thereby used him as the blind instrument for destroying his own power.³ But by what means he was thus deceived, and how again this delusion on his part agrees with the idea of a price paid and a bargain struck with him, is left as yet unexplained.

The death of Christ is further viewed by Origen as an atoning sacrifice, and is in this sense, too, declared to be necessary. "It was necessary that a victim should be provided for sin."⁴ The question has been raised, whether he taught the theory of vicarious satisfaction, as afterwards understood. There are cer-

¹ *Tom.* xxxv. 75.

² *Ps.* xv. (E. V. xvi.) 10.

³ *In Matt. Tom.* xiii. 9.

⁴ *In Num. Hom.* xxiv. 1. Cf. *Tom. in Joann.* xxviii. 393.

tainly scattered through his writings expressions, which might at first sight seem like anticipations of such a view; and, unlike earlier writers, he explains the prophecy of Isaiah, of the discipline of our peace being laid upon Christ, of the chastisement due to us for our discipline and recovery of peace being laid upon Him, not, however, as a retributive punishment, but a remedial chastisement.¹ That chastisement, inflicted by the hands of men, he invariably ascribes not to the wrath or vindictive justice, but to the love of God for men. Christ suffered, indeed, in our place, and for our deserts; but it was because His suffering had become the only means of securing our reformation, and thus delivering us from eternal death.² His sacrifice resembled in kind, though it transcended infinitely in degree, the sacrifices of those who have prefigured or imitated Him in laying down their lives for their fellows. As the first-born of Egypt died that Israel might be saved; as apostles and martyrs have sealed their testimony with their blood; so, but far more perfectly, He who alone was sinless laid down His life for sinners, the one true and sufficient sacrifice of obedience to the will of God.³ He suffered at sinners' hands that temporal death, which had been under the Law the penalty of sin, but which, since He has

¹ *Tom*, in *Johann*. xviii. 1. *κόλασις* not *ποινή*. That Origen did not hold the theory of vicarious punishment is quite clear. Compare Redepenning's *Origines*, vol. ii. p. 408, *sqq.*, and Bähr's *Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu* (Sulzbaeh, 1832), pp. 123-128, and 151-154, with the passages quoted.

² *Serm.* in *Matt.* 904. *Tom.* in *Joann.* xxviii. 393.

³ *Tom.* in *Matt.* xii. 546. *In Joann.* xxviii. 393.

consecrated by enduring it, is changed into a salutary penance, to be willingly, nay, thankfully, accepted in conformity with His example, and as the path to eternal life.¹ Wherein consists the especial connection between His obedience to God and the sacrifice of the Cross, and how it is reconciled with that other necessity of a satisfaction to Satan, or how again the sinless Soul of Jesus could be a price paid to the Evil One—these are difficulties which Origen does not solve. But he clears up much which had been left undetermined by Irenæus, and gives to the death of Christ, as the great act of obedience, and the culminating point in that struggle of good against evil, which had marked all along the history of mankind, a deeper moral significance than is exhibited by any previous writer.

To our former summary of the teaching of the first three centuries we must now add the full and distinct enunciation of what before had been intimated or implied, but never systematically expounded, the necessity or quasi-necessity of satisfying Satan's claim, as a matter of justice; or, to use the language employed by those who maintain this opinion, of a ransom being paid to him for the souls of men. The necessity of a sacrifice to God is also dwelt upon by Origen, but its grounds are left undeveloped, though clearly not understood in the sense of St. Anselm. The perpetual priesthood of Christ in heaven, which occupies a prominent place in nearly all the writings we have examined, is even more emphatically insisted upon by Origen. And

¹ *Hom. in. Levit. xiv. 4. Serm. in Matt. 912.*

this deserves to be remembered, because it is a part of the doctrine which has been almost or altogether dropped out of many Protestant expositions of the Atonement, whereas those most inclining among Catholics to a merely juridical view of the subject have never been able to forget the present and living reality of a sacrifice constantly kept before their eyes, as it were, in the worship which reflects on earth the un-failing liturgy of heaven.

CHAPTER III.

THE LATER FATHERS AND JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA.

As we pass from the third to the fourth century, from the age of persecutions and apologies to the age of controversies and councils, of systematic theology and definite creeds, a change comes over the whole literature of the Church. It becomes at once fuller, and in some sense more exact. The number of writers is multiplied, both in East and West, and their works grow more voluminous. We can no longer examine in detail the statements of each Father, as during the earlier centuries, nor is there the same reason for doing so. Throughout the whole period, from the fourth century to the time of St. Anselm, two tendencies, divergent but not necessarily contradictory, (for both often appear in the same writer) manifest themselves in the treatment of the question before us, and the passages bearing on it may accordingly be grouped under one or other of two classes. We have found

both these lines of thought exhibited in Origen's theological system; succeeding writers were occupied in their development.

First and chiefly, we have seen that Origen regards the death of our Lord as a ransom paid for our deliverance from the power of Satan; and the three ideas involved in this theory, and expressly insisted on by him—of an actual right over us acquired by the Devil through sin, which could not justly be rescinded without some adequate compensation; of the deceit practised upon him, by which he was made the instrument of his own discomfiture; and of the necessity for the death of Christ as the only sufficient ransom—form the basis of its treatment by later Fathers, who labour to harmonize what had seemed inconsistent, and to clear up what was left uncertain in the original statement. It was shown, on the other hand, that Origen taught, like his predecessors, that our Lord's death was a sacrifice offered to God, though he does not explain why this sacrifice was needed, or how it was at the same time a satisfaction to the Devil. This view also is developed in the writers who followed him; but the notion of a ransom paid to Satan continues to be the common explanation of the necessity for Christ's death till St. Anselm's time, finding indeed its last express utterance in Peter Lombard. We may proceed, therefore, to examine the patristic literature of this period as treating the question under these two opposite aspects, of a satisfaction to Satan and a sacrifice to God; not taking each writer separately, but using the testimony

of all so far as it bears on our subject. John Scotus Erigena, who stands alone in the ninth century, isolated alike in character and in date from the Fathers who preceded and the Scholastic writers who followed him, shall be reserved for separate notice at the end of the chapter.

Foremost among the Greek Fathers of the period before us stands Gregory Nyssen, foremost among the Latin stands a name, which is to Christian theology what Plato and Aristotle are to the philosophy of the ancient world, a name never to be mentioned without admiration and reverence—though even to the greatest of human teachers we may ascribe no infallibility—Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It is these two writers, and especially St. Augustine, whom we shall find, here as elsewhere, the most prominent though by no means the solitary exponents of the theology of their age. If I make special mention after them of Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, Gregory the Great, and St. Leo, in connection with our present subject, it is by no means to the exclusion of other and still memorable names. Let us proceed, then, first to investigate their view of the atonement as a ransom paid to Satan, including the three ideas of his claim to a payment, the delusion under which he accepted or rather extorted it, and its necessity.

1. It was Origen's argument, that Satan had acquired an actual right over men through the Fall, for which the Soul or Blood of Jesus was the only adequate ransom. That right is admitted more or less distinctly

by all subsequent Fathers, and while some, as St. Leo, call it 'tyrannical,' they do not deny it to be just.¹ Peter Lombard, indeed, the latest advocate of the theory, distinguishes between the justice of our bondage and the injustice of our task-master; but he lived after St. Anselm had pointed out the distinction, and made it a ground for rejecting the whole scheme.² So late as the eighth century, the last Greek theologian, John of Damascus, though, as we shall see by and by, not ignorant of its difficulties or willing to accept it in its entirety, asserts expressly that the tyrant would have had ground for complaint, if after having himself conquered man he had been violently robbed of his prize by God.³ The same view is expounded at length by St. Augustine, St. Gregory Nyssen, St. Gregory the Great, Theodoret, and others, on the ground that, as we had voluntarily placed ourselves under Satan's dominion, we could not justly be delivered from it without an equivalent being paid.⁴ And that equivalent, they declare with one voice, was the Blood of Christ. "The price is the Blood of Christ," says St. Augustine, who may speak for all the rest.⁵ It is in this sense, and not with any notion of our sins being imputed to Him, that they understand His death as vicarious, and His being made a curse for us. We

¹ Leo *Serm.* xxii. 3. "Jus tyrannicum vindicabat, nec injusto dominatu premebat."

² Pet. Lomb. *Sent. Lib.* iii. *Dist.* 19.

³ *De Fid. Orth.* iii. 18.

⁴ Aug. *De Lib. Arb.* iii. 10. Greg. Nyss. *Or. Cat.* xxiii. Greg. Mag. *Mor.* xvii. 28. Theod. *De Prov. Or.* x.

⁵ *Enarr. in Ps.* 95.

were given in pledge, St. Ambrose says, to an evil creditor, and Christ "is not unjustly *said* to be made sin, since He was offered for sin;" and so St. Augustine, "By receiving the punishment, and not the sin, He destroyed both sin and punishment;" St Athanasius, "Seeing the impossibility of our paying an equivalent penalty, He took it on Himself;" and Eusebius, "He took the curse upon Him, being made a curse for us; for what else is this than a ransom for our souls (*ἀντιψυχὸν*)?" "This solution of the evil was left," says Proclus, "for neither man nor angel would suffice;" and Gregory the Great, "The Father being just disposes all things justly, punishing the Just One;"¹ but this language of God punishing the Son is rarely met with, however it be explained. They add that the payment greatly exceeded the debt; it was not only a full equivalent for all other things together, it was, as Gregory Nyssen says, a higher and greater discharge.² God did more than justice to the Evil One. "The adversary," says St. Ambrose, "rated us at a low price, as slaves, but the Lord ransomed us for a great price, as being made after His image and likeness."³ But why, it may be asked, was this particular kind of ransom required? The answer, already suggested by Origen, seems to be this. Man had voluntarily succumbed in his conflict with Satan; and the tyrant could

¹ Amb. *De Virg.* iii. *ad fin.* In *Ep. ad Cor.* ii. 5. Aug. *Serm.* xxxvii. in *Luc.* Ath. *In Pass. et Cruce Dei.* Euseb. *De Dem. Ev.* x. 1, Procl. *Const. Hom. de Christ. Nat.* Greg. *Moral.* iii. 13.

² Basil. *Hom. in Ps.* xlviii. The references to Greg. Nyss., where it is not otherwise stated, are to his *Catechetics*, ch. 25-28.

³ Ambr. *In Luc.* vii. 2.

claim dominion over him till he had slain one perfectly righteous, free from actual, and, as St. Augustine is careful to add, original sin, and who had foiled him by the use of that same free-will which man had perverted to his ruin. Many righteous men he had in past times striven against and slain, but none, even the holiest of them, was perfect. One alone could successfully contend with him; and here we see Irenæus' view of the Temptation illustrated.¹ One alone could suffer a wholly unmerited punishment, who as God was sinless, and as man could die. In the words of St. Leo, the great doctor of the Incarnation; "Though, in the sight of the Lord, the death of many saints was precious, yet the killing of no innocent man was the propitiation of the world; the just received crowns, but did not bestow them; from the fortitude of the faithful came examples of patience, not gifts of righteousness."²

2. But how came the price to be accepted, if Satan had the option of refusing it; or, rather, why did he violently extort what deprived him for the future of his empire over the souls of men? To this question Origen had not scrupled to answer, that Satan was deceived, and deceived by God; and here he is followed by all succeeding writers. But *how* this was done Origen did not explain. They do; and their explanation is a startling one. He was deceived, they say, by means of the Incarnation, and they sometimes

¹ Greg. Mag. *In Luc. i.*, *Hom. xvi. 2.* Cf. *supr. p. 116.*

² Leo, *De Pass. Serm. xii.*

even speak as if the main object of the Incarnation was to deceive him. No one is more explicit on this point than Gregory Nyssen, who dwells on the skill and cunning of the arrangement.¹ The human nature of Christ was the veil to shroud His Divinity; according to Gregory the Great, it was the bait whereon the Evil One was to be caught and pierced, as a fish on the hook; it was a net to catch the bird in, according to Isidore of Seville; the Cross, adds Peter Lombard, was a mousetrap, baited with His Blood.² One passage shall be quoted from Gregory Nyssen, where this view is stated in full: "It was impossible for him (Satan) to look on the bare form of God without seeing in Him something of flesh, which he had already subdued through sin. *For this cause the Godhead was veiled in flesh*, that looking on Him according to what was of kindred nature (on His humanity) he might not dread the approach of superior power, and after seeing His power quietly shine out more and more through His miracles, might think He was rather to be coveted [as a victim] than to be dreaded." St. Leo speaks in much the same sense.³ Not that Satan was supposed to be ignorant that Christ was the Son of God, or that He was incarnated for our redemption, but ignorant of the means destined to accomplish it, and therefore persuaded that, if he could kill the Redeemer, he could also retain Him in his power, and

¹ τὸ σοφὸν καὶ τεχνικὸν τῆς οἰκονομίας.

² Greg. *Mor.* xxxii. 7. Isid. Sev. *Sent.* i. 14. Pet. Lomb. *Sent.* ii. 19.

³ Leo *Serm.* xxii. 4.

frustrate His design.¹ It is obvious that this view is very difficult to reconcile with that of a bargain struck and price paid, which yet is equally maintained by Gregory Nyssen under the term used before by Origen (*ἀντάλλαγμα*). Others, as Gregory the Great and St. Leo, dwell less on this aspect of the matter and insist more exclusively on the deception. It was necessary, for this end, that Christ should be born (His miraculous birth Satan knew not) and pass through the ordinary stages of childhood, youth, and manhood, as the introduction to His Crucifixion, by which Satan finally overreached and defeated himself. On the difficulties of this theory something shall be said presently. Meanwhile, let us pass on to the third point included in it.

3. All, from Irenæus downwards, who have advocated the notion of a payment made to Satan, state or imply that it was necessary as a matter of justice. But was the necessity an absolute one? The Fathers are unanimous in replying that it was not; and when they speak of it as necessary, they must be understood as meaning that it was necessary, if an adequate price were to be paid at all. Gregory Nyssen asks why God does not of His own mere will do what He purposes, and answers that we cannot tell. Gregory Nazianzen says that, as He made all things by His word, He might have saved us by His will; Athanasius, that He might by a mere word have loosed the curse; Theodoret, that He might have dissolved the power

¹ Greg. *Moral.* xxxiii. 7.

of death by His will only. Gregory the Great, St. Leo, and St. Cyril of Alexandria say the same.¹ St. Augustine is even more outspoken: "They are fools who say, the wisdom of God could not otherwise deliver man than by taking human nature and being born of a woman, and suffering all things at sinners' hands; but if He did otherwise, your folly would be equally dissatisfied." He says elsewhere that the method chosen was good and congruous to the Divine dignity, and no other could be more convenient, but that others might have been found.² It was this congruity, as matter of justice towards Satan, that led God, according to the Fathers, to choose the method He did choose; some add, as Athanasius and Augustine, that it was also chosen as the most beneficial to man. We see, then, what they mean by speaking, in this connection, of a necessity for the Incarnation and the Cross.

As I began the account of this theory with a quotation from its first author in the Church, St. Irenæus, it may be closed with the following passage from its latest advocate, Peter Lombard; "He was made, therefore, mortal man, that by death He might conquer the Devil. For unless He were man who overcame the Devil, man would seem to be violently, not justly, delivered from him to whom he had voluntarily subjected himself. But if man overcame him, he clearly

¹ Greg. Nyss. *Or. Cat.* 17. Greg. Naz. *Or.* 9. Ath. *Cont. Arian.* *Or.* ii. 68. Theod. *Contr. Græcos Disp.* 6. Leo *Serm.* i. *De Nativ.* Greg. *Moral.* xx. 26. Cyril Alex. *De Incarn.* See for other authorities Petav. *De Incarn.* ii. 13.

² Aug. *De Agone Christi*, 10. *Ib.* *De Trin.* xiii. 10.

lost all right over man, and, for man to conquer, God must be in him to make him free from sin. For if he were mere man, or an incarnate angel, he might easily sin, as we know both natures have fallen by themselves. Therefore the Son of God assumed a passible humanity, in which He tasted death for us, and by which He opened heaven to us, and redeemed us from the service of the Devil, that is from sin (for the Devil's service is sin) and from punishment."¹

It is obvious to remark, that this method of regarding the Passion and death of Christ brings out certain aspects of truth with conspicuous clearness. It exhibits that mighty contest between good and evil which has been waged incessantly, since the mystery of iniquity began to work, in the world, in the Church, and in each separate soul, but which reached its culminating point when the Tempter strove with the human Soul of Jesus, through every avenue of sense or spirit, through the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, and prevailed not. All possible malice of all possible temptations was gathered up and concentrated in that last bold act of rebellion, and all was staked upon the issue. If the Evil One conquered then, he conquered all; if he failed, all was lost. The pledge of our victory was assured when the Soul of the Redeemer passed beneath his fiery touch, shrinking, indeed, in all but intolerable anguish no tongue may utter, no heart of man conceive, from that close approach of defilement, yet passed unscathed, as

¹ Pet. Lomb. *Sent.* iii. 19.

the three Holy Children through the fiery furnace of Babylon. Till then he had seemed to triumph; the righteous suffered, and their blood was spilt upon the earth. They were scourged, or stoned, or sawn asunder, or burnt, or crucified, and the world was glad at their departure. In the fulness of time God sent His Son, who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth, and because of His perfect holiness men rose up against Him and slew Him; but His death was the life of the world. The woman's Seed had crushed the serpent's head. The representative wickedness of mankind, all the darkest sins that stain our corrupt humanity, were collected, during that Paschal week, within the circle of the apostate city. Pride, impurity, hypocrisy, cowardice, cruelty, falsehood, the bitterness of malice, the meanness of jealousy, the devilish hatred of superior goodness—all were there. There was the incestuous Herod, the coward judge, who bartered right for interest, the traitor apostle, the hypocritical priesthood, the frenzied, fanatical multitude. There was the horrible determination to put down an opponent by foul means, if not by fair; if evidence were wanting, false witnesses could be purchased; if violence were dangerous, the end could be attained by fraud. The odium of judicial murder could be thrown on the Gentile, but the voice was the voice of the Jewish Sanhedrim, though a Roman governor pronounced the sentence, and Roman soldiers fulfilled it.¹ If, then, that crowning iniquity could

¹ διὰ χειρῶν ἀνόμων προσπήξαντες ἀνείλετε. Acts ii. 23.

be pardoned—and it is a pious tradition in the Church that all who had a hand in crucifying Jesus are now before His throne in heaven—none need despair of forgiveness. In the redemption of His murderers we read the promise of our own.

With sacrifice the tale of our misery had begun, and with sacrifice it was to end. In the dim twilight of human history, when sin was first breaking in on that fair creation, which the All-Merciful had blessed because it was very good, there is revealed the form of a mother, struck with anguish, weeping over the fierce iniquity of her first-born and the beautiful corpse of her martyr-boy; martyred, it would seem, in that very act of sacrifice which is the creature's rightful homage to his Maker and his God. Thousands of years rolled by, and another Mother, pierced with the sword of sorrows, stood beneath the noonday starlight on the mount of death, where the Blood that speaks better things than the blood of Abel flowed, and the cry rose up from the darkened Cross, whose echo dies not day nor night before the throne in heaven, and the altars of the earthly Church; "Father forgive, they know not what they do." Henceforth the law of suffering, to which the Incarnate Son had voluntarily submitted, was turned from a curse into a beatitude; self-sacrifice became the royal road of redemption, the baptism of blood was for remission of sin. The kingdom of Satan, like the kingdom of God, is within us, and he is then most near the sons of God when they come to present themselves before the Lord. Therefore He came, in whom alone the

Prince of this world could have no part nor lot, to break the chains of that bondage of corruption, and bid the slave go free.

In this sense, the speculations of the Fathers on the relation of the Incarnation to the Evil One have left an abiding heritage to the Church. But, on the other hand, the theory of a ransom, if literally understood, is beset with difficulties, both intellectual and moral, of the gravest kind. First, it is not coherent; for how can the notion of Satan being deceived, which forms an integral portion of it, be reconciled with the notion of a bargain struck and a price paid to satisfy a claim of justice? If he was tricked into forfeiting his just rights by grasping at rights where he had none, how is compensation made to him? Then, again, how can the Blood, or Soul, or death of the Redeemer be an equivalent to him at all for the empire which he lost, when it gave him no real power over Him who died only to rise again from the dead, whose Soul was not left in Hades, and whose Flesh knew no corruption? And if the theory labours under these logical difficulties, the moral and religious objections are still more serious. What is meant by God deceiving the Devil, and by the parallel so elaborately drawn by many writers between the deceit which ruined man and the deceit which redeemed him? When, for instance, Gregory Nyssen says, that the one wrought his deceit for the corruption of our nature, but the Just, and Good and Wise used the counsel of

deceit for the salvation of that which was corrupted,¹ is not this like saying that the end justified the means, that deception was the chosen instrument of the God of truth? A modern writer, viewing the whole question from the independent stand-point of impartial unbelief, adds a further objection, that the Incarnation being thus introduced for an illusory purpose is in danger of being itself regarded as a phenomenal illusion, and the Docetic heresy brought back by a side-wind into the Church.² That, however, seems an over-refinement of criticism. Those who insist most strongly on this object of the Redeemer in taking human nature, insist also on the necessity of His actual death, which required a real, not merely a phenomenal, body; not to repeat here an observation made before, in a different connection, that the Fathers recognise many other objects of the Incarnation which certainly involve its reality. It is more to the purpose to remark, what indeed did not escape the notice of many advocates of the theory, that there is something shocking to natural reverence in the Blood of the Holy One becoming the prize of Satan. More than that, the whole theory carried with it the original sin of its Gnostic parentage. The essentially dualistic notion of two independent powers, set over against one another, of a kingdom of light and a kingdom of

¹ He proceeds, οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀπολωλότα διὰ τούτων ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀπωλείαν καθ' ἡμῶν ἐνεργήσαντα, which seems to imply his agreement in Origen's belief of the restoration of the fallen angels.

² Baur, *Von der Versöhnung*, pp. 82, 83.

darkness, with jurisdictions mutually limited by conflicting claims, lies inevitably at the root of any system which treats evil as other than a temporary and accidental interruption of the divine order, or ascribes to the Evil Spirit rights of whatever kind, and though acquired by the voluntary and disgraceful submission of his captives, as against the supremacy of Him who is infinite in holiness as in power and love. An unjust victory could confer no claims, nor wrong, because it was successful, become the ground of an immoral right.

This radical flaw of the Origenist system had not been unfelt from the first, while its inadequacy as an explanation of the great mystery of redemption had prevented it from ever being held alone. We have seen that Origen himself combined with it the idea of a sacrifice offered to God, though without attempting to harmonize the two, which indeed was scarcely possible. Nor was this idea ever lost sight of by succeeding writers. It is suggested in antagonism to the dominant theory, as early as the fourth century, by Gregory Nazianzen. To the question, *To whom* was Christ's Blood paid as a ransom? he replies; "If to the Evil One, shame upon the insult, that the robber should not only receive a ransom from God, but receive God Himself, a payment so much exceeding in value his own tyranny, on account of which it was just that we also should be spared. But if it was paid to the Father first, how? For it was not by Him we were held captive. And next, *for what reason should the Blood of His only-begotten Son please the Father*, who

would not receive Isaac when being offered up by his father, but changed the victim and gave a ram instead of the human sacrifice? Or is it clear that the Father receives it, *without having asked or needed it*, but on account of the dispensation (*οἰκονομίαν*) and its being fit that men should be sanctified by that which is mortal in God, that He might deliver us Himself, having conquered the tyrant by violence, and bring us back to Himself through the mediation of His Son, who disposed this too to the honour of the Father, to whom He seems to concede all things."¹ This was to assert that a sacrifice was presented to the Father, but to reject particular theories about it as doubtful or superfluous. And, accordingly, the writer says elsewhere that it is a point on which we are free to speculate, for though not without advantage to hit the mark, it is not dangerous to miss it.² Four centuries later, John of Damascus, who repeats almost the very words of Gregory as to the price being paid to the tyrant, though in an earlier chapter of the same book he had acknowledged a certain claim of justice on Satan's side, decides, against Gregory, that the 'ransom' was paid to the Father because we had sinned against Him.³ It is remarkable that Gregory, while discarding the idea of a payment to Satan, yet retains one of the strangest features of that theory, saying that he who had deceived us with the hope of Godhead was himself deceived by the veil of flesh.

¹ Greg. Naz. Or. 42.

² Ib. Or. 33.

³ De Fid. Orth. iii. 27. Cf. *supr.* p. 128.

This idea of a sacrifice offered to the Father, or rather to the whole Trinity,¹ is stated or implied by the great body of patristic writers, though not made the basis of any particular scheme of satisfaction, and usually held in connection with the notion of a ransom paid to Satan. St. Athanasius speaks of Christ offering a sacrifice for all; St. Augustine traces out the essential obligation of sacrifice, even antecedently to the conviction of sin, as the outward expression of the supreme homage (λατρεία) due to God; Eusebius refers to the sacrifice of Abel, which he says was accepted in preference to Cain's because it was an animal sacrifice; St. Cyril of Alexandria says, "This was the goat sent alive into the wilderness, the goat that was offered to the Lord as a victim for the propitiation of sins, and made a true propitiation for the peoples who believe on Him;" St. Leo speaks of an offering to God, though he dwells chiefly on the necessity of a ransom from the power of the Evil One; St. Gregory the Great says, that the Son of God offered a sacrifice for us, and insists that a victim for man must himself be man, but to cleanse them from sin must be sinless.² The only attempt, if such it can be called, to mediate between these theories is in the view dwelt upon in St. Athanasius' treatise on the Incarnation, of a sinless victim being needed to undergo the sentence of death, incurred by man, as an obligation or kind of debt, at the Fall, and

¹ Fulgent. *Contr. Arian*. ii. 4. Cf. Ans. *Cur Deus Homo*, ii. 18.

² Eus. *De Dem. Ev.* i. 10. Aug. *De Civ. Dei*, x. 19. *Contr. Faust.* xx. et passim. Cyril *In Lev.* x. Greg. Mag. *Mor.* xvii. 46.

from which God could not otherwise release him without being untrue to His own word. The writer sometimes speaks of an equivalent (κατάλληλον), sometimes of a debt owed (ὀφειλόμενον τῷ θανάτῳ) or a full satisfaction to death; and he thus illustrates the two natures of our Lord, who must be man to die, and more than man not to be under the obligation of dying. The Word is said to take to Himself a body, which partaking of the common nature of all may be fit to die in the place of all, but through the indwelling Word may remain incorruptible.¹ The same view is expressed by St. Ambrose, when he says that our Lord underwent death in order that the sentence might be fulfilled and the decree satisfied.²

At the root of all these theories, whether of a ransom paid to Satan, or a sacrifice to God, or a fulfilment of the sentence pronounced on Adam's sin, lay two ideas, which became afterwards the two factors of the Scholastic theory of satisfaction, and which were brought into prominence by the controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries, in the East on the Godhead and Incarnation of the Eternal Son, in the West on the extent of man's natural faculties and the doctrines of grace. These ideas are, on the one hand, the infinite value of the human acts and sufferings of the

¹ Ath. *De Inc.* 9. τὸ δυνάμενον ἀποθανεῖν ἑαυτῷ λαμβάνει σῶμα, ἵνα τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων λόγου μεταλαβὼν ἀντὶ πάντων ἱκανὸν γένηται τῷ θανάτῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸν ἐνοικήσαντα λόγον ἀφθαρτον διαμείνῃ.

² Ambr. *De Fug. Sæc.* "ut impleteret sententia et satisfaceret judicato." Here we have the word 'satisfy,' but in reference to the sentence pronounced on Adam, not to the justice of God.

Redeemer, through the hypostatic union; on the other, the exceeding sinfulness of sin, and the need of Divine grace to supplement the weakness of a corrupted will. The latter point assumed a new importance and distinctness in St. Augustine's controversy with the Pelagians. St. Athanasius, in his first and second Orations against the Arians, is led constantly to argue that only One who is Himself God could mediate between God and man, could restore to us the holiness we had lost, make us partakers of the Divine nature, sons of God, and heirs of eternal life. A mere man, he urges, might have preached forgiveness, he could not have really removed the barrier between man and God. St. Cyril, in his tenth anathema, is still more explicit; he says again; "One would not have been equivalent to all, had He been mere man; but if He is understood to be God incarnate and suffering in His own flesh, *the whole creation is little as compared to Him*;" as little, says St. Chrysostom, as a tiny drop to the boundless ocean. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says similarly, that the iniquity of sinners was not so great as the righteousness of Him who died for them, who was not mere man or angel, but Incarnate God.¹ Thus the whole doctrine of Redemption was seen to hinge on a right belief about the Person and nature of the Redeemer, and therefore also about the Holy Trinity. Only One, who was God and Man, could bring man again into

¹ Ath. *Con. Arian.* i. 19, 37, 49; ii. 14, 20, 68, 69, 70, 77. Cyril. Alex. *De Recta Fide.* Ib. *Contr. Nestor.* iii. 2. Chrys. *Hom. x. in Ep. ad Rom.* Cyril. Hier. *Cat.* xiii. 33.

communion with God. But it is rather His assumption of our nature in all its fulness than His death alone, that the Fathers dwelt upon. He is the Representative Man, the Second Adam, the Head of the Body, who recapitulates in Himself, as they are fond of expressing it, the whole human race, and imparts to them, through the union of their nature with His, a new principle of life, in whose death all die, in whose resurrection all are made alive. This is Athanasius' great argument against the Arians; so, too, St. Augustine says, "That nature was to be assumed which had to be delivered." Hilary of Poitiers had said before him; "He took on Himself the nature of all flesh, by which, being made the True Vine, He contains in Himself the race of all the progeny of flesh," that is, He is to the new creation what Adam was to the old. And St. Leo says, after him, that the Son of God is one and the same Christ in all His saints, that on the cross is celebrated the oblation of human nature.²

Enough has been said to show, from what point of view the Fathers were wont to regard the Redeemer's office and work, and that their whole teaching hinged on a right understanding of His consubstantiality with the Father by virtue of His Eternal Generation, and with us by His Conception in Mary's womb. In bring-

¹ Aug. *De Vera Rel.* 30. Hil. *De Trin.* ii. 24. Leo *Serm.* lxvi. 4. *De Pass.* iv. It is a strange perversion of this idea when Strauss says, "True philosophy substitutes for Jesus the abstract term Humanity. Humanity dies, rises again, and ascends up on high. The individual Jesus is of little moment, saving in so far as He may have served to bring out the idea." We may reply, in the words of Rousseau, *L'inventeur en serait plus étonnant que le héros.* (*Emile*, 54, 4.)

ing out the need of a reconciliation between God and man, divided by sin, and the infinite dignity of the Person of Christ, they laid a basis for future speculation on the atonement; but their own theories, whether of a ransom paid to Satan, or a sacrifice offered to God upon the Cross, were kept subordinate to their reiterated and many-sided exhibition of the assumption of our nature by the Incarnate Word, the Corner Stone who makes both one, the Man whom holy Job sought and found not, who could arbitrate between him and his Maker, because He laid His hand on both.¹ The Incarnation itself they regard as "a kind of perpetual sacrifice," in which the whole human family is offered up to God, and this begins from the first moment of the Conception. "By the mystery of His humanity," says Gregory the Great, "He offers an everlasting sacrifice."² He is Priest and Temple, Altar and Victim, all in One.

But they never imagined, let it be distinctly repeated, that the Incarnation or the Cross effected a *change* in the mind of God towards us, or implied a division of will between the Father and the Son. The sacrifice of Calvary, however explained, they looked upon as part of an eternal purpose, not a device to avert the wrath of the Father, but the utterance of His unfailing love. The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world, though offered once for all in

¹ Job. ix. 33.

² Greg. *Mor.* i. 19. See Thomass. *De Inc.* x. 8, 9, and the passages there quoted.

blood on the Cross, offered continually, till time shall be no more, in the heavenly Jerusalem and on the altars of the earthly Church. I quoted a writer of the first century who lays down this principle. Let me add here the testimony of the greatest doctor of his own or any age of Christian history. The passage is too remarkable to be curtailed; "What means this, 'reconciled by the death of His Son?' Is it, that when the Father was angry with us He looked on the death of His Son for us and was appeased? Had the Son, then, been so completely appeased already, that He even vouchsafed to die for us, but was the Father still so incensed that He would not be appeased unless the Son died for us? And what is it, which the same teacher of the Gentiles says elsewhere; 'What then shall we say to these things? If God be for us, who is against us? He, who spared not His own Son but delivered him up for us all, how has He not with Him given us all things?' Would the Father, unless he had been already appeased, deliver up His Son for us, not sparing Him? Do not these statements seem to contradict each other? In the former the Son dies for us, and the Father is reconciled to us by His death; but in the latter the Father, as though He first loved us, Himself does not spare His Son for our sakes, Himself delivers Him up to death for us. But I see that the Father loved us before also, not only before the Son died for us but before He created the world, as the Apostle himself testifies, saying, 'As He has chosen us in Him before the creation of the world.'

Nor was the Son delivered up for us, as it were, unwillingly when the Father spared Him not, since it is said of Him also, ‘who loved me, and gave Himself for me.’ The Father, therefore, and the Son, and the Spirit of Both, work all things at the same time, equally and harmoniously; yet we are justified in the Blood of Christ, and reconciled to God through the death of His Son.” This shows how little a change in the Divine Mind, or a division of will in the Persons of the Trinity was thought of. “One,” says St. Leo, “is the kindness of Their mercy as the sentence of Their justice, nor is there any division in action where there is no diversity in will.” And Cyril of Alexandria almost repeats the very words, already quoted, from the Epistle to Diognetus: “God was and is good by nature, ever full of mercy and pity, and did not become this in time, but was shown to be such towards us.”¹ It was we who changed; His mercies had not failed. With Him, who knows no shadow of vicissitude, the grace of redemption was involved in the prevision of sin.²

And now we are in a position to answer the question which may perhaps have occurred to the reader,

¹ Aug. *De Trin.* xiii. 11. Leo *Serm.* iii. *De Pent.* Cyr. Alex. *adv. Nestor.* iii. 2.

² Thus Campbell: “If God provides the atonement, then the love of God must precede atonement; and the atonement must be the form of the manifestation of the forgiving love of God, not its cause.....the Scriptures do not represent the love of God to man as the effect, and the atonement of Christ as the cause, but—just the contrary—they represent the love of God as the cause, and the atonement as the effect. “God so loved the world, that he gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him might not perish, but have everlasting life.” *Nature of Atonement*, pp. 18—20.

as to why we find so little of definite theory on the Atonement among the Fathers, while one view very prevalent then has since completely passed away, and a great writer even says it is a matter on which we need not have any theory at all. Was their faith in Christ uncertain, or were they ashamed of the foolishness of the Cross? The answer is not far to seek. To them, as to the Church in all ages, it was not the Atonement but the Incarnation which was the centre of Christian faith as of Christian life; the *Incarnatus* was the key-note of their creed. The difference between their way of looking at the matter and that which came in with the Reformation may be shortly described as follows. By the Reformers, the incarnation and earthly life of Christ is regarded only, or chiefly, as the necessary introduction to His atoning death; while the Fathers see in His death, not an isolated act, or even an isolated sacrifice, but the natural consummation of that one great act of self-devotion whose unbroken energy stretched from the Conception to the Cross. The Blood that flowed on Calvary was indeed the price of redemption, but it could not be thought of apart from the Redeemer's life; it was not so much the blood as the will of Him who shed it, that was the real oblation;¹ His work of mediation was summed up but not exhausted in the act of dying; He was anointed for His priesthood in Mary's womb; He is still a Priest in Heaven. In all

¹ Thus St. Bernard said afterwards, in reply to Abelard, "Non mors sed voluntas sponte morientis placuit."

the stages of that life, as in the closing sacrifice, the believer was to be associated, I might almost say identified, with his Lord; "on the Cross was celebrated the oblation of our common humanity," as the faithful unite the oblation of themselves with the abiding sacrifice of the altar. In the words of a modern writer, "As the Atonement is the development of the Incarnation, so is Christianity a development of the Atonement." The whole life of Christians was to be, like His who died for them, an act of life-long crucifixion, but also a risen life, for all rise with him.¹ Over all that touched His Person the Church kept jealous watch, for in Him she lived and moved and had her being, and on Him through successive ages was fixed her deepening gaze. He had assumed man's nature, with all its sinless infirmities, and by the very act of assuming had restored it, and bridged over the chasm which divided the creature from his Creator. In that nature He died for us. Fathers and doctors might well be suffered to use their own judgment in explaining the efficacy of His death, or to abstain from explanations, so long as the truth of His Person and natures, on which all its efficacy rested, was held fast. And in this the Church did but carry out the intimations of Scripture, which does not dwell exclusively on the

¹ Thus Robertson says: "Real human life is a perpetual completion and repetition of the Sacrifice of Christ,—'All are dead,' the explanation of which follows, 'to live, not to themselves, but to Him who died for them, and rose again.'" Robertson's *Sermons*, vol. iii., p. 114. The author adds, "This is the truth that lies at the bottom of the Romish doctrine of the mass." Rather, it is part of that doctrine, for "the mass is the compendium of the Gospel."

death of Christ, but exhibits in the four Gospels the facts and words of His earthly ministry. When, for instance, we read; "For this end hath the Son of God appeared, that He may destroy the works of the Devil," it is rather His life than His death that is referred to. By His victory over the Tempter, by His miracles of mercy, by His perfect obedience, by His pure teaching, by the vocation of His Apostles, by the institution of His Church, no less than by the crowning act of self-devotion on Calvary, He broke the power of the Evil One. When, again, He says of Himself, "I am come that they may have life, and that they may have it more abundantly," He speaks not so much of the forgiveness of sin as of the engrafting in our nature of a new principle of life through union with His own, who took root, according to the Prophet's saying, as a tender plant in the dry and thirsty soil of our corrupted humanity. It was when all this was coming to be forgotten, when the Incarnation itself was thrust into the background, the sacraments which are its application slighted, and the Sacrifice of the Altar which perpetuates it reduced to a symbolic form, that theories about the Atonement were made into articles of a standing or falling Church, and became, for those who had lost the true key for interpreting it, a source of manifold misconceptions. When the life of Jesus was treated as a biographical record, men began to wrangle about the meaning of His death.

I make no apology for closing this summary of patristic teaching with words which express its spirit far

better than any I could hope to use myself: "The Son of God then took our nature upon Him, that in Him it might do and suffer what in itself was impossible to it. What it could not effect of itself, it could effect in Him. He carried it about Him through a life of penance. He carried it forward to agony and death. In Him our sinful nature died and rose again. When it died in Him on the Cross, that death was its new creation. In Him it satisfied its old and heavy debt; for the presence of His divinity gave it transcendent merit. His presence had kept it pure from sin from the first. His Hand had carefully selected the choicest specimen of our nature from the Virgin's substance; and, separating from it all defilement, His personal indwelling hallowed it and gave it power. And thus, when it had been offered up on the Cross, and made perfect by suffering, it became the first-fruits of a new man; it became a divine leaven of holiness for the new birth and spiritual life of as many as should receive it."¹

From the death of Gregory the Great, 'the last of the Fathers,' at the beginning of the seventh century, till St. Anselm came forward, at the close of the eleventh as the pioneer of Scholasticism, the theology of Western Christendom slept, it has been said, her winter sleep—a sleep disturbed rather than broken by the strange apparition in the ninth century of John Scotus Erigena, one of the most original thinkers of his own or any age,

¹ Newman's *Paroch. Sermon*, vol. vi. p. 86.

as of one born out of due time.¹ He belongs, however, more to the preceding than the subsequent period, and must therefore be noticed here. Christian theology, as has been observed before, took its rise at Alexandria, the home of Neo-Platonism, in the third century; its later scholastic form was based on the study of the other great master of ancient philosophy, Aristotle. Erigena, who drew his inspirations chiefly from Maximus, the last but one of the Greek theologians, and the works composed during the fifth century under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, is the latest and most systematic exponent of a Platonic theosophy of the Gospel. With the part he took in the controversies of his own day on predestination and the Eucharist, we need not meddle here. Nor can I profess to do more than give a brief sketch of his teaching on sin and redemption, as gathered from his five books on the *Division of Nature*.² It would be beyond my present scope to enter into any lengthened discussion of it, or to trace its connection in detail with other parts of his system, which in regarding the Divine nature as incomprehensible alike to itself and to every created intellect, as not something but nothing because exceeding everything, not itself being, but the source of

¹ He was a Scotch or Irish monk, and is said to have visited Athens in his youth. He certainly knew Greek, for he translated the works of Dionysius. It was his aim to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, in whom he professed an equal belief. Milman thinks he "not improbably became a pantheist," (*Lat. Christ.* vol. iii. p. 89). Ozanam (*Hist. Civil.* vol. i. p. 33), speaks more cautiously of his "halting on the very brink of pantheism." The more charitable verdict is far the likeliest to be the right one.

² *De Divisione Naturarum*, lib. v. *Div. Desiderati*. Oxon. 1681.

being to others,¹ is not easy to reconcile with God's revelation of Himself, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. His explanation of the fall and restoration of man, translated into the simplest language it will bear, may be stated thus. The Creator is properly one with His creation, for He contains in Himself the primordial ideas or archetypes on which it is formed; man, His chief work, is the middle point of creation, combining in himself the opposite poles of creaturely existence, the sensible and the intellectual.² He fell, not in time and in the earthly paradise, but in himself, and before the temptation of the Devil, for it is incredible that had he ever stood in contemplation of eternal peace, he should have fallen at all.³ By this fall he not only lost his original union with God, but suffered an internal division in himself into male and female, which was healed by the resurrection of Christ, who rose, not in bodily sex but simply as man, for in Him is neither male nor female.⁴ Man retained, however, in his fall the mind, in which chiefly consists the image of the Creator, and by which we understand Him, and did not wholly desert the Author of his existence, for in

¹ Ib. ii. p. 78.

² Ib. ii. p. 48.

³ Ib. iv. p. 196. "Datur intelligi quod homo prius in se ipso lapsus est quam a diabolo tentaretur, non enim credibile est eundem hominem et in contemplatione æternæ pacis stetisse, et, suadente feminâ, serpentis veneno corruptâ, corruisse."

⁴ Ib. ii. p. 49, cf. p. 52. "Adunatio totius creaturæ quæ in primo homine fieret si non peccaret, in Christo resurgente ante omnes per omnia facta. Non enim in sexu cori oreo sed in homine tantum surrexit ex mortuis, in ipso enim nec masculus nec femina erat."

Him we live and move and have our being.¹ But there was need of reconciliation. Therefore the Word of God took upon Him human nature, and in doing so took upon Him the nature of every created substance, visible or invisible, that He might save and restore all by saving and reuniting after an ineffable manner the outward products to the original causes or archetypes, which existed eternally and immutably in His own Divine nature; and thus, by His Incarnation, He gives to men redemption, and to angels knowledge of Himself, for before this incarnation or theophany He was incomprehensible to all created natures alike. The restoration of man is fulfilled in His death, for the dissolution of the body is the end of our destruction and is rather a benefit than a penalty, though it be the penalty of sin, and is not to be regarded as the perishing of our substance, but as a wonderful and ineffable return into the former state which man had lost by sin, that state of pure contemplation in which nothing remains but what is spiritual and intellectual, for the substance of the body is itself intellectual.²

The Platonic element in this scheme is obvious enough. We have the *ἰδεαί* and the *φαινόμενα*. The Word of God is incarnated in visible form to reunite the ideal with the actual, the One with the many, the figures traced on the wall of the earthly cave with the eternal archetypes whose reflection they are, but from which they have been unnaturally divorced by sin. The Incarnation and Resurrection are dwelt upon

¹ Ib. ii. p. 48, v. p. 230.

² Ib. v. p. 252, 232.

almost to the exclusion of the Passion, and the death of the corruptible body is felt to be not so much a punishment as a release, the rending asunder of the material veil interposed between the spirit of man and the spirit of God. Erigena's theory exhibits forcibly the abnormal division between man and his Maker, wrought by sin, and the need of One who shares the natures of both to become the Repairer of the breach. But it is not equally easy to connect all its details with the doctrines of the Gospel. He has rather galvanized than revived the Alexandrian theology in this last attempt to harmonize faith with reason through the forms of Neo-Platonism, and in his own day he found few to understand or appreciate it. For two centuries yet the trance of theological science remains unbroken; but sleepers dream before their awakening.

NOTE TO CHAPTER III.

ON STRAUSS' ESTIMATE OF THE BELIEF OF THE EARLY CHURCH.

IN a section on the "Christology of the Orthodox System," at the conclusion of his original work on the *Life of Jesus* (*Das Leben Jesu*. Tübingen, 1837), Strauss, after insisting that the outlines of that system are to be found in the New Testament and have their roots in the conviction of Christ's resurrection, had taken occasion to describe, with that eloquence which is always at his command when he chooses to employ it, the belief of the early Church in her Lord. He stood, like Balaam, to gaze on the armies of Israel, and his tongue was constrained to bless the faith which he has made it the labour of a lifetime to uproot. My object in referring to the statement here is to observe, that it substantially endorses the view of patristic theology taken in this volume. And since there is a lesson to be learnt from the utterances of 'Saul among the prophets,' and the book is not familiar to the majority of English readers, it may be worth while to translate the passage here, premising that some of its native force must inevitably evaporate in the process.

"How full of blessing and elevation, of encouragement and comfort, were the thoughts the early Church derived from this conception of her Christ! Through the sending of the Son of God into the world, and His delivery to death for it, heaven and earth are reconciled (2 Cor. v. 18, *sqq.*, Ephes. i. 10, Col. i. 20); through His

supreme oblation the love of God is guaranteed to men (Rom. v. 8, viii. 31, *sqq.*, 1 John iv. 9), and the most joyful hope opened to them. Since the Son of God has become Man, men are His brethren, and, as such, children of God, and joint heirs with Christ of the treasure of Divine beatitude. (Rom. viii. 16-29.) Their slavish estate under the law has ceased, and love has come into the place of the fear of punishment threatened by the law. (Rom. viii. 15, Gal. iv. 1, *sqq.*) Believers are redeemed from the curse of the law, inasmuch as Christ has given Himself up for them, by enduring that death on which the curse of the law was laid. (Gal. iii. 13.) Now we have no longer the impossible task of fulfilling all the requirements of the law (Gal. iii. 10, *sqq.*)—a task none have accomplished (Rom. i. 18, iii. 20), and, owing to the sinfulness of our nature, none can (Rom. v. 12, *sqq.*); which only entangles more deeply those who attempt it in the misery of an internal conflict with themselves. (Rom. vii. 7, *sqq.*) He who believes in Christ, and trusts to the atoning power of His death, is pardoned by God; he who surrenders himself to God's free grace is justified before Him by grace, not through any works or performances of his own, whence all self-righteousness is excluded. (Rom. iii. 31, *sqq.*) And, since the Mosaic law can no longer bind the believer who has died to it with Christ (Rom. vii. 1), since His eternal and all-sufficient Sacrifice has superseded the Jewish sacrifices and priesthood, the wall of partition which divided Jew from Gentile is broken down. The Gentiles, estranged from the old theocracy, left 'without God and without hope in the world,' are called to share in the new covenant of God, and a free approach provided for them to their heavenly Father. Thus the two great divisions of mankind, once at enmity with each other, are now at peace, members of the body of Christ, which is the spiritual edifice of His Church. (Eph. iii. 11, *sqq.*) But that justifying faith in the death of Christ is in very deed a dying with Him—a death, that is, unto sin; and as He rose from death to a new and immortal life, so shall they that believe on Him rise from the death of sin to a new life of righteousness and holiness; they shall put off the old man and put on the new. (Rom. vi. 1, *sqq.*) Christ Himself stands by to aid them with His Spirit, who fills those He inspires with spiritual might, and frees them more and more continually from the bondage of sin. (Romans viii. 1.) Nay, more; those

in whom that Spirit dwells will be quickened in body as well as soul; for when the course of this world is ended, God through Christ will raise their bodies as He has raised the body of Christ. (Rom. viii. 11.) Christ, whom the bonds of death and Hades could not hold (Acts ii. 24), has conquered both for us, and released believers from fear of those chiefest powers of mortality. (Rom. viii. 38, *sqq.*, 1 Cor. xv. 55, *sqq.*, Heb. ii. 14, *sqq.*) His resurrection, which gives to His death its atoning power (Rom. iv. 25), is also the pledge of our resurrection and future life in Him, when He shall return to take His own to the joys of His Messianic kingdom. (1 Cor. xv.) Meanwhile we are assured, that in Him we have an Intercessor with God, who knows our need of help and forbearance, because He knows by experience the infirmity of our nature, with which He has clothed Himself, and in which He was 'tempted in all points, yet without sin.'" (*Leben Jesu*, vol. ii. 695-7.)

Strauss goes on to argue, chiefly from Rom. i. 3, 4, viii. 34, 1 Tim. iii. 16, and the baptismal formula, that "the Church of the early centuries" had abundant materials for constructing "the so-called rule of faith," comprised eventually in the Apostles' Creed; of which the Incarnation—ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο—was the groundwork, and that she was fully justified in excluding as they arose the successive heresies, from the Ebionite to the Monothelite, which directly or indirectly contradicted that faith.

In his new *Life of Jesus* (*Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*. Leipzig, 1864), addressed this time not to a learned but a popular audience, "as Paul turned to the Gentiles when the Jews rejected his gospel," the concluding Dissertation, from which my extract is taken, does not occur. But the Preface contains a general endorsement of the contents of the former work. The author still regards the 'Christology' of the Church—that is, the whole Christian doctrine of the Incarnate Word—as the product of several 'Groups of Myths' (twelve are here given, ranging from the Conception to the Ascension), whose formation must, however, be so far distinguished from that of the Greek, or rather Aryan, mythology as explained by recent writers, such as Professor Max Müller and the Rev. G. W. Cox, that they do not originate in observations of natural phenomena, but have a nucleus of historical fact. For the personal existence of Christ, which seemed to be left uncertain by

the language of the earlier work (Introd. sect. 15) is here expressly affirmed, in accordance with Baur's system ; though it is rather to the first Christian teachers, especially St. Paul, than to Himself that the form of religion which bears His name is to be attributed. There are "few great men of history of whom we know so little as of Jesus." (p. 621). "The Christian Church in its earliest form, as it appears in the New Testament, was already the result of so many other factors besides the Person of Jesus, that any inference from it [*i. e.* from its belief] to Him is in the highest degree unsafe." (p. 623). "It may even be questioned whether, if He had re-appeared on earth about the time of the destruction of Jerusalem (70 A. D.) He would have recognised Himself in the Christ then preached in the Church." (p. 623). "Little of His real history can now be certainly ascertained ; what is certain is, that those supernatural acts and events whereon the faith of the Church has principally fastened, never occurred at all."¹ Strauss admits, with Spinoza, that the Divine wisdom which is the Eternal Son of God "was remarkably (*in ausgezeichneter Weise*) manifested in Jesus Christ ;" but His example can only be considered a partial and one-sided model,² and the great work of future theology is to discriminate "the ideal from the historical Christ," and thus convert "the religion of Christ into the religion of humanity." (pp. 624-26). Strauss hails in Renan a fellow-labourer in the same cause, with whose book his own "shakes hands across the Rhine," though he considers the *Vie de Jésus* by no means

¹ Has there not sometimes been a tendency among orthodox writers to dwell too exclusively on the miracles as proofs of *power* ? They are surely represented in the Gospels primarily as exhibitions, so to say, of the character of God, as revelations of divine love. This is noticed, I believe, in the Bp. of Algiers' *Observations* on Renan's book, which I only know, however, from extracts. There is a remarkable passage on the *way* in which our Lord's miracles affected men's estimate of Him in *Ecce Homo*, pp. 44-48. The author speaks of His "temperance in the use of a supernatural power," as "a moral miracle superinduced on a physical one."

² Elsewhere (pp. 37, 38), it is argued at length, that so long as Christ is viewed as a mere man He cannot be held to represent the perfect ideal of humanity. The criticism is intended for Keim, a German writer, but has its obvious application to Renan also. I may add, that the charge of 'cold-bloodedness' brought against the first *Leben Jesu* is equally applicable to the second. It has none of that glow of sympathy which gives to the *Vie de Jésus* its seductive charm. It is not bread but a stone.

free from grave errors, especially, as we learn elsewhere (p. 37), in ascribing an undue and suicidal authority to the narrative portion of St John's Gospel.¹

The distinctions between the old Christianity, which the author desires to supplant, and the new religion to be substituted for it, are thus summarised in the Preface. "As long as Christianity is regarded as something given to mankind from without, Christ, as One come from heaven, His Church, as an institution for the purification of men from sin through His Blood, the religion of the Spirit is itself unspiritually conceived of, and Christianity regarded as Judaical. When it is understood, that in Christianity mankind has only become more deeply conscious of itself than before, that Jesus is only the man in whom this deeper consciousness first came forth, as a power determining His whole life and being, that we can only be cleansed from sin by entering into this idea, by taking it, as it were, into our own blood, then for the first time will Christianity be really understood in a Christian sense." (Pref. p. 18.) And again; "The constitution of the Church is only the form in which you preserve the contents of Christianity; and to know what form is best adapted for that purpose, you must know what it is you have in Christianity, whether it is something natural or supernatural. And you can so much the less leave this question undecided, because a supernatural religion with mysteries and means of grace brings with it as its legitimate sequel (*folgerichtig*) an order of priests standing over the community. *He who wishes to get rid of the clergy from the Church, must first get rid of the supernatural (das Wunder) from religion.*" (ib. p 19).² In the body of the work (pp. 575, 576), while of course denying that the Old Testament prophecies really refer to the death of Christ, as "a death of atoning sacrifice," (*eines sühnenden Opfertodes*)—the sufferer spoken of being some pious contemporary or the "collective servant of Jehovah"—Strauss expressly asserts that such was never, theless the belief, and the "natural" belief, of the first converts from Judaism. On the whole then, I conceive, we shall not be wrong in assuming that the view of Christianity, as a supernatural and sacra-

¹ Hase in his *Leben Jesu* (5th Ed. Leipzig, 1864), accepts the Resurrection against Strauss, but denies the Ascension against Ewald. He considers the latter the mystical expression of a devout but uncritical belief.

² The italics are the author's.

mental religion, centred in the Person of a crucified and risen Lord, who "was delivered for our offences," as an atoning Sacrifice, and "was raised for our justification," to send down the Spirit who dwells in the Church and in its individual members as the Source of truth and grace, is still considered by Strauss a perfectly legitimate development, to say the least, of the Gospel preached within less than half a century of the death of Christ, and while His Apostles still ruled the Church. He admits, in other words, that those who accept the Evangelical records of the life of Christ, and the comment on them contained in St. Paul's Epistles, or even in those four whose genuineness the Tübingen School does not dispute,¹ will find the Catholic creeds the most natural expression of their belief.

¹ Romans, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians.

CHAPTER IV.

ST. ANSELM AND THE SCHOOLMEN.

THE transition from the period we have been hitherto considering to the scholastic era is a more complete change than can easily be expressed. We seem to have passed from a world of realities to a world of abstractions, where the forms of language or of logic have taken the place of substantive ideas. The Fathers stand to the Schoolmen something in the relation of Plato to the Alexandrian Neo-Platonists, or Aristotle to his Latin copyists of the days of the Empire. The very difference of name, 'Fathers' and 'Doctors,' serves to mark their difference of position. The whole patristic age was a life and death struggle with enemies of the faith, first with heathenism, then with heresy; it was no time for subtle distinctions, and ingenious outreasoning of artificial objections by equally artificial replies. The Fathers were engaged in building up and developing the fabric of Catholic dogma, chiefly on the Trinity and Incarnation, against opposite errors, and bringing home the truths of Christianity to the conscience and convictions of a corrupt but highly civilized world. Through the whole scholastic period there were no great doctrinal controversies.

The Church's foes were of her own household; not the heretic or the sophist, but the fierce half-converted barbarian, or the mail-clad baron who professed allegiance to her laws. The eleven general Councils, from the first of Lateran to that of Florence, were occupied with disciplinary questions, as of investitures, or healing the schism of the anti-popes, or suppressing the Templars; and were only indirectly, when at all, concerned with doctrine, as in the discussion of the Double Procession and Purgatory at Florence, with a view to the reconciliation of the Greeks. The Schoolmen, accordingly, were not employed, like the Fathers, in elaborating and fixing particular dogmas, but in reducing the whole existing body of doctrine to what they considered a rational and consistent intellectual system. Their ambition was to construct a philosophy of belief. With a few, like Abelard, this meant testing the doctrines themselves by a philosophical standard, and accepting nothing as matter of belief which could not be comprehended by the reason. With the majority it meant educing from the received creed of the Church, illustrated latterly by the physical and metaphysical principles of Aristotle, and with the aid of definition and syllogism, a kind of cyclopædia of revealed and ethical truth. They wrote for the learned few who alone could understand their language and method, whereas Sermons and Homilies held a prominent place in patristic literature. St. Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and St. Leo were among the greatest preachers of the Church.

X The scholastic age, of which St. Anselm is the pioneer, attained its zenith in the thirteenth century with the seraphic and angelic doctors, as they are called, Bonaventure and Aquinas, and may be said to last till the Reformation, though it has no great names to show after the close of the fourteenth century. That was a period when history, criticism, and science were almost unknown. Latin was the common tongue of the learned, and for the most part they understood no other, except their own. They had little critical knowledge of the past experience of the Church, or anticipation of what future was in store for her.¹ All this was a serious drawback to theological study. On the other hand, the whole speculative intellect of Europe was concentrated upon it, and that in an age of keen intellectual activity, for as yet it had no rival in the world of thought; and this could not but lead to a great expansion and development of theological ideas within a certain range, and be productive of permanent results. But it followed also from so large an expenditure of intellectual energy on so narrow a field, and from the onesidedness of its analytical method, that many trifling or incongruous questions would be mooted, there would be much mere playing with edged tools, and many an elaborate edifice would be reared on the sand which the advancing tide of sounder knowledge must

¹ Peter Lombard, the Master of the Sentences, Gratian, the compiler of the *Decretum*, and Peter Comestor, who wrote an Ecclesiastical History from the Creation to the birth of Christ—all authors of the second half of the twelfth century—were long regarded, according to Fleury, as forming a complete theological library.

inevitably sweep away. Few, probably, who care anything for theological study, will be prepared to endorse Milman's sweeping assertion that "of those vast monuments of [Scholastic] theology which amaze and appal the mind, the sole remnant to posterity is that barren amazement."¹ Yet we cannot help feeling, with a writer who has shown a far juster appreciation of the period, that "it is impossible to take up a volume of some great Schoolman without being aware that, if it exhibits intellectual qualities of no common order, it seems separated from the rest of literature by some impassable barrier."² The doctrines illustrated by the Schoolmen remain equally true for us, but our methods of illustration are necessarily different from theirs. Still, with whatever shortcomings, it cannot be denied that Scholasticism is an important chapter in the history of the human mind, and one which requires to be carefully studied in tracing the development of doctrine. If the then condition of European society imposed restrictions on the progress of theological science which were not the fault but the misfortune of its votaries, if many of those who pursued it were little better than triflers or sophists, we must never forget that it also commanded the service of the acutest intellects

¹ Milman's *Lat. Christ.* vol. ix. p. 118.

² Shirley's *Lecture on Scholasticism*, p. 8. The writer adds, not untruly: "We seem almost at times to be reading the philosophy of another race of beings." But he also says: "Those vast tomes of the Schoolmen, which we regard with so distant a respect, not only bespeak an amount of literary toil, rare in the most cultivated times, but give evidence of a precision of thought and a subtlety of logical analysis which may challenge comparison with the best works of the best ages of philosophy."

and the devotion of the most saintly hearts. The *Summa* of St. Thomas has not lost its dogmatic value, though much of the Aristotelian philosophy on which it is based may have since become obsolete, and he has also made lasting contributions to the science of Christian Ethics; whatever, again, may be thought of the supplementary details of St. Bonaventure's *Life of Christ*, none will dispute the spirit of ardent piety which breathes in every page.

For our present purpose it will be convenient to divide Scholastic theology into the earlier and more unsystematic period, which is about co-extensive with the twelfth century, and includes the names of St. Anselm, who may be called the father of Scholasticism, and his immediate followers, Abelard, St. Bernard, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Robert Pulleyn and others; and the later period, when it took a more systematic shape, and numbers among its celebrities Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Wicliffe, branching out into the two great schools since known as the Scotist and Thomist, of which the Franciscan and Dominican Orders are the traditional representatives.

Few names are so dear to the student of ecclesiastical history, especially if he be an Englishman, as that of the great and good Archbishop of Canterbury who is the model at once of a recluse and a ruler, a student in the cloister and a hero in the strife. He surely was no common man who fought out, almost single-handed, the great battle of investitures in Eng-

land, who confronted by mere force of saintly character the brute strength of the rough-handed Rufus, and foiled the cunning king-craft of his courtly successor by no other weapons than the nobleness of Christian simplicity. The injustice he met with in life has been atoned by an exceptional unanimity of posthumous homage. The name of Anselm comes down through twenty generations, wreathed with a halo time has not dimmed; his memory is honoured, the very prayers he composed are still repeated, by many even of those who do not accept his creed. A modern author calls him "the profoundest and most original writer that had appeared in the Latin Church since St. Augustine,"¹ and certainly the appearance of the *Cur Deus Homo* forms an epoch in the history of Christian doctrine. The theory of a ransom paid to Satan by the death of Christ, which had prevailed for nearly a thousand years in the Church, and on which the Fathers had grounded the necessity for the Atonement, is here for the first time expressly and unreservedly rejected. There is no minute discussion of details; it is repudiated on the broad principle, so strangely overlooked before, that it contradicts the omnipotence or the goodness of the Creator to suppose that He can recognise any right of evil and injustice in that universe which is His own. It is not denied that there was a certain *fitness* in the

¹ See *Essays and Reviews*, by R. W. Church (London, 1854), p. 125. The essay contains an admirable sketch of St. Anselm's career in England. Is it vain to hope that the gifted author of this interesting volume will give us some further results of his singular capabilities for the illustration of mediæval Church history?

Devil being overcome by the wood of the cross, as he had overcome men by the wood of the tree of life, just as there is a fitness in the Redeemer being born of a woman, as the first man was deceived by a woman; but these 'congruities' are 'a kind of pictures' that may be offered for the persuasion of unbelievers, not the ground of any solid theory. We belonged not to the Devil, but to God; and the 'handwriting against us' was not, as St. Leo had imagined, a compact with Satan, but the decree of God who allowed him to punish us when we became the slaves of sin. "There was no need for God to come down from heaven to overcome the Evil One or to make a compact with him for the delivery of man; but God required of man that he should overcome the Devil, and satisfy by righteousness the God he had offended by sin. For God owed nothing to the Devil except punishment, nor man anything but to conquer him by whom he had been overcome; whatever was required of man he owed to God, not the Devil."¹ But Anselm at the same time insisted, not only on the congruity but the absolute necessity of man's redemption, and on the death of Christ as the only possible means of effecting it, innovating in both respects on the teaching of former theologians. His explanation of the positive side of his system is scattered over the two books of the *Cur Deus Homo*, mixed up with incidental notices of many collateral questions, as of the primitive state of man, the bodily resurrection, the relations of human

¹ *Cur Deus Homo*, xi. 19, ad fin. Cf. i. 7, throughout, also 3 and 4.

redemption to the fall of the angels, and the fitness of Christ's birth of a virgin. We must confine ourselves here to a statement of the theory itself, as he has laid it down.¹

It is impossible that mankind, as a whole, should fail to attain the end for which they were created, because it is inconsistent with the being of God to suffer any rational nature to perish completely and thus fail to perfect the work He has begun.² Not that in speaking of necessity, though absolute, we are to view it as a power external to Him, like the *ἀνάγκη* of Greek mythology which limited and constrained the will of Zeus. Rather it is improperly called necessity, for it is part of His own nature, it is that immutability which belongs to His holiness, that supreme justice which is one with Himself.³ But man has forsaken his true end by sin, and can only be restored to it by redemption. By sin he has robbed God of what was due to Him from human nature, and has, so far as was possible, deprived Him of a part of His honour (*Deum exhonorat*); he has committed an evil which, if

¹ It would be troublesome and confusing to the reader to give separate references for each statement. They shall be given where there is any special reason for it. The chapters from which the system is chiefly to be gathered are i. 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25; ii. 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 19, 20.

² The author adds a reason, borrowed from St. Augustine, that men were created to supply the place of the fallen angels (i. 16-18), but this is immaterial to the coherence of his system. The necessity of man's restoration is maintained on independent grounds.

³ Ib. ii. 5. "Quæ scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam immutabilitas honestatis Ejus, quam a Se Ipso et non ab alio habet, et idcirco inproprie dicitur necessitas." Cf. i. 13. "Summa justitia quæ non est aliud quam Ipse Deus." Cf. also ii. 18. *a.*

not actually infinite,¹ is yet so great that the preservation of the universe would be too dearly purchased by the commission of even the slightest sin. And therefore he has incurred a debt which can only be paid by something greater than the whole universe, greater than all that is outside God.² But he has nothing to pay it with himself, for all that he has and is he already owes to God as his Creator, without any reference to the compensation of sin. And this very inability to pay the debt is not an excuse, but is itself a sin, being caused by his own fault, and therefore is not a ground of free forgiveness. Nor, indeed, is free forgiveness possible. God cannot suffer anything to mar the perfect order of His kingdom. The sinner must either make adequate satisfaction to God, according to the measure of his sin, or endure the penalty. This satisfaction, to be equal to the sin, must be greater than anything outside God, and therefore only God can supply it; but it must be paid by man, or it is not man's satisfaction. "The debt was so great that none but God could pay it, and none but man owes it, therefore One must pay it who is God and Man." Hence the necessity for the Incarnation. But the Incarnation would not suffice of itself. The perfect obedience of Christ, as Man, could be no satisfaction for sin, for

¹ In one place it is called 'infinite,' but as being so great that it could not lawfully be committed to preserve an infinite number of worlds from destruction. Ib. ii. 14.

² Cf. Ans. *De Concep. Virg. et Pecc. Orig.* 21. "Deus non exigit ab ullo peccatore plus quam debet, sed quoniam nullus potest reddere quantum debet, solus Christus reddidit pro omnibus plus quam debetur."

obedience is due to God from every rational creature. But His death was not due, for death is an obligation incurred by sin; and His death accordingly, as a voluntary offering, is the sufficient and only possible satisfaction, which not only equals, but infinitely exceeds, the payment owed for the sins of the whole world. For this death, freely offered, He deserved a recompense from the Father. But He needed none for Himself, and could receive nothing that was not already His. He claimed, therefore, and justly received from the Father, as a reward, the salvation of those for whom He died. And thus mercy and justice are reconciled. For what more merciful than that the Father should say to the sinner, who has nothing whereby to ransom himself from eternal punishment, "Receive My only-begotten, and give Him for thyself," and the Son say, "Take Me and ransom thyself?" What more just than that He who receives a payment far exceeding the debt should remit the debt?

Such is a summary of the Anselmic theory of satisfaction. Its whole force hinges on the assumed impossibility of any incongruity (*inconvenientia*) being tolerated by God. *Deum non decet aliquid in regno Suo inordinatum dimittere.* Both in its negative and positive aspects it differs widely from the patristic conception of the subject. The necessity for the death of Christ becomes for the first time absolute, not indeed any longer as a compensation due to Satan for the power over men acquired by their sin which he was to lose by their redemption, but as a satisfaction to God

for the honour of which sin had robbed Him. Not that Christ's death is regarded by Anselm, any more than by earlier writers, as a punishment inflicted on Him by the Father for our sins, but as a voluntary payment of the debt incurred by us when we could not pay it ourselves. It was essential to the justice or holiness of God that sin should be either punished or atoned. Only the God-Man could make adequate reparation, and He only by His death, for that alone He did not, in His human nature, owe to God.

It is obvious that the *Cur Deus Homo*, if taken, as the title might seem to imply, for an exhaustive account of the objects of the Incarnation, would be a very defective one; and there are, in fact, many indications in the book itself that such was not the intention of its saintly author. We cannot doubt that he, like those before him, saw more, far more, in that mystery of love than the mere payment of a debt. But even in the restricted sense, which it is clearly meant to bear, of an explanation of the death of Christ, his argument is open to very serious criticism. With the negative side of his theology, his rejection of Satan's supposed rights, we certainly need not quarrel, and here his judgment has been fully endorsed by the common instinct of the later Church. But, as regards his positive theory, even admitting the assumption (contradicted as it is by the whole course of previous theology) of a debt incurred to God, which it is absolutely impossible for Him freely to remit, the account given of the payment is, in more than one point,

at issue with itself. I pass over the extreme difficulty of admitting a necessity, though explained as part of the Divine Nature, which seems to limit omnipotence, and goes far to assimilate the external operations to the immanent acts of God. But the statement of a *necessity* for the Incarnation is obviously inconsistent with making it also a free exhibition of love. For if God's honour *necessarily* required reparation, and it could only be made in one way, then it was not for our sakes, but for His own, that He sent His Son into the world to die. Nor can it be replied that, according to Anselm's teaching, the honour of God is not really increased or diminished by anything external to Him, and cannot, therefore, be affected in itself by sin; for it is distinctly said to be essential to His honour that the order of the universe should be preserved, and that this can only be done by the punishment of the sinner or by an equivalent for the sin.¹ That order, as we have seen, is broken if His object in the creation of man is frustrated, and therefore adequate satisfaction is an internal necessity of His own nature. The author's only attempt to meet this difficulty in fact admits its force.² When it is urged, that God in creating man foresaw both his fall and his redemption, but did not therefore shrink from the obligation He voluntarily assumed in creating him, this of course may show that creation was an act of love; but it implies that, creation once premised, the Incarnation was an act of necessity. It was at least

¹ See especially *Cur Deus Homo*, i. 13, 14.

² *Ib.* ii. 5.

not a separate act of love. There is another inconsistency to be noticed. It is essential to the theory, that the death of Christ should be something He did not *owe* to God. But if satisfaction for sin was absolutely necessary for the Divine honour, and His death alone could supply it, it follows, surely, that, as Man, He was morally bound to die, and thus His death ceases to be a voluntary oblation. This difficulty is more than once indirectly touched upon but is never really answered.¹

There was reason for dwelling thus at length on the argument of the *Cur Deus Homo*, because its author is the founder, or rather harbinger, of the whole scholastic method, and is also the first to explain the death of our Lord by a theory of satisfaction which refers it immediately, not to any rights acquired by the Evil One, but to inherent necessities of the Divine nature. The principal succeeding writers of this earlier period may be contrasted according to their relations, whether of agreement or difference, with him. Conspicuous among them stand the names of Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, the last of the Fathers, as he has been not unaptly designated, and Abelard, who may with equal propriety be termed the first of the Schoolmen. The positive side of the Anselmic system is rejected by both. Abelard's exposition of the grounds of the Incarnation and sufferings of Christ is given in his *Commentary on the Romans*, chiefly with reference to the famous passage about God being just, and jus-

¹ Ib. i. 9, ii. 18, b. See on this point Petav. *De Incarn.* ix. 8.

tifying the believer in Jesus.¹ He not only assents to Anselm's denial of all rights in the Devil, but goes beyond him, arguing that man would rather have a right to punish the seducer who had betrayed him by a promise of immortality he had no power to fulfil. The elect alone, he adds, were released by Christ, and they never belonged to Satan in this world or the next; this is proved by a strange application of the parable of Dives and Lazarus. Moreover, if no injustice was done to the Devil by the assumption of a sinless humanity, how could injustice have been done him by the far lesser grace of a free forgiveness? Some other reason must be found. To Anselm's view of an all but infinite debt, and the need of a corresponding equivalent, Abelard replies that Adam's sin, however great, could not be atoned by the yet greater crime of those who murdered Christ. And further, as Gregory Nazianzen had said before him, how could the blood of an innocent Victim be an acceptable ransom to God, to whom, if to any one, the ransom must be paid? Abelard therefore seeks the ground of the Incarnation, not in the justice, but the love of God, who might indeed have pardoned us without it,

¹ Rom. iii. 26. This verse has been sometimes taken to imply the necessity of Christ's sacrifice, as a matter of justice, for our forgiveness. But if so, we must read *καίπερ* instead of *καί*. It clearly means, "that He who is holy might bestow sanctification on believers." Since the first edition of this work appeared, I have met with the following apposite confirmation of this view in *Robertson's Letters* (vol. ii. p. 58), "The Evangelical scheme of reconciling justice with mercy, I consider the poorest effort ever made by false metaphysics. They simply misquote a text. That He might be just (and yet) the justifier, whereas St. Paul says, the just and the justifier, i.e., just, because the justifier."

but selected this method as the most effectual for eliciting our love. The spectacle of Christ's spotless life and obedience even unto death, endured for us, was the most persuasive argument for withdrawing us from the service of sin and making us meet to receive His grace. He is said, therefore, to have died for us, because in His Crucifixion He bore the penalty of our sins and by His death drew us to Himself, commending His charity towards us by dying for us while we were yet sinners, and implanting love in our hearts through faith in Him. This includes the case of the old Patriarchs who looked for His coming, though it applies still more to those who have lived since, as it is written, "Those who went before and those who came after, cried Hosanna to the Son of David." And thus by grace we are pardoned on our repentance, its defects being supplied by the intercession of Christ, who, as Man, is bound by the law of charity to pray for us and whose prayer, from His perfect holiness, cannot but be heard. Hence the need for His Incarnation. This theory seems to place the ultimate ground of the Atonement, not in the nature of God but of man, who required such a revelation of Divine charity to recall him from sin.

St. Bernard,¹ I need scarcely remind the reader, was engaged in frequent controversy with Abelard, chiefly about the doctrine of the Trinity, on which his

¹ Morison's *Life and Times of St. Bernard* (London, 1863) gives a very interesting biography of him, about half consisting very properly of translations from his Letters. The author does not dwell at any length on his character as a theologian, and is evidently not so familiar with that part of the subject.

language was, to say the least, difficult to reconcile with orthodox belief. It was natural, therefore, that on other subjects also his teaching should be received with suspicion. St. Bernard attacks his explanation of the Atonement partly, as he assailed the belief in the Immaculate Conception, on account of its novelty; partly, as contravening the testimony of the ancient Fathers on the rights of Satan—a charge which it shared with St. Anselm's. To Abelard's objection about the murderers of Christ he replied, in words already quoted, that it was not His death, but His voluntary acceptance of it, that was pleasing to the Father. He did not, however, any more than his opponent adopt the Anselmic theory of a debt incurred to God which could only be paid by the death of His Son. On the contrary, he falls back on the older opinion, which both Anselm and Abelard had rejected, of the claim of Satan, to whom therefore the price was paid; though he so far modifies it as to admit, that it was only by God's permission the Devil could have any rights. He adds, that Christ made satisfaction as the Head of the Body, representing its members. The work of salvation includes three things; the humility by which God emptied himself, the love which persevered even unto death, and the 'sacrament of redemption,' by which in dying He destroyed death. This last Abelard is accused of denying by denying the rights of Satan, and of making the teaching and example of Christ the sole benefits of the Incarnation.¹ But he

¹ Bern. *Ep.* 190 *ad Innoc.*

had not said so, and he distinctly asserts, in his *Apology*, that "the Son of God was incarnate to deliver us from the bondage of sin and yoke of the Devil, and to open to us by His death the gate of eternal life." And St. Bernard himself, in this very Epistle, expressly denies any absolute necessity for the method of redemption chosen, and suggests a reason for it not so very unlike Abelard's. "Perhaps that method is the best, whereby in a land of forgetfulness and sloth we might be more powerfully and vividly reminded of our fall, through the so great and so manifold sufferings of Him who repaired it." Elsewhere, when not speaking controversially, he says still more plainly; "Could not the Creator have restored His work without that difficulty? He could; but He preferred to do it at His own cost, lest any further occasion should be given for that worst and most odious vice of ingratitude in man."¹ What is this but to say that He chose to redeem us by the method most effectual for eliciting His creature's love?

Our countryman, Robert Pulleyn, a teacher at Oxford and contemporary of St. Bernard and Abelard, follows the latter, whose intimate friend he was, both in adopting Anselm's denial of the claims of Satan, and in rejecting the notion of an absolute necessity for the Atonement.² He regards the sufferings of Christ

¹ Bern. *Serm.* xi. in *Cant.*

² R. Pulleyn *Sententiarum Libri* viii. His wide divergence from the old theory is marked by his representing the dream of Pilate's wife as sent by the Devil, to hinder the death of Christ. Satan, therefore, was neither compensated nor deceived. Pulleyn was distinguished for Biblical learning. See Newman's *Office and Work of Universities* (Longman, 1856), p. 258.

as giving us an example of patience and steadfastness, and being, in some sense not accurately defined, requisite for our redemption; and His blood, not as a ransom paid to the Evil One, which would be a renunciation of His Godhead, but as a sacrifice offered to the Father. Hugh of St. Victor, another writer of the same date, tries to harmonize all the previous systems. He recognizes in Satan a certain right of dominion acquired over man, though not any rights as against God. From this dominion man cannot free himself, except by God's assistance; but—and here the Anselmic notion comes in—God was Himself angry with man, and required to be propitiated by a perfect obedience to compensate Adam's apostasy, and by an adequate punishment to atone for the dishonour done to Himself. Man had neither to offer: therefore, what man owed, God gratuitously supplied in the Incarnation and death of His Son. Yet the author expressly denies any absolute necessity, and gives a reason for the Incarnation elsewhere, differing little if at all from Abelard's, saying that Christ gave us in His Passion a motive of love, in His resurrection a pledge of immortality, "that He may be the Way by His example, the Truth by His promises, the Life by His reward."¹ Richard of St. Victor has sometimes been represented as accepting in its entirety the argument of the *Cur Deus Homo*, which he has undoubtedly made great use of in his treatise on the Incarnation. But his language does not imply anything more than that the death of Christ was neces-

¹ Hug. de S. Vict. *De Sacram.* 4, 10.

sary, if an adequate satisfaction were to be made at all. He says it was required for *full* satisfaction, that "there should be as great humility in the expiation as there had been presumption in the sin;" but this does not exclude other methods of satisfaction, or free forgiveness.¹

The last writer of the twelfth century to be noticed here is Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, the Master of the Sentences. That he retained the Patristic theory of the Devil's rights we have already seen (in chap. iii.), and his statement of it need not be repeated here. It was natural that, as a compiler of the opinions of the Fathers, he should do so. Yet in his hands it had lost much of its old technical meaning, and even where most distinctly stated, as in the passage quoted above, seems little more than a way of expressing our release from the power of sin. Thus he says that Christ came into the strong man's house, that is into our hearts where the Devil ruled, "and so by Christ's Blood, who pays that He had not taken, we are redeemed from sin, *and thereby from the Devil*. For he did not hold us, except by the bonds of our sins; those were the captive's chains." Here the idea receives a nobler and more spiritual interpretation. The writer also includes in our release from Satan our release from a debt or penalty incurred, in so far as Christ bore in His Body the chastisement of our sins,

¹ "Sine satisfactione hominem *ad plenum* reparari non posse, ad *plenitudinem* autem satisfactionis oportuisse, ut tanta esset humiliatio in expiatione quanta fuerat presumptio in prævaricatione." Rich. S. Vict. *De Inc. Verbi*, 8.

and won for us by His cross a plenary remission in baptism, a partial remission in penance, of the temporal chastisements of sin. For thus overcoming Satan's power the incarnation of the God-Man is required, who alone is sinless.¹ Elsewhere he says that God had decreed not to admit us to His presence, till there had been found as great humility in man as there had been pride in our first father; and this perfect sacrifice Christ alone could bring. He is careful to add, that God might have found other ways to save us.² But where the Master speaks out most clearly the positive side of his theology, it is substantially accordant with Abelard's, in placing the need of reconciliation on the side of man, not of God. "The death of Christ justifies us by exciting His love in our hearts." And he pointedly insists, as was natural in a student of antiquity, on the principle which Cyril, Augustine, Leo, and other Fathers had laid down before him, that we are not to understand the Atonement as though a change were effected in the mind of God, and He began to love, when He had before hated us, as one enemy is reconciled to another. "We were reconciled to God, when He already loved us. *For He did not begin to love us from the time we were reconciled to Him by His Son's Blood*, but before the world, and before we existed. How then were we reconciled to God when He loved us? On account of sin we were at enmity with Him, who had love toward us, even while we showed our enmity against Him by working ini-

¹ Pet. Lomb. *Sent.* iii. 19, A. D.

² Ib. iii. 18, E.

quity.....Christ, therefore, is called a Mediator, because standing between men and God He reconciles them to God. But He reconciles them, by taking from the sight of God what offends in man, that is, by destroying sins which offended God and made us His enemies." And again; "He reconciled all believers by His death to God, since all were healed of their iniquity who by believing loved the humility of Christ, and by loving imitated it."¹

So far, then, the positive side of St. Anselm's theory finds no support from succeeding writers. His rejection of the Devil's claim is gradually adopted, though not without occasional protest. But his notion of an absolute necessity on God's part for the Incarnation and death of Christ is repudiated alike by all. Peter Lombard and Hugh of St. Victor, who in language seem at times to come nearest to him, are in fact the most widely removed from him.

In passing from the twelfth to the thirteenth century, we approach the more systematic period of Scholasticism, based on a study of Aristotle, and occupied, in great part, in drawing up elaborate commentaries on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, which are expanded into an interminable series of wire-drawn and often unprofitable distinctions. It would, of course, be impossible to examine in detail this voluminous literature. But, before proceeding to compare the two great leaders of the opposite schools of Scotists and Thomists, it will be well to take as a specimen one of the princi-

¹ Ib. iii. 19, A. F. G.

pal Commentators, and analyse his treatment of the question before us. No better or more favourable example can be selected than St. Bonaventure, who follows to a great extent the system of St. Anselm, but deserts him in the point essential to its internal coherence, the theory of an absolute necessity. He considers the question under six different heads.¹ 1. Was it fitting for human nature to be restored? which is of course answered in the affirmative. 2. Was 'satisfaction' the most fitting method of restoring it? 3. Could a mere creature make satisfaction for the whole human race? 4. Could any man, assisted by grace, make satisfaction for himself? 5. Was God bound to accept the method of satisfaction by Christ's Passion? 6. Could He have saved the human race by any other method?

Let us take in order the replies given to these last five questions. 2. What method is most fitting must be considered in reference to the righteousness, omnipotence, wisdom, and majesty of God. Tested by this standard, the method of satisfaction is declared to be most consistent with His justice and mercy; His justice in requiring, His mercy in Himself supply it; it is also most suitable for men, that they should procure their restoration through the means of satisfaction and merit, repairing by endurance of punishment the dishonour done to God by sin. It is then added, in reply to objections, that it would not be more fitting for God to display His mercy by a free forgiveness, because His mercy does not exclude His

¹ S. Bonav. *Opp.* tom. v. (Lugd. 1688) in lib. iii. *Sent. Dist.* 20.

justice; that it is not to meet any want in God that satisfaction, any more than obedience, is required, but from regard to us; that it cannot be said He would have shown His omnipotence more fully by pardoning with a mere word, for in this work it was most essential to reveal His goodness and His justice; that mere forgiveness would not have been so constraining a claim on our thankfulness and love, because it is a far greater thing to die for men than only to forgive them; nor would it have set us a better example, for punishment belongs to God, though not to man, and moreover by satisfaction God gave us a more perfect model; lastly, that it is a property of the Highest Good to employ, where possible, the co-operation of the creature in His noblest works, and this was possible in redemption though not in creation.

3. The next question is a favourite one with the Schoolmen. Could any mere creature make satisfaction for the whole human race? The author, in replying, first divides satisfaction into that made for the injury, and that made for the loss. It is clear that no mere creature could make satisfaction for the injury done to God, on account of His greatness. But neither could he for the loss. No mere man could give an equivalent to God for the loss He suffered by Adam's sin, which extended over the whole race. Still less could a creature of some other order of being, as an angel, do so, for his satisfaction could have no relation to the sin of man. 4. As to whether a mere man, with the assistance of grace, could make satisfaction for his own sins,

it is replied that he might make a partial, but not a plenary, satisfaction for actual, none for original sin; because original sin involves depravation not only of will but of nature. For this last none could make satisfaction who was not himself free from it, and who did not possess grace to be the Second Adam, or Head of the renewed race (*gratiam communem hoc est gratiam Capitis*). Hence Christ alone could atone for original sin, and He by doing so won grace for men, whereby they are enabled to make satisfaction for their own actual sins. His Passion, therefore, acts more fully in the sacrament of baptism, which remits original, than in the sacrament of penance, which remits actual sin.

5. To the fifth question St. Bonaventure answers, that the most fitting method of satisfaction for God to accept was the Passion and Death of Christ, because it is the noblest that can be conceived, and that on four grounds. It was the most acceptable for appeasing God, the most suitable for curing the disease of sin, the most effectual for attracting the human race, and the wisest for overcoming the enemy of man. It was the most pleasing to God, because, as St. Anselm said, the hardest, and therefore most precious, free-will offering man can make in token of entire self-sacrifice, is voluntary death. As man had sinned through pride, lust, and disobedience, the fittest cure was humility, pain, and fulfilling of the divine law. In no other way could God so effectually elicit the love of men as by dying for them on the Cross; and without winning their love He could not save them, for He would

not force their free-will. Finally, as Satan overcame man by treachery, so Christ overcame Satan by prudence, "drawing Leviathan with a hook." Objections are then stated and answered. It may be said that Christ's life is more precious than His death; but the greatest satisfaction is the most painful, and to be willing to die for God's honour is a more heroic act of perfection and charity than to be willing to live for it. It may be objected again, that the sin of Adam cannot be atoned by the greater sin of the murderers of Christ. But the Atonement is made by Him, not by His murderers; and it is a conspicuous evidence of Divine wisdom to draw good out of evil, nay, to draw the highest good. If it is further urged, that Christ should then have suffered twice, once for Adam's sin, once for the greater sin of those who slew Him, it is replied, that the merits of His sufferings exceed infinitely the guilt of the traitor Judas, of the Jews who instigated His death, and the Gentiles who accomplished it.

6. The last question concerns the necessity of this method of satisfaction. And here Bonaventure is in direct collision with Anselm. He admits, indeed, that on man's side no other method was possible, but with God all things are possible. To the objection, that no method but satisfaction consists with the Divine justice, and that only the death of the God-Man could make adequate satisfaction, he replies, first, that God might, had He so willed, have saved us by way of mercy and not of justice, and still nothing would have been left

disordered (*inordinatum*) or even unpunished in the universe, for sin brings its own punishment with it; secondly, though Christ's death was the most fitting satisfaction, any, the very slightest, suffering of His would perhaps have been sufficient, for, as it is written, "with Him is plenteous redemption."¹ St. Bonaventure concludes by expressing his firm belief, that the human race could have been *delivered* by other methods, but will not pronounce whether or not it could have been otherwise *redeemed*.² No one will be disposed to quarrel with the conclusion, but it is not very easy to reconcile with all that has gone before. If penal satisfaction was so demonstrably the method most becoming the attributes of God and the condition of man, it is difficult to conceive any other being adopted; and if sin would in any case have adequately punished itself, the argument for a penal satisfaction being requisite is undermined. The *Cur Deus Homo* is more consistent here.

Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great, come nearer to Anselm's view. Alexander begins, it is true, by admitting that according to that justice which is identical with His Being, and therefore with His power, God could have saved man without satisfaction, though according to that justice which goes by congruity of merits He could not. But the admission

¹ Ps. cxxix. (E. V. cxxx.) 7.

² "De liberatione enim firmiter credo, quod alio modo potuit liberari, de redemptione vero nec nego nec andeo affirmare, quia temerarium est, cum de divinâ potentiâ agitur, terminum præfigere ei. Amplius enim potest quam nos possumus cogitare."

does not go for much. For he afterwards decides, with Auselm, that, had God used His absolute power to pardon man, He would have left something disordered (*inordinatum*) in His kingdom, which is as impossible as for Him to do evil; and no satisfaction could be adequate but that of the God-Man.¹ Albert the Great comes to a similar conclusion, on the ground that original sin could only be remitted through One who was the second Head of the race, and, as it would be monstrous to have two heads in the natural order, the second must be in the supernatural order; or, in other words, must be Christ, who, as God, can alone impart grace to the mystical body.²

We come now to the founders of the two great schools of Thomists and Scotists, which have existed from that day to this in the Church; and we shall find them differing, as on other points, so also in their view of the Atonement; a difference partly grounded on their opposite views of the motive of the Incarnation. With the Thomist doctrine of grace, and all the controversies that have been raised upon it, we are not concerned here. The reasoning of Aquinas on the Atonement is contained in four Questions of the *Summa*, from which I will extract the points most deserving of notice.³ He treats in order the sufferings of Christ, their efficient cause, and their results. As regards the question of necessity, taking the Aristotelian division of internal

¹ Alex. Hales *Summa*, Pars iii. Q. i. 4, 7.

² Alb. Magn. *Comment. in Sent.* iii. 20, art. 7.

³ *Summa D. Thom. Aq.* Pars iii. Q. 46-49.

necessity and external coercion, he denies that in either of these senses the Passion was necessary. It was only necessary, assuming the prevision and predestination of God to redeem man in that manner, and in no other; nor would He have acted against justice in forgiving without any satisfaction offences committed only against Himself. He was not (as Grotius afterwards represented the case) in the position of a civil ruler who cannot lawfully remit the penalty of offences committed, not against himself personally, but against the common weal. At the same time, however, the Passion of Christ was the most suitable method of redemption, as revealing the love of God, giving us an example of obedience and all other virtues, and a strong incitement to purify ourselves from sin after being redeemed at so great a price. Moreover, Christ not only freed us from sin, but won for us grace and glory, and it was fitting that by death He should overcome the power of death; but His death need not have been a violent one. The greatness of His pains, above all others in this life, is inferred from His suffering at the hands of such various classes of persons, such various kinds of pain, both of soul and body, and in every part of His Body, and from the peculiar capabilities for suffering of His mental and bodily organization, as it is written; *Ego in flagella paratus sum*. The manner in which His sufferings take effect on us is fourfold; by merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, and redemption. As Head of the mystical Body, He imparts to all His members the grace He had merited for them. His

satisfaction for the same reason is applicable to them, and is not only sufficient but superabundant, from the greatness of His dignity, His sufferings, and His love. Satisfaction is defined, as giving to the offended party something he loves as much as he hates the offence, or more. The Passion of Christ is also the most perfect sacrifice, that is, the highest act of homage ever offered to God, of which the Jewish sacrifices were types. Lastly, it ransoms us from the bondage and punishment of sin. Under all these four aspects the Passion of Christ benefits us, and its fruits are applied to us by faith, not a dead faith, but faith working by love (*fides formata*), and through the sacraments. In baptism we are conformed to the image of His death, by dying to original sin; we must be conformed to Him by acts of penance for sins committed after baptism, but such acts gain all their efficacy from His superabundant satisfaction, for no mere man can satisfy adequately for himself. His Passion, then, has reconciled us to God, both as being the most acceptable sacrifice, and as removing the sin which caused our separation, and thus it has opened to us the gate of heaven. The idea of a vicarious satisfaction seems to be more prominently exhibited here than before, and the means of applying Christ's merits through a living faith, and the sacraments of faith, is more explicitly and fully laid down. Before making further comment, it will be well to state briefly the Scotist theory, so that we may be in a position to compare the two.

In his *Commentary* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lom-

bard, Duns Scotus contradicts much of the Thomist, and the whole Anselmic view of satisfaction.¹ The merit of Christ, as depending on His finite human nature, is itself finite, and has no inherent claim to be accepted by God, as infinite. But the value of meritorious acts is measured by God's acceptance, not His acceptance by their value; as the goodness of creatures depends on His love, not His love on their goodness. And there is a certain *congruity*, from the dignity of Christ, which there would not else be, in God accepting His merits for any, even infinite, number of persons to whom they may be applied. His Passion, therefore, suffices for so many, and so great sins, as God is pleased to accept it for. But neither is it true, that sin is formally in its own nature an infinite evil, though in a certain sense it may be so called (*sortitur quamdam denominationem extrinsecam*), as being a departure from the Infinite Good; just as the love of a Saint or of the archangel Michael may be called infinite, from its being directed to an infinite object. It follows, that the punishment due to mortal sin is in no other sense infinite, than as being of infinite duration, so long as the will remains fixed in sin; God might, without injustice, punish it for a single day only, and then annihilate the soul. There was no *necessity* either for the restoration of the human race at all, or for the method of restoring it by the satisfaction of Christ, except as consequent on Divine predestination, for all God's

¹ Joann. Duns Scoti *In Sent. Pet. Lomb.* iii. 19, 20.

external operations are free.¹ Adam might have made satisfaction for his sin by a greater act of love; nor is it true to say, with Anselm, that the sin was infinite, and the love offered in reparation must be infinite too. The act of conversion to God is not in its formal nature greater than all creatures, nor was even the love of Christ. A good angel, or a mere man conceived without sin by the power of the Holy Ghost, could have made satisfaction for the whole race, had God chosen to accept it; nor will Anselm's objection hold good, that we should have been more bound to him than to God, for all his merit would have been derived from God, as is all the merit of the Blessed Virgin and the Saints. Christ suffered for righteousness' sake, seeing the sins of the Jews and their ill regulated and perverted affection for their law, so that they sacrificed its moral to its ceremonial precepts. "Therefore, desiring to withdraw them from error by His works and discourses, He preferred dying to keeping silence, for then the Jews had to listen to the truth; and thus He died for righteousness' sake." He offered His Passion to the Father for us, and we are not the less, but the more indebted to Him for doing so, since He might have redeemed us without it. It is clear how this part of the Scotist system, which was substantially adopted by the Franciscan, William Occam, and the

¹ See Faber's *Precious Blood*, p. 225. "It (the Precious Blood), is a magnificent price for sin, because it is infinite; and sin is only infinite by a figure of speech, or an invention of the mind. *We did not therefore require an infinite redemption*; though on the side of God's sanctity there may have been a propriety, looking to us like a necessity, for an infinite expiation."

Nominalist school generally, cuts at the roots of the Thomist, and still more of the Anselmic conception of the question. For an infinite merit it substitutes a voluntary acceptance, while the denial of an infinite debt removes any plea for the necessity of an infinite satisfaction. There are certainly parts of the scheme which are difficult to reconcile with the inherent distinction of good and evil, and look as if morality had no independent existence, but was an arbitrary creation of the Divine will. Nor is it consistent with the reality of the hypostatic union to ascribe an only finite character to the human, or, as they are sometimes called, 'theandric' actions of the God-Man.¹ At the same time, the Scotist view, as a whole, is more consistent than the Thomist, which rejects the necessity of the sufferings of Christ, while laying so predominant a stress on the idea of satisfaction.

But there was in fact another, and far more fundamental, difference between the 'subtle' and 'angelic' doctors, in their way of regarding the Atonement, which, if it did not at the time exercise so perceptible an influence over their modes of expression, could not but make itself in the long run more deeply felt; for it materially affected the relative importance and bearings of the whole question. I refer to their opposite views, noticed in a previous chapter, on the primary motive of the Incarnation. This, according to Aquinas, was the redemption of fallen man. If there had been

¹ The Bull of Clement VI. *Unigenitus* (1343) implicitly condemns this portion of Scotus' system.

no sin, Christ would not have come in the flesh; in the prevision of His Conception was included the prevision of His Cross. Against this Duns Scotus urges, that His human nature was predestined antecedently to the Fall, and was the model on which ours was formed; and that Christ would, in any case, have come to be the Second Adam and Head of the mystical body.¹ He considers this view most congruous to the honour of God; most accordant with the testimony of Scripture, especially in such passages as the first chapters of the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians; and not inconsistent with the language of the Fathers, who need not mean more, when they seem to contradict it, than that Christ would not have come in a passible body, if we had not sinned.

To enter on a detailed discussion of the scriptural argument would be out of place here. It is sufficient to observe, that the line of interpretation suggested by Scotus certainly opens out to us a deeper meaning in many passages of Holy Writ, both in the Old and New Testament; while such statements as that of our Lord Himself, that He is come "to seek and to save that which is lost," and the noble supplication of the hymn founded upon it,² miss none of their constraining force, even if it be true that He would have come to be our Brother, though we had needed no redemption. As

¹ Joann. Duns Scoti *Summa*, Pars III. Quæst. i. Art. 3. (Opp. tom. iv. Romæ, 1737).

² "Recordare, Jesu pie,
Quod sum causa Tuæ viæ,
Ne me perdas illa dic.

"Quærens me sedisti lassus,
Redemisti crucem passus;
Tantus labor non sit cassus."

regards the Fathers, an opinion has already been expressed, that the Scotist view of the Incarnation is most consistent with the general spirit of their teaching; but the question never came directly before them for adjudication. The greater number of passages quoted by advocates of the opposite side, such as Thomassin and Petavius, though not all of them, may be understood as stating the purposes for which Christ actually did come, after we had fallen, or as referring to the altered conditions under which He came, in a passible and corruptible body, or as meaning that but for our sins He would not have died on the Cross.¹ Neither, indeed, if it could be shown that some or most of the Fathers express or imply the reverse of an opinion, which in their day had never been put forward, would it at all follow that the opinion was not in fact a legitimate development of their belief. What is certain is, that they attach to the 'sacrament' or 'economy' of the Incarnation, considered in itself and apart from the Passion, a significance quite disproportionate to what it bears in many later schemes of doctrine. And more, while most of them regard the death of Christ as a ransom paid to Satan, none hold such a payment to have been necessary for our redemption. The Anselmic notion of its exclusive, or almost exclusive object being the discharge of a debt to God, incurred by sin, and still more the Lutheran

¹ This seems also to meet the argument sometimes drawn from such passages as John iii. 16; Gal. iv. 4, 5; and the "*propter nostram salutem*" of the Nicene Creed. See especially, on the other hand, Col. i. 15—20 : Eph. i. 10.

idea of a literal punishment of our sins inflicted vicariously by the Father on His spotless Son, are foreign to their whole habit of thought. On the contrary, their way of looking at the matter seems to imply a belief, that in any case the predestined method for perfecting our nature, and bringing us into full communion with God, was the Incarnation of His Son.

We have seen, again, how some of the greatest Fathers, like St. Augustine, are specially carefully to point out the priority of the idea of sacrifice to the idea of sin, and in this they are followed by later Catholic divines. Sacrifice is the spontaneous expression of the homage due from the creature to his Creator, and the purest Heathen sacrifices were those which simply expressed this idea. "All devotional feeling," it has been truly said, "requires sacrificial expression." Sin impressed on it, as on all human acts of devotion, an additional character of reparation. But from the beginning it was not so. If man had never fallen, the most perfect sacrifice would still have been offered to the Eternal Father in the human life, though not in the death, of Jesus; for it is the will that consécrites the outward act. *Oblatus est quia Ipse voluit.* To repeat once more the memorable words of St. Bernard, *Non mors sed voluntas sponte morientis placuit.* Without the Fall there would have been no Passion; perhaps, but only perhaps, there would have been no Eucharist. The earliest recorded type of Holy Communion is the tree of life in Paradise, the great prefigurement of the Christian sacrifice is the bloodless offering of Mel-

chisedec, and that was not a sacrifice for sin. It is anyhow beyond dispute, that the Incarnation need not presuppose the Fall.

A few words will suffice to indicate the bearing of the Scotist theory—which, though by no means universally accepted, has obtained the general suffrage of the later Church—on our way of regarding the Atonement. The very title of the *Cur Deus Homo* loses its meaning in the sense in which the author applied it. Theories about ransom and satisfaction, though not therefore rejected, sink into subordination to a higher truth, when the Incarnation is no longer looked upon as a merciful after-thought, to remedy man's corruption and make reparation to the wounded majesty of God, but as the fulfilment of an eternal purpose, modified indeed, but only modified, by sin into a deeper act of love. Bethlehem and Calvary are transfigured with a more exceeding brightness, yet the brightness of a sunshine all our own, when they are seen to reveal, under the conditions of time and the pathetic incidents suited to our fallen state, the unutterable yearning of a Love which knows no change, to win our hearts, and make our natures His.

The full extent of the difference between these two theories did not, as has already been remarked, make itself felt at once. We sometimes find St. Thomas using language that would seem rather to belong to the opposite school,¹ nor is it to be imagined that so

¹ Thus, *e.g.* he calls our Lord, "similitudo exemplaris totius naturæ." *Summa*, Pars III. Quæst. i. Art. 8.

great a mind as his would rest in any exclusive system. In their view of the satisfaction of Christ the Nominalists and Franciscans for the most part followed Duns Scotus, while the Dominicans naturally ranged themselves under the banners of Aquinas, but not without exceptions or modifications on either side. Thus the Dominican, Durandus of St. Pacian, denies that Christ satisfied in strict rigour of justice, because all He had, as Man, was already owed to God; Raymund Lully, the Franciscan, goes beyond or rather against Scotus, in maintaining the necessity of the Incarnation, assuming the creation of man, as the perfection and crown of human nature. But we need not examine in detail the later Scholastic writers, who add little new to what the great masters had said before them. It is worth while to observe that Wicliffe, the precursor of the Reformation, recurred to the Anselmic view of an absolute necessity for the Incarnation, as the only adequate satisfaction for Adam's sin, though his argument differs in some respects from that of the *Cur Deus Homo*.¹ He gives a strange reason why Satan cannot be saved. As it was needful for the Second Person of the Trinity to be incarnated for man's redemption, who had sinned against the Wisdom of God, the Third Person must have been incarnated for the redemption of Satan, who had sinned the sin against the Holy Ghost, which is therefore unpardonable, because no such Incarnation can possibly take place!

¹ John Wicliffe *Trialog*. iii. 24, 25. *De Inc. et Morte Christi*. He considers all God's external operations, and the Incarnation among them, absolutely necessary.

To sum up the Scholastic period; we have found, at its commencement, the idea of an absolute necessity for the Incarnation and death of Christ, as the only possible means of restoring fallen man, put forward for the first time by St. Anselm, but very generally rejected by subsequent writers of whatever school. On the other hand, the doctrine of satisfaction first distinctly enunciated by him becomes the subject of elaborate discussion, and branches out eventually into the two opposite theories of a superabundant satisfaction which had an inherent claim to be accepted, and a satisfaction, sufficient indeed, but relying for its efficacy on a free acceptance from the mercy, not the justice, of God. Meanwhile, underlying these notions, two opposite views of the motive of the Incarnation develop themselves, destined to exercise an influence on the course of later theology which only the next great epoch in Church history will adequately reveal. We shall then find the more rigid and technical notion of satisfaction, already adopted by Wicliffe, assuming a critical importance in the Lutheran and Calvinistic systems, where the Scotist view of the Incarnation could have little meaning; while, as that view gradually spreads among Catholic theologians, the broader and nobler idea of sacrifice predominates within the Church.

Two writers of the fifteenth century may be briefly noticed in conclusion, who, though following to a great extent scholastic opinions, can hardly be reckoned among the Schoolmen, because their method is entirely different—the Spanish Raymund of Sabunde, and Car-

dinal Nicolas of Cusa. The former has composed a *Theologia Naturalis* (which, I need hardly remind the reader, does not mean what we understand by Natural Theology) designed to exhibit in detail the conformity of Christian doctrine with our natural anticipations, and the eternal fitness of things. His results do not greatly differ from those of St. Thomas; but he follows the reasoning, and not unfrequently uses the language, of the *Cur Deus Homo*, rather than of the *Summa*. Man owed to God a natural debt of perfect obedience as His creature, and since the Fall he owes a second debt of satisfaction for sin. Merit is measured by the person towards whom an act is done; and as obedience to God deserved an infinite recompense, the enjoyment of Himself, disobedience incurred an infinite debt. This no man could pay, being himself involved in the guilt, and no angel, who himself is finite; God alone can pay what only man owes, therefore He who pays must be God and man. To restore man, against the resistance of his corrupt will, is a greater work than to create him out of nothing. But all the requisite conditions meet in Christ. His *death* is necessary, because that alone He does not owe as man to God; but He cannot kill Himself, and must therefore suffer at the hands of others, whose sinful life is rebuked by the unfailing holiness of His teaching and example, and whom Satan instigates to slay Him. The merit of His acts is doubly infinite, both from His own nature and from that of God, to whom they are offered, but He needs and can receive no reward for Himself, and

therefore accepts as His reward our redemption; and thus mercy and justice are reconciled. His death was necessary for the satisfaction of sin, and it is against the wisdom of God for all mankind to perish. There is much in this to remind us of St. Anselm, but the treatment is partly different, and there is no such stringent statement of the absolute necessity of satisfaction.¹

Nicolas of Cusa has not written a system of Theology, but he deals with several detached questions, partly metaphysical, partly theological. In speaking of the mystery of Christ's death he dwells chiefly, like the Fathers, on His human nature containing in itself that of all men, and thus atoning for all, as all are baptized into His death, and united with Him in His resurrection. Elsewhere he refers with approval to the *Cur Deus Homo*, though somewhat modifying its statements. But he does not treat the question at length, or in a systematic way.²

¹ Raim. de Sabund. *Theol. Nat.* Solisb. 1852, Pars vi. pp. 412, *sqq.*

² Nic. de Cus. *Opp.* Basil. *De Doct. Ignor.* iii. pp. 50, 51. *Exercti.* iii. 418, 419.

CHAPTER V.

THEORIES OF THE REFORMATION PERIOD.

WE have now reached the period of the Reformation, and it therefore becomes necessary to exhibit at some length the views of the Atonement put forward by the various Protestant leaders, in so far as they are based on an acceptance of the traditional belief of Christendom about the Person of our Divine Lord. Where that is rejected, as by the Socinians and later Rationalists, the terms for a comparison are wanting, and we should be led aside from our proper subject into the wide question of the limits and nature of revelation. Moreover Socinianism, like its Arian prototype, has never been able to construct a *theology* for itself, as was sorrowfully confessed not long since by its greatest representative in this country, whose own published Sermons, I may venture to add, sufficiently attest its failure to satisfy such minds as his.¹ On the Socinian

¹ "I am constrained to say that neither my intellectual preference nor my moral admiration goes heartily with the Unitarian heroes, sects, or productions of any age. Ebionites, Arians, Socinians, all seem to me to contrast unfavour-

view, the benefits of Christ's incarnation are necessarily limited to His proclamation of the divine promises, the perfect example of His life, and still more of His death, and His pure utterance of the moral and spiritual law; and they even included in this last His revelation of the Lord's Prayer, forgetting that it was at least composed of petitions already in use among the Jews.¹ His teaching and example were guaranteed by His death and resurrection, which also gave a pledge of ours, and He is henceforth to be adored as a glorified Man, our King and High Priest in heaven.² But there could be no room for a real mediation between man and God, where there was no real union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of the Incarnate Word. The specific objections of Socinus, how-

ably with their opponents, and to exhibit a type of thought far less worthy, on the whole, of the true genius of Christianity. *I am conscious that my deepest obligations are in almost every department to writers not of my own creed.* In philosophy I have had to unlearn most that I had imbibed from my early text books, and the authors most in favour with them. In Biblical interpretation I derive from Calvin and Whitby the help that fails me in Crell and Belsham. In devotional literature and religious thought I find nothing of ours that does not pale before Augustine, Taylor, Pascal. And in the poetry of the Church it is the Latin or German hymns, or the lines of Charles Wesley or of Keble, that fasten on my memory and heart, and make all else seem poor and cold.....I cannot help this. I can only say I am sure it is no perversity; and I believe the preference is founded on reason and nature, and is already widely spread among us."—Martineau's *Letter to Macdonald* (London, 1859), quoted in *Christian Remembrancer*, Jan. 1864, pp. 204, 205.

¹ M. Guizot is less happy than usual, when he says (*Medit.* vol. iii. 127) "Non seulement Jesus Christ s'élève contre les Scribes et les Pharisiens qui placent dans ces actes toute leur foi et leur piété; il fait plus; il enseigne à ses disciples la simplicité vivante de l'Oraison dominicale." The half clause, "As we forgive them that trespass against us," is the only one that may perhaps be new.

² This account of Socinian doctrine is summarised from Möhler's *Symbolism*, vol. ii. p. 335, *sqq.* (Robertson's Translation.)

ever, are mainly directed against the moral and theological aspects of the system originated by the earlier Reformers, as to satisfaction, imputed righteousness, and justification by faith; and are, many of them, perfectly just. We shall have occasion to refer to them again in this connection by and by.¹

It has been already observed, that there was little of direct controversy raised between Catholic and Protestant writers on the doctrine of the Atonement, as such, nor did any fresh definitions on the subject emanate from the Council of Trent. The Tridentine *Catechism*, though not possessing direct dogmatic authority,² is universally accepted and used in the Church, as containing a clear and luminous exposition of Christian doctrine on the Creed, Sacraments, Decalogue, and Lord's Prayer. In commenting on the fourth article of the Apostles' Creed, it recounts the "benefits merited for us by the Passion of Christ," which are summed up under the four heads of deliverance from sin, and from its penalty, rescue from the tyranny of the devil, and the opening to us of the kingdom of heaven. Its efficacy is explained to consist in its being a full and entire satisfaction, offered "after a certain admirable manner" to the Father, a most ac-

¹ Socinus' system on the Atonement is to be gathered from his *Praelectiones Theologicae*, *De Jesu Christo Servatore*, *Brevissima Institutio Christianæ Religionis*, and *Refutatio Sentent. Vulg. de Satisfact. Christi*.

² When the controversy on grace and freewill (*De Auxiliis*) was under discussion before the Roman tribunals, the Jesuits protested against the *Catechismus ad Parochos* being appealed to as having a symbolic character, and their objection was admitted. Cf. Möhler *Symb.* vol. i. pp. 18-20. But it possesses the highest sanction as a Catechetical manual.

ceptable sacrifice to God, and a redemption from our vain conversation ; while it also gives us a bright example of patience, humility, charity, obedience, meekness, and constancy even unto death.¹ No explanations are added of questions disputed among the Schoolmen, or stirred at the Reformation. The expression on which some of the Reformers so strenuously insisted, that the death of Christ reconciled God to us, is not used at all in the Catechism, which confines itself to stating, in the language of Scripture, that He reconciled us to God.² But if no issue was raised on what may be called the objective side of the doctrine of the Atonement, its subjective side, in all that concerns the application of its efficacy to ourselves, or, in other words, the doctrines of original sin and justification, formed, I need hardly say, matter of prolonged and vigorous controversy, and elicited from the Council of Trent a full and elaborate statement of doctrine. Part of the fifth, and the whole of the sixth Session, was occupied with this subject. It is here accordingly that we must look for the specialities of the Reformed systems, and it is in this connection, in accordance with their exclusively subjective spirit, that they treat the Atonement; but of course differences on the one point imply differences on the other too.³ The impu-

¹ *Cat. ad Par.* Pars i. c. 5. Q 14, 15.

² *Ib.* i. c. 3. Q 3. The *Augsburgh Confession* (Art 3) says, "ut reconciliaret nobis Patrem," as does also the second of the Thirty-Nine Articles.

³ Luther accordingly, in the *Smalcaldic articles*, classes not only justifying faith, but redemption, among the doctrines at issue between Protestantism and "the Papacy, the Devil, and the world."

tation, for instance, of our sins to Christ, and His righteousness to us, are only opposite sides of the same idea.¹

The two great Confessions inaugurated by Luther and Calvin are agreed in their rejection of the Catholic doctrine on the primitive state of man, the Fall, justification, and the need of personal satisfaction for personal sin—which last implies, under whatever name, the notion of a purgatory. But they differ in some respects from each other, and therefore require separate examination. We will afterwards notice the later Protestant developments, which had their origin, for the most part, in a recoil from the extreme views of Luther and Calvin, and manifest, amid many grave errors, a decided tendency on these points to recur to a healthier tone. This is shown even in the Socinian protest against Luther's illogical ascription to faith of a merit he denies to obedience.²

For understanding rightly the point of departure of the Reformed systems, it is necessary to indicate their relations to the Catholic doctrine on the state of innocence and the Fall, for here the root of all further differences will be found to lie. Coleridge does not go at all too far, when he says that "without just and distinct views respecting the article of Original Sin, it

¹ Our view of the Atonement is of course necessarily determined by our view of original sin. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that an able critic of Newman's *Apologia* in the *Westminster Review* for Oct. 1864, after asserting that "man has undergone no terrible aboriginal calamity," adds that "there has been no need for a Sacrifice of Blood."

² Socin. *De Jesu Chr. Servatore*, iv. 11. "Quasi vero major dignitas in istâ fide, quam in hâc obedientiâ reperiatur," *et sqq.*

is impossible to understand aright any one of the peculiar doctrines of Christianity.”¹ I must, therefore, before proceeding further, claim my readers’ indulgence for what I fear they may consider a somewhat dry and technical exposition of doctrine; it shall be made as brief as is consistent with clearness of statement.

That God “made man upright” was agreed on all hands; but Catholic theology distinguished between that integrity of nature, in which Adam was created after the image of God, with the body subject to the mind, and all the inferior faculties and instincts under perfect control of the reason, and that gift of supernatural grace (*originalis justitia*) superadded as a crown to the endowments of his unfallen nature, which raised him to communion with his Maker, and fitted him to be the heir of a blessed immortality. This gift, called in Scripture the likeness of God, was held to be bestowed on man at his creation, or shortly afterwards—a point left open purposely by the Council of Trent—but must in either case be carefully distinguished from the perfection of nature.² By sin man

¹ *Aids to Reflection*, p. 215.

² The later scholastic theology, of which Cajetan and Suarez may be taken as exponents, distinguishes a state of *pura natura* as possible, though never actual, in which our various natural faculties would exist, but without being duly harmonized; the state of *integra natura*, in which many suppose Adam to have been actually created and to have awhile remained, where all the lower faculties are perfectly under control of the reason, and the soul is capable of knowing and loving God; the state of *originalis justitia*, to which man was supernaturally raised by grace, either at or after his creation, and whereby he became holy and pleasing to God; the state of *lapsa natura*, in which all men are born since the Fall, when this gift is lost, and the natural faculties disordered; and, lastly, the state of *redempta natura*, wherein grace

lost this gift of original righteousness, and marred, though he did not lose, his natural faculties for good. He was deprived of his supernatural and wounded in his natural powers; or, to adopt the language of Bellarmine, he lost the similitude, but retained the image of God. Original sin consists, *formally*, in the loss of that supernatural gift, *materially* in the disorder of his natural faculties which followed on its withdrawal, and, as some maintain, would have occurred sooner or later, had the gift never been bestowed. This disorder, or concupiscence, is not itself sinful, being involuntary, but is certain, when uncontrolled by grace, to lead men into sin (James i. 15). Freewill was impaired, but not destroyed at the Fall, and man was therefore able to co-operate with grace, when offered, but unable of himself to do any acts pleasing to God and deserving eternal life. This deprivation of supernatural grace, with its moral and natural consequences, implying further the loss of his claim to supernatural beatitude, our first parent transmitted to his posterity; but not, of course, his personal guilt, or, as was strangely imagined by the Reformers, any positive evil quality; and they could only be restored by the merits of Christ to the state of grace which he had forfeited. Man cannot merit or obtain restoration for himself, but he

is restored, but the conflict between the higher and lower faculties (*concupiscentia*) remains, making us liable to sin. See on this whole subject Kuhn's *Die christliche Lehre von der göttlichen Gnade*, Tübingen, 1868. Bp. Bull defends at length the Catholic doctrine in his *Primitive State of Man*, with copious extracts from the Fathers. It is in reference to this treatise that Dr. Newman says (*Letter to Pusey*, p. 47), "This is Anglican doctrine as well as Catholic."

can and must co-operate freely with the grace of God calling him to repentance, and this is sometimes termed in scholastic language 'merit of congruity.' On his true repentance he is forgiven, and with remission of sin the love of God is infused into his heart, and he is thus not only accounted but made righteous, and enabled to do works pleasing to God and deserving eternal life. Justification and sanctification are different names for the same thing, accordingly as it is viewed in its origin or its nature, except that, in ordinary language, justification is used for the initial act on the part of God in a process of which sanctification, in its fullest sense, is the gradually accomplished result; they stand to each other in the spiritual life, as birth in the natural life to the gradual advance to maturity. The sinner is justified, not by a bare acquittal, or by some juridical fiction of a transfer of Christ's merits, as though they were his own, but by the gift of inherent righteousness, or indwelling of the Holy Ghost, bestowed (primarily in baptism) for the merits of Christ. That gift though not *of* him is *in* him, and he is thereby also sanctified, not in name but in reality. Hence all merit, properly speaking, is ultimately derived from that of the Redeemer, and in crowning our merits God crowns His own gifts.¹

¹ The reader may consult for a fuller account *Canones Conc. Trid.* Sess. vi., especially cap. 7; Möhler's *Symbolism*, vol. i. ch. 1-3; and the appendix to Newman's *Lectures on Justification* (2nd ed. London, 1840), where the views of several writers, as well Catholic as Protestant, are given and discussed. It is a strange misapprehension when a modern German writer (Baur, *von der Versöhnung*, pp. 350, 351) insists that the Catholic Church before the Reformation always taught an *independent and co-ordinate* merit of man in the work

And now let us turn to the Lutheran idea of the primitive state of man and of original sin, which shall be described, as concisely as the case admits, before we proceed to notice the views of the Atonement based upon it in the Protestant formularies.¹ Luther denied the supernatural character of man's original sanctity, and considered it part of the essence of human nature, wherein both the capabilities *and the acts* of virtue are implanted by God. It followed, of course, that there could be no real freedom of will, since our acts are simply God's, and Luther accordingly asserts this in the strongest terms in his work, *De Servo Arbitrio*, expressly sanctioned by the *Formulary of Concord*; so also did Melancthon at first, though on this, as on other points, he afterwards recoiled from his master's teaching. As original righteousness was part of man's nature, he lost an integral part of his nature at the Fall. In the strange language of the *Augsburg Con-*

of justification. The Church, then as now, taught the co-operation of the human *will* in the process, and the reality of human merit in the works of those already justified, which are wrought by grace, and therefore are acceptable to God.

¹ The main authorities for the Lutheran doctrine, besides of course the writings of Luther himself and the chief Lutheran divines, are the *Augsburg Confession* (1530) with Melancthon's *Apology*, Luther's *Smalcaldic Articles* (1537), the *Formulary of Concord* (1577) including the *Epitome* and *Solid Declaration*, and Luther's two *Catechisms*, called the 'Bible of the Laity,' to which may perhaps be added Melancthon's *Loci Theologici*, as containing a clearer and more consistent exposition of Lutheran tenets than is always to be found in the works of the Reformer himself. Where no reference is given, my statements of Lutheran doctrine are derived from these sources. Cf. also Kuhn's *Lehre von der göttlichen Gnade*, § 22. It need hardly be observed, that many of the more repulsive features of the system have practically dropped out of the religious belief of those who still accept the Lutheran formularies. Some evidence of this will be given further on in the volume.

fession, he is “*born with sin*, without fear of God or confidence in Him;” in the language of the *Formulary of Concord*, he had lost all, even the slightest, capacity and aptitude and power in spiritual things; he had lost the natural faculty of knowing God, and the will of doing anything whatever good; he could neither begin, nor operate, nor co-operate, more than a stock or a stone; he had not the smallest spark of spiritual powers, and the image of God, or the whole spiritual part of his nature, was utterly obliterated. These statements, and they might be multiplied indefinitely, seem strong enough, but this is not all. For that positive part of his nature which man had lost there was substituted a *positive quality of sin*, whatever that may mean. Sin, according to Luther, is of the essence of man. Original sin, transmitted from father to son, is not, as the Church taught, the loss of supernatural grace with the consequent disorder of natural faculties; it is not even simply the loss of an integral portion of human nature; it is something born of father and mother—the clay of which we were formed is damnable, the fœtus in the womb is sin, man with his whole nature and essence is not only a sinner but sin. Such are the expressions of Luther, endorsed by Quenstedt. Melancthon and the *Formulary* are equally explicit. Man receives from his parents a congenital evil force, a native impulse to sin; there is substituted in the place of the image of God an “intimate, most evil, most profound, inscrutable, ineffable corruption of our whole nature, and all its powers,” which is implanted

in the intellect, heart, and will; man is wholly evil. Actual sin is not distinct from original, but is one phase of it, for original sin is an 'actual corrupt cupidity.' Concupiscence is not simply the result of disordered faculties, but a positive evil quality, and is itself sin. The results of this view, as regards the whole condition of the Heathen world, and the gradual preparation of mankind for the Incarnation, on which both Scripture and the Fathers so strongly insist, contradict of course alike the witness of history and the instincts of our moral nature. And these consequences are openly proclaimed. The kingdoms of this world have become the kingdom of the Devil and of his angels. Heathen virtues are scarcely even 'splendid vices.' Melancthon calls them 'shadows of virtues;' he says that all men's works and all their endeavours are sins, that the constancy of Socrates, the chastity of Xenocrates, the temperance of Zeno, are vices: and with perfect consistency he denounces the study of Aristotle and Plato. Luther himself says that men's works, however specious and good they may appear, *are probably mortal sins*, and that the works of the just would be mortal sins, unless they so regarded them themselves from fear of God.¹ Calvin clenches the matter by observing that from man's corrupted nature comes only what is damnable.²

¹ "Opera hominum ut semper speciosa sint, bonaque videantur, probabile tamen est ea esse peccata mortalia.....justorum opera essent mortalia, nisi pro Dei timore ab ipsismet justis ut peccata timerentur."—Heidelberg Propositions, 1519, quoted in Hallam's *Introd. to Lit. of Europe*, vol. I., p. 299.

² Calvin. *Inst.* ii. 3.

That Luther and his associates were laudably desirous to exhibit the depths of human sin and Divine compassion, and that they failed adequately to appreciate the real drift of their teaching, I am quite ready to believe. But we cannot wonder if the intellect and conscience of mankind, in its recoil from so horrible and repulsive a system, was tempted into the opposite extreme of denying the very existence of original sin. It is obvious what bearing the Lutheran view of it must have on the doctrine of justification. Man cannot co-operate, for he has no freewill, and no natural faculties for good; the whole work must be something external to himself. And so it is. Terrified by the preaching of a law he is powerless to obey, he listens to and grasps at the merits of Christ, whom he apprehends by faith (that is by a 'fiduciary apprehension,' as Gerhard expresses it), and thus he is justified. His repentance, such as it is, is founded on fear, not on love. Obedience, indeed, and sanctification ought to follow, but justification is distinct from these results and independent of them. Justification, according to the *Formulary*, is simply acquittal from sin and its eternal penalties "on account of the righteousness of Christ, which is [not *imparted* but] *imputed* to faith," and that, while by reason of their corrupt nature men still remain sinners; for original sin is not extirpated, but only weakened in the regenerate, being part of their nature, and concupiscence, even when resisted, is itself sin. The justified do so much good and for so long only as the Spirit of God impels them. It is admitted in words,

that men may *resist* the Spirit, though they cannot co-operate; but the distinction is unmeaning, for God draws all and only those whom He intends to convert. From this view of original sin and justification the Lutheran view of the Atonement is a logical sequence, and it has been already in part anticipated. That righteousness of Christ, which of mere grace is imputed to the believer, is described in the *Formulary*, as “the *obedience*, Passion, and resurrection of Christ, whereby He satisfied the law for us, and expiated our sins.” On account of this whole obedience in act and suffering, and through faith (*fiducia*), God remits our sins, accounts us (*reputat*) just, and rewards us with eternal life. For this the Incarnation of Christ was required, because His Divinity alone could not discharge the office of Mediator, nor could humanity alone satisfy the eternal and immutable justice of God. The absolute necessity of an infinite satisfaction for an infinite debt was borrowed from St. Anselm’s system, but in many points the Lutherans both exceeded and changed it. They derived from Catholic tradition the infinite value of the Redeemer’s acts through the *communicatio idiomatum*,¹ and the value of His obedience as well as His death; but this last idea received in their hands, as we have seen, a startling but very character-

¹ There was, however, a certain difference here. Catholic theology teaches that our Lord is Mediator, as the God-Man, but by virtue of acts done in His human nature only; the Lutherans made Him Mediator by virtue of both natures; while Stancarus said He was Mediator only as Man, a view which Bellarmine justly censured as Nestorian. Cf. Pet. *De Incarn.* xii. 3. 4. See also Bellarm. *Disp.* tom. i. *De Christo*, v. 1.

istic development. The obedience of Christ was the *substitute* for ours. According to Chemnitz (one of the compilers of the Formulary so often quoted), God could not and would not pardon us without the intervention of some real righteousness; but this it is impossible, on Lutheran principles, for man himself to offer, and therefore "the law is transferred to the Mediator."¹ Quenstedt is even more explicit, when he says that Christ made satisfaction for sinners in two ways, by fulfilling the law in their place, and by enduring the curse and penalty of the law. It was not, as had often been taught before, that His obedience was an acceptable sacrifice to God, and gave its meaning and efficacy to His death, but that it was accepted by God *instead of ours*, which, with a nature so hopelessly corrupted, we could never pay ourselves, His death was now, moreover, for the first time viewed as a vicarious punishment, inflicted by the Father on Him instead of on us. He was punished and accursed of God, in our place. Quenstedt maintains against the Schoolmen, that for God to pardon us without satisfaction is against His nature, His veracity, His sanctity, and His justice; yet he explains, that "by a certain kind of relaxation of the law," another *person* is substituted for the debtor.² In other words, though it is matter of indispensable justice to punish the sin, it is immaterial whether or not the punishment be endured by the sinner. It

¹ "Facta igitur est translatio legis in Mediatorem." Chem. *Loci Theolog.* ii. 313. Cf. Thomasius, *Dogmat. de Obed. Christi Activa Hist.*, Erlang, 1846.

² Quenstedt, *Theol. Didact. Polem.* (Wittenberg, 1669), pp. 327, 351, 354.

was but the natural and logical inference from this strange notion of vicarious substituted punishment, that Christ endured in His Passion the pains of Hell; and this blasphemous corollary is distinctly put forward by Quenstedt, Gerhard, and Calvin, as a necessary part of the idea of satisfaction. Well might Bellarmine call it a new and unheard-of heresy!¹ It is not too much to say that the Lutheran view of the Atonement, with whatever occasional similarities of language, is a complete innovation in all its essential points on that previously held, and in a sense directly calculated to discredit the whole doctrine in the eye both of reason and religion.²

¹ Frank, a modern Lutheran divine, in a tract, *De Satisfact. Christi* (Erlangen, 1859), argues against this inference. But cf. Quenst. ut supr. p. 354; Gerhard *Loci Theol.* xvii. 2, 54; Calvin, *Inst. Rel. Chr.* ii. 16, 10; Bellarm. *De Christo*, iv. 8. Mr. Campbell, after quoting the above passage (*Nature of Atonement*, p. 408) observes, that the language (of St. Anselm) about Christ paying a debt to the Divine justice, and the earlier (patristic) idea of a ransom paid to Satan, had prepared the way for this revolting doctrine of the Reformers. No doubt such notions may have helped to suggest the inference to them, but both Fathers and Schoolmen would have shrunk from it with horror; and, while St. Anselm's theory never obtained general acceptance, the notion of a ransom to Satan had long since passed away. Moreover, it is the very characteristic of heresy to base itself on an exaggerated or distorted presentation of the truth.

² It does not fall within the province of this Inquiry to compare Luther's doctrine with St. Paul's, on which it was professedly founded. Some striking points of contrast between the Apostle's and the Reformer's way of looking at the matter will be found in the Dissertation 'On Righteousness by Faith,' in Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul* (London, Murray, 1855), vol. ii. pp. 446, 447. I may be pardoned for adding, that the author seems to have somewhat misconceived the Catholic doctrine of justification, which he, rather oddly, sums up in the formula of 'justification by works.' See also Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, pp. 386, 387. Mr. Campbell's account of the teaching of Luther (*Nature of Atonement*, ch. ii.) appears to me a highly idealized one. His extracts from the *Commentary on the Galatians* either fail to bring out with sufficient distinctness, or omit altogether, the most characteristic, and, I may add, most offensive, features of the Lutheran system. For some further remarks on this point, I must refer to the Preface.

Calvin, who in some points was greatly Luther's inferior, was his superior in learning and in clearness of mind; and, accordingly, the system he founded has for the most part a rigid logical coherence in which the Lutheran is conspicuously deficient. We have seen that absolute predestination was really involved in Luther's denial of freewill, but he shrunk from pressing this inference, and his followers expressly repudiated it; nor is it ever fair to make a writer responsible even for a logical inference from his principles, which he disclaims. Calvin, however, with more consistency asserted the irresistible efficacy of grace, and the absolute predestination of the elect, with its inevitable correlative, the absolute reprobation of all who are not elect. From this it follows, even if denied in words, that God is the Author of sin. Calvin expressly maintains, that man commits sin "by the just impulse of God," and that the Fall was not simply foreseen, but predestined by Him. Beza adds, that He creates certain men in order that they may be the instruments of sin, and Zwingli defends this doctrine on the ground that, as the law is not made for the just, God is above law, and therefore breaks none in causing men or angels to transgress, as when He was the Author of David's adultery.¹ The object and justification of this predestining of evil is, that He may manifest His mercy in the gratuitous salvation of the elect, His justice in the damnation of the reprobate. But the

¹ Calvin. *Inst.* iv. 18, 2, iii. 24, 3; Beza *Aphor.* 22; *Absters. Calumn. Hesh. contr. Calvin*; Zwingli. *de Prov.* 5.

wilfulness of Adam's sin is maintained,⁷ as in the Lutheran system, by the distinction (which in this case is certainly without a difference) between necessity and coercion. Calvin, however, approaches more nearly than Luther to Catholic language, if not to Catholic belief, about original sin. The Divine image in man, though grievously deformed, was not utterly destroyed by sin; some sparks of religious knowledge survived among the Heathen, but then this is perversely said to be allowed in order that they might not have the excuse of ignorance, and might be condemned out of their own mouth! The will had a certain, though very subordinate, part in the work of regeneration, and the beginnings of repentance were due rather to the preaching of the Gospel than the terrors of the law. In this point, again, Calvin's teaching is an improvement on that of the earlier Reformer. Both kinds of conversion find their prototype in Scripture, but the comparison is not in favour of the Lutheran view. There are two forms that hover in an agony of repentance round the closing scenes of the Redeemer's earthly ministry; one represents the remorse of terror, the other the contrition of love. Both repented, but both were not forgiven. Ere the blood of Judas was dry on the field of Aceldama, the soul of the pardoned robber was sun-flushed with the brightness of the uncreated Vision, and sphered within the emerald of the rainbow that circles the everlasting throne.

If we except his predestinarian doctrine, that Christ

died only for the elect, and the subjective assurance of salvation on which he insists more consistently than Luther, Calvin's language on the Atonement comes much nearer on the whole than Luther's to that of Catholic theology. The value of Christ's death is derived, with St. Bernard, from its voluntary character. The new ideas of a substituted obedience and punishment are, however, retained in their fulness, and Calvin seems to regard the condemnation and execution of Christ by a regular legal tribunal as essential for this end. He expressly asserts, that our obligation of punishment and the curse of sin was *transferred* to the Son of God, and does not, as we have already seen, shrink from the terrible consequence of this view, that He suffered in His descent into Hell the actual torments of the damned.¹ On the other hand, Calvin denies the absolute necessity of the Incarnation, but regards it as the best method for restoring fallen man, and even maintains that, if we had never fallen, the mediation of the God-Man would have been needed to bring us into intimate communion with God and make us His children. He, moreover, in his treatise on the Sacraments, ascribes a life-giving power to the flesh

¹ Calvin *Inst.* i. 15, 4 ; 12, 18 ; ii. 3, 6 ; 16, 5. "Hæc nostra absolutio est, quod in caput Filii Dei translatus est reatus qui nos tenebat pœnæ obnoxios..... Peccati vim abolebat Pater, *cum in Christi carnem translata est ejus maledictio.*" Ib. ii. 16, 6, 7. Cf. ii. 16, 10. For the logical connection between the theory of literal substitution and the Calvinist notion, that Christ died only for the elect, because it would be unjust that any whose punishment He really endured should be themselves punished, see Campbell's *Nature of the Atonement*, ch. iii. It appears from an extract given (p. 58) that Edwards taught explicitly, in the last century, that our Lord "underwent the pains of Hell;" but the opinion has been suffered to drop out of later Calvinist theology.

of Christ, not only as having suffered for us once, but as still infusing life, derived from the fountain of God-head, into those who are engrafted in His mystical body. This is said partly in connection with the Eucharist, on which Calvin held a much higher belief than Zwingle's. And he even admits, in one passage, when replying to Osiander, who taught a higher doctrine than his own, that "we participate in the righteousness of Christ, not by an external imputation, but because we put on Christ, and are inserted into His body, and He has vouchsafed to make us one with Himself."¹ So far, then, Calvin's system is a reaction in the Catholic direction. With his distinctive theory of absolute predestination we are not further concerned here. It may suffice to observe, that in not shrinking from the full statement of what it implies, he shows more consistency, let me add more reverence also, than do those who put forward one side of the doctrine, while seeking through some paltry trick of language to veil its naked deformity by concealing the other. But this is all that can be said for him. The more thoroughly the dogma itself is realized, the more clearly will it be seen to be subversive of the first principles of morality, and therefore of theism. It has, indeed, been modified in some later Calvinist systems, by the admission that Christ died—objectively so to say—for all men. But as His death is only supposed to

¹ Ib. ii. 12, 1; iii. 11, 10. *Defens. Orth. Doct. de Sacram.* Opp. t. viii. p. 658. Hallam observes (*Lit. of Europe*, vol. i. p. 300) that "the Calvinistic churches generally make a better show in this respect," of morality, than the Lutheran.

profit those who are predisposed to receive its benefits by the sovereign grace of God, which is confined to the elect, the distinction is practically without a difference.

A writer whose name has just been mentioned, Osiander, deserves a passing notice here. Though himself a professed Lutheran, and not the founder of any new system or sect, he was one of the first to protest against Luther's characteristic tenet, that justification means, not "really and truly to make just, but only to account and pronounce a man just," which he calls a forensic and sophistical theory, contrary to Scripture and verging on blasphemy. For this the strict Lutherans accused him of trampling under foot the Passion and death and precious Blood of Christ. He says expressly that God justifies by *imparting* to us His righteousness.¹ After making due allowance for some confusion, both of language and thought, it seems most probable that he meant by the substantial indwelling of Christ's Divine nature something different from the Catholic doctrine, as being a righteousness imputed and external to us (though in a different sense to Luther's) and not an actual renewal of our nature, making us righteous. Still his protest against the Lutheran error of confounding justification with redemption, and its antinomian results, is important. In a separate treatise, specially devoted to the inquiry whether the Son

¹ *Conf. Andr. Osiandri. Regiomonte, Prussia, 1551, pp. 42, 189; Theses de Justif.* 120. There is some difference between Döllinger (*Die Reformation*) and Möbler in their way of understanding him.

of God would have been incarnated, if there had been no sin, he adopts and defends at length, on Scriptural grounds, the Scotist opinion, and insists that the predestined Humanity of Christ was the image on which ours was formed.¹ Another Lutheran divine, Karg of Ansbach, about ten years later, protested against the doctrine of vicarious obedience to the law, but afterwards retracted. At the close of the century, John Piscator elaborately discussed and condemned the notion, making justification consist simply in the remission of sin for the sake of Christ's sufferings, after which the imperfect obedience of the regenerate is accepted, and its imperfections condoned through the Blood of Christ, as long as it is sincere.² His views, however, were vehemently opposed among the Reformed, and the tenet he rejected found a place in the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* of 1675.

The treatise of Grotius on the Satisfaction of Christ, written early in the seventeenth century against Socinus, deserves a more extended notice, both from the author's high reputation and from his having struck out a theory of his own on the subject. It will be convenient, therefore, to reserve it for separate examination further on. Meanwhile we may glance at the teaching of the principal sects which branched off from the original Lutheran or Calvinistic stock, so far as it bears on the Atonement; and, as their systems were

¹ *An Filius Dei fuerit incarnandus si peccatum non introivisset in mundum?* Monteregio, Prussia, 1550.

² John Piscat. *Thes. Theol.* Herborn. 1618.

partly shaped by historical circumstances, it will be best to take them in chronological order.

The earliest organised protest against the new doctrine of justification came from the Anabaptists, who insisted on the necessity of good works; and this, as Justus Menius truly enough observed, in a Refutation published with a preface by Luther, is inconsistent with the doctrine that faith alone saves. It was only, however, in their second stage, as 'Mennonites,'¹ that the community can be said to have had any definite creed. In a Confession, drawn up in 1580, original sin and justification are described in language substantially accordant with that of the Council of Trent; free-will is expressly affirmed to have survived the Fall, and justification is ascribed to the 'effusion or infusion' of real righteousness through Christ by the co-operation of the Holy Ghost, while justifying faith is said to be that which works by charity, the *fides formata* of Catholic, as opposed to the *fides informis* of Lutheran theology.

The next great movement among the Reformed was a still more direct and vehement recoil from received opinions, confounding in an indiscriminate hatred the original Christian dogma with the newer glosses which had been put upon it. If Luther maintained, in his *Commentary on the Galatians*, that Christ only accidentally discharged the office of a Teacher and Law-

¹ So called from Menno Simonis, a Catholic Priest of Friesland, who joined the sect in 1536. I need scarcely remind the reader, that they must not be confounded with the English 'Baptists,' who came into existence as a distinct community in 1633.

giver, that the blindness of Papists alone had fashioned out of the Gospel 'a law of love,' and that so far from coming to authenticate the moral law the Saviour came to abolish it, Socinus would hardly admit any object of the Incarnation but that of instruction and example; if Luther's ubiquitarian theory absorbed the Humanity into the Divinity of Christ, Socinus rejected His Divinity altogether; if original sin was interpreted by the Reformed in a sense which outraged alike the verdict of history and of common sense, its very existence was, with equal disregard to facts, denied by their new opponents. No place was allowed to the human will in the Lutheran scheme of justification, therefore no room is left for Divine grace in the Socinian; the Wittenberg theologians could scarcely endure the very name of reason, and their Italian assailants were almost as intolerant of faith. It has already been remarked, that their conception of Christ's Mediatorial office was necessarily moulded on their humanitarian conception of His Person, and falls therefore beyond the scope of this treatise. That they approximated more closely than their predecessors among the Reformed to some details of Catholic belief is true, but their denial of a false supernaturalism was, in fact, ultimately based on a negation of the whole principle, though it of course took time for the seminal ideas of the system to attain full development.

Very different in character was the almost simultaneous revolt against Calvinistic orthodoxy named from Arminius, a theological Professor at Leyden, who died

in 1609. On the whole question of justification, Arminianism was really though not professedly little else than a simple recurrence to Catholic doctrine.¹ Efficacious grace was said to be determined by its voluntary acceptance, not by its intrinsic nature, and the notion of irresistible grace, however explained, was absolutely rejected. But the Arminians taught, almost in the very language of the Council of Trent, that Divine grace must prevent, accompany, and complete every good work.² The views of Grotius, the chief ornament of their body, will be examined presently. Two other writers may be noticed here, Curcellæus, and Limborch.³ Both agree in insisting chiefly on the death of Christ as a sacrifice, which is a different idea from the payment of a debt; they deny that Christ in any sense endured, as the Lutherans taught, eternal death and the wrath of God. If He had strictly and fully suffered the punishment of our sins, our pardon would be matter not of mercy but of justice; Curcellæus adds, that, if His satisfaction, righteousness, and sanctity are *imputed* to us, there is no further ground for our observing the moral law, nor can God justly demand either faith or obedience from us. The efficacy of the sacrifice offered for the sins of all mankind is ascribed by Limborch to the will of God in freely

¹ Accordingly the Caroline school of divines in England were frequently stigmatized by their Puritan opponents as Arminians.

² See the *Confessio sive Declaratio Pastorum*. Herdervici, 1622-4. It is an indication of their theological tendencies, that Grotius at the time of his death had it in contemplation to become a Catholic.

³ Curcell. *Inst. Rel. Christ.* Amsterdam, 1675. Limborch *Theol. Christ.* Amsterdam, 1730.

accepting it for that end, and to the dignity of the Person who offered it. The imputation of His righteousness can in no other sense be true than that God, for His sake, is pleased to accept our imperfect obedience as though it were perfect, for He cannot regard us as other than we really are. The Lutheran antithesis of faith and works is unmeaning; both alike are in one sense our own, in another sense the gift of God. The object of faith is not simply the Atonement, but the whole Person and office of Christ, Prophet, Priest, and King. There is a double protest in these writers, against the extravagances of Reformed doctrine, and the Socinian negations to which they had given birth.

The next system calling for notice here is that of the Quakers, founded in this country about the middle of the seventeenth century, by George Fox. Robert Barclay is their great theologian.¹ This scheme of doctrine is directly opposed to historical Christianity, but, unlike most of the Protestant Confessions, is remarkable for its internal coherence. We may regard it as the natural term in a series of mystical developments, provoked by the exoteric and unspiritual nature of the Lutheran scheme of justification, which began with Schwenkfeld and Wiegel, and found a more distinct utterance in the writings of Jacob Böhme. While discarding all technical terminology not sanctioned by the language of Scripture, the Quakers taught that a 'seed of sin' was transmitted from Adam to all his posterity, though only imputed to those who have

¹ Rob. Barclay, *Theologicæ vere Christianæ Apologia*. Lond. 1729.

actually sinned. The remedy is to be sought in the 'inward light' or grace emanating from Christ, the Light that lightens every man, and this is offered to all but forced on none; for Calvin's doctrine of predestination is declared to be most injurious to God, and to make Him the Author of sin. This 'objective revelation,' whereby God speaks to every man, does not supersede Scripture, but is superior to it, and constitutes the primary source of knowledge and rule of faith. The inward light is also the source of regeneration; and here the Quakers, in fact, touch on the confines of Catholic doctrine. The Lutheran denial of the necessity of good works is explicitly condemned; justification is described as the formation of Christ in us, producing righteousness and holiness, and this is its formal cause. The merit of good works is asserted and vindicated, and the obligations of the moral law are insisted upon. Justification and sanctification are practically identified, as in the Catholic system. And, although, as time went on, a Docetic tendency to ignore or depreciate the historical manifestation of Christ not unnaturally developed itself in the teaching of his followers, Barclay himself distinctly ascribes justification to 'the sacrifice and propitiation' of our Lord. But their extreme dislike of all theological dogma and repudiation of sacraments combined with other elements of the system to induce a disparagement, leading ultimately into a denial, of objective Christianity altogether.¹

¹ It is remarkable that Tom Paine was brought up a Quaker, and that his theories, both religious and political, seem to have been materially, though indirectly, influenced by his earlier training. Cf. *Sat. Review*, Oct. 28, 1865.

The last, and in some respects most remarkable, of these organized protests against the principles of the original Reformers was inaugurated, in the eighteenth century, by Emmanuel Swedenborg, the son of a Swedish Lutheran bishop. His profound hostility to the Protestant notion of justification, as subversive of morality and most pernicious to all Christian life, may be said to have given its distinctive character and aim to the peculiar system of belief he founded, which is still professed by some few of our own countrymen.¹ This is not the place to enter on a general examination of his theology, but I may observe that in its ulterior developments it has exploded almost every distinctive tenet of the Christian faith.² A prophet who claimed to derive his message by direct revelation and visions from on high—and of Swedenborg's sincerity there cannot be a shadow of reasonable doubt—was not likely to be careful about conforming its contents to

¹ *True Christian Religion, containing the Universal Theology of the New Church.* By E. Swedenborg. London, 1819.

² An Expository work by a Mr. Noble was lent me some years ago by a member of the sect, in which I found every article of the Apostles' Creed, except the first, directly or indirectly denied. The correctness of the account of Swedenborgian doctrine given here has been called in question by the Rev. A. Clissold, with whom I had a correspondence on the subject in the *Guardian*, between Aug. 24 and Nov. 22, 1865, to which the reader may be referred. So far, however, from shaking my previous estimate of the doctrine, his letters have in every respect confirmed it; and I found fresh corroboration in the perusal of his own work on the *End of the Church*, where he expressly says, moreover, (p. 80) that from the Council of Nice downwards there has prevailed "under the semblance of a Catholic apostolicity a CATHOLIC APOSTASY." There is no lack, however, of English works on Swedenborg and his teaching, and those who doubt the accuracy of my statements can easily verify them. Mr. Clissold has defended his own view in a work of four volumes, entitled *The Spiritual Exposition of the Apocalypse*.

the traditional beliefs of Christendom, least of all when the first impulse to his supposed inspirations arose from internal revulsion against the belief in which he had been brought up. His vision of the various states of Purgatorial or more hopeless suffering, in which the principal Reformers were expiating their erroneous teaching on predestination or justification by faith alone, indicates the ruling idea which shaped his whole theology.¹ Like Socinus, he had a laudable desire to pull up the tares, and even more completely than Socinus he succeeded in rooting up wheat and tares together. Thinking, oddly enough, that the Lutheran notion of faith apart from morality was grounded upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and took its origin at the Council of Nice, he replaced it by one not materially differing from Sabellianism. Perceiving again, and rightly, that the new theory of justification introduced by the Reformers was based on their peculiar estimate of original sin, he denied the Fall of man altogether. A new motive was found for the Incarnation in the rebellion of the apostate Angels, and redemption consisted in "reducing the Hells into subjection," and thus bestowing renewal on the earthly Church. While, however, Swedenborg attributes no special efficacy to

¹ Luther was in a more hopeful state than others, as having originally belonged to a Church which exalts charity above faith, and never having been able altogether to divest himself of his early creed. Recollections of classical mythology seem to have exercised some influence over Swedenborg, who was a man of wide and varied information. Thus *e.g.* Melancthon was constantly employed in writing the words, "Faith alone saves," which were as constantly erased by an unseen hand.

the *death* of Christ, he insists on the Incarnation as the proper and only means of bringing men into communion with the Deity, using on this point language very like that of Cardinal Cusa and other Catholic divines. Hence his view of justification is also very like the Catholic. It is represented as identical with sanctification, and as a renewal of the whole inner man. But he confounds the belief in the meritorious sacrifice of Christ with the Lutheran doctrine of imputation, which was fastened on it, and maintains that both alike came in with the Nicene definition of the Trinity, whereas the former, as we have seen, existed from the first, and the latter was scarcely heard of before the sixteenth century. In Swedenborg the recoil from a dry and technical theory of satisfaction reaches its culminating point; and the wide acceptance, for a time, of his fanatical claim to be the inspired restorer of primitive Christianity, proves how deep a wound had been inflicted by some of its modern exponents on the reason and conscience of mankind.

And now it is time to revert to the treatise of Grotius on Satisfaction, already mentioned. He was, as we have seen, an Arminian, and with strong Catholic leanings, but he must not of course be taken as a safe interpreter of Catholic belief, nor must we be blinded by his zeal for Trinitarian orthodoxy to the very questionable nature of his theory of the Atonement and of the arguments by which he supports it. His book

¹ *Defensio Fid. Cathol. de Satisfactione Christi*, 1617 (Hug. Grot. Opp. Theol. iv. Basileæ, 1732).

was answered by the Socinian Crellius (the writer against whom Petavius' third book on the Trinity is directed) and defended at length, in a work called the *Triumph of the Cross*, by Essenius, who reproduces his conclusions and expands with perverse ingenuity the most objectionable parts of his reasoning.¹ Before making any comments, it will be convenient to give a brief analysis of Grotius' treatise, which is written with all the perspicuity and subtilty of a legal mind, and displays, as might be expected from its authorship, extensive research, both in sacred and secular literature.

Grotius begins by laying down as the Catholic opinion, that God, wishing to benefit mankind but being hindered by their sins, which deserved punishment, determined that Christ should pay the penalty for our sins, by willingly enduring the bitterest torments and a bloody death, in order that *without prejudice to the exhibition of Divine justice (salvâ divinæ justitiæ demonstratione)* we might through faith be delivered from the penalty of eternal death. The reader will take note, that the words I have italicized contain the gist of the whole theory. In the first chapter, adopting the Aristotelian division of causes, the author lays down as the *efficient* cause of satisfaction, first God the Father who gave His Son, and secondly Christ who gave Himself for us. The *material* cause consists in the sufferings of Christ, both of soul and body, especially of soul, preceding death, and still more in His

¹ *Triumphus Crucis, sive Fides Cathol. de Satisfact. Christi.* Amstelod. 1749.

actual death. The *formal* cause is the payment of the penalty for our sins, which are expressly said to be imputed to Christ. Grotius, therefore, translates and explains Isaiah's prophecy in accordance with the Hebrew text, of the '*chastisement*' of our peace being laid upon Him, not the 'discipline,' as the Fathers had taken it—and insists, also against patristic tradition, that in saying He was made a curse for us, St. Paul means that He was accursed *of God*.¹ God punished, and Christ endured the punishment. The *final* cause of redemption is, on God's side, the exhibition of Divine justice, on ours, the remission of sin, that is of punishment; and by justice is not to be understood the righteousness or holiness of God, which is imputed to us, but His retributive justice, which is displayed in the punishment of sins. To these four causes Grotius adds, as the *motive* cause, on the one hand the love of God and Christ for man, on the other our sins which deserved punishment. The four grounds (or final causes) alleged by Socinus for the death of Christ—to bear witness to His teaching, to win the right of pardoning us, to show an example of patience and obedience, and to elicit our faith—are not only rejected as inadequate (as they are) but almost, as in the Lutheran theology, excluded altogether.

The second chapter of the treatise is devoted to proving that God punishes or releases from punishment, which last Scripture calls to justify,² not as

¹ Cf. *supr.* p. 105.

² The reader will observe the Lutheran idea again cropping out.

the Creditor or the Person offended, but as the Ruler of the world; for the offended party, as such, has no right to demand punishment but only compensation for the offence. Punishment belongs to the Ruler for the good of the community, not for his own sake, even when the crime is against himself, or for that of the person injured. The third chapter explains, that God's act in pardoning us is not an abrogation or interpretation of the sentence of death pronounced on sin at the beginning,¹ but a relaxation or dispensation of it, as regards certain persons, namely, believers. All positive law is, in its own nature, dispensable, nor are penal laws an exception; but they should not be dispensed without grave cause, or the authority of law generally would be impaired. A two-fold cause existed here, for without relaxation of the law of death both man's worship of God and the evidence of God's mercy to man would have utterly perished. In the fourth chapter the question is asked, whether Christ's being punished for our sins was unjust? It cannot be unjust in itself for God to visit His most innocent Son with the bitterest torments and death, because He did so. Neither is it unjust in itself, that the innocent should be punished for the guilty, of which there are abundant examples in nature, in history, and in human law, as when children suffer for their parents', subjects for their rulers' sin.² It is essential to justice, that punishment should be inflicted on sin, but not that it should fall on the sin-

¹ Gen. ii. 17.

² Essenius has an elaborate chapter expanding this argument in detail.

ner, at least where there is some natural or moral connection between the culprit and the victim, as between father and son, sovereign and people, surety and client.

In the fifth chapter, which is the most important of all for understanding his view, Grotius inquires whether there was sufficient cause for God to punish Christ, or, in other words, how it could benefit us? For God's wishing to pardon us, the cause was His own goodness; the question is about the *method*. This is expressly shown, by the testimony of several Fathers, not to have been necessary. Other ways of delivering man were possible, but this was the most convenient, because the authority of the moral law and the order of things would have been endangered, had God let off the sinner without some *conspicuous example* of the real deserts of sin. That the example does not take place in the person of the sinner is immaterial. According to jurists, the most perfect method of relaxing a law is where there is some compensation or commutation, and this may be a commutation not only of punishment, but of persons punished. Thereby also God showed His special love towards us, inasmuch as it was not a matter of indifference to Him (*ἀδιάφορον*) to punish or not to punish sin. It is shown in the sixth chapter, that God intended to punish Christ, for He had never granted or promised pardon on any other condition. He therefore made Christ to become sin, and a curse. The nature of satisfaction is then explained, as being not an actual payment—for that *ipso facto* releases the debtor from all further obligation—but a payment re-

quiring a voluntary intervention on the ruler's part (*solutio recusabilis*) to relax the law and remit the penalty, because it is not a payment of the very thing owed—which in this case was our eternal death—but of something else. The ruler does not receive anything, for there is nothing to receive, but he agrees on the payment of a certain penal satisfaction to remit all punishment for the future.

The last four chapters of the treatise are occupied with the death of Christ, considered as a reconciliation or propitiation, a redemption, a substitution, and an expiation. It not only reconciles us to God but God to us, which is stated to be the same thing, by turning away His wrath from us. It is a redemption, because our release from eternal punishment was purchased by it; and even texts which expressly speak of our being redeemed from iniquity are pressed into the writer's service in this sense, while he goes out of his way to deny that they mean, what they certainly say, that we are redeemed from the bondage of *sin*.¹ He adds, that the punishment or death of Christ was substituted for ours. It is an expiation, as being an antecedent act required on God's part for the remission of punishment.

Such, then, is the great jurist's defence of the Catholic Faith, or rather of his own, on the Atonement. In his zeal against Socinianism, he has reproduced some

¹ Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. i. 18. These are the only passages in the Epistles where the word *λυτρόω* is used. It occurs once elsewhere in the N. T. in Luke xxiv. 21.

of the worst features of the Lutheran and Calvinistic systems, which helped to create it. The idea of justification, as a mere remission of punishment, the shocking notion of a literal imputation of our sins to Christ, with its immoral correlative of an imputation of His holiness to us, reappears at least in words.¹ But in its main characteristics Grotius' theory is his own, as are also the arguments by which he supports it. And of these something must now be said.

The first point to strike a reader of the treatise is its thoroughly abstract and juristic manner of handling the question. Such a view could only have occurred to a mind habitually versed in the technicalities of legal hair-splitting. It is rather the device of a special pleader, who has taken a brief for the Atonement, than the judgment of a theologian. Yet even so, and allowing for the charm of an exercise of controversial ingenuity, one can scarcely conceive its having satisfied so clear and capacious an intellect. Were it simply suggested as a fiction of the law, we might reply with the legal maxim, *Summum jus summa injuria*. But, if it means anything more, what shall we say? The Anselmic notion, that pardon was impossible without the payment of an infinite equivalent for an infinite debt, however untenable, is at least so far intelligible and consistent. It supplies an adequate motive for the Incarnation and the Cross. But Grotius denies that an equivalent was either required or paid. His ratio-

¹ This view is however expressly disclaimed by Grotius in his later writings.

nale of the death of Christ is one which shocks both our reason and our religious instinct. It was not fitting that God should let us off, so to speak, without some terrible example of His righteous indignation against all manner of iniquity; but whether or not the punishment took effect on the sinner was indifferent, so long as it was clearly understood to be the punishment of sin.¹ The spectacle on Calvary was a grand dramatic exhibition of God's retributive justice, and having thus publicly vindicated the authority of His law, He consented to remit all further penalties of disobedience. Yet surely, if a conspicuous example were needed to deter men from sin for the future—and it could have no other object—not only was there no ground for selecting an innocent victim, but it was absolutely essential that punishment should fall on the guilty; the greater the criminal the more forcibly would the lesson be conveyed. Least of all was the Incarnation of a Divine Person requisite, that the Father might teach us the heinousness of our iniquities by visiting their merited chastisement on His sinless Son;² the Socinian account of that mystery would fully satisfy all the requirements of the case.

It is true, indeed, that the Crucifixion of Jesus revealed, as nothing else could reveal it, the exceeding sinfulness of sin, but that is quite another thing from

¹ This is very much the notion of 'rectoral justice,' which Campbell justly censures in recent Calvinist theology. See *Nature of Atonement*, ch. iv.

² This weakness of the theory was pointed out by later writers among the Lutherans who attacked it. See Buddæus *Instit. Theol.* 1725; Pfaff, *Examen lib. Grot. de Satisf.* 1753; and the jurist Ulrich Huber, quoted by Buddæus.

saying, with Grotius, that He was punished and accursed for our warning by the vindictive justice of God. There is no attempt to account for His being chosen as the Victim beyond the passing remark in the fifth chapter, that He had a special aptitude, from the dignity of His Person and His intimate union with us, to be made a conspicuous example; surely the more perfect His innocence the more conspicuous, on this view, the example of injustice. I pass over the purely exoteric character of the whole theory, which reduces the Incarnation and the Passion to a thrilling scene in the drama of the world's history, and recognises no real communion between the Second Adam and the members of His Body, from His flesh and from His bones, no link between His death and their redemption, that the condemned criminal is bidden to gaze on the punishment of the Just as the condition of being spared his own.

 But if the theory itself is startling, the line of argument it is supported by is more startling still. In this world the innocent often suffer for the guilty, children bear the burden of their fathers', subjects of their rulers' sin; nay, it frequently happens, in the execution of justice, that good and bad are punished together, or the good instead of the bad; therefore, while the law must visit crime, it need not touch the criminal! But does not Christian instinct, to say nothing of Scripture, teach us that these inequalities of earth will be rectified by unerring wisdom in the world beyond the grave? or, rather, are not those very inequalities a confirmation of our belief in the new

heavens and new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness? Such seeming difficulties, which from the days of Job have tortured the philosopher, and sometimes disquieted the Saint, run up at last into the one insoluble riddle of all metaphysics and all theology, the origin of evil. When once the existence of evil is accepted as a fact, though its original permission cannot be explained, they cease to be difficulties, and are felt to be a temporary and incidental interruption of the perfect order of the universe, introduced by sin. They have also their bearings on the sacrifice of Christ, as has been observed in a former chapter. But it is quite a different matter when the experience of human history, *delirant reges plectuntur Achivi*, is converted into a principle of divine governance, and it is gravely inferred that, because God for wise ends permits the afflictions of the righteous, He *punishes* them for others' sins.¹ To the bitter cry of humanity, "What hope of answer or redress?" we have hitherto been content to reply, "Behind the veil, behind the veil." But to argue from the manifold chastisements entailed by the wickedness or follies of parents on coming generations, or of sovereigns on a whole people, or again from the necessary or culpable imperfections of human law, or the

¹ It is one thing to say, with Butler (*Analogy*, pt. ii. ch. 5), that vicarious sufferings in this world are an answer to objections drawn from the fact of the innocent Victim suffering for the guilty (cf. *supr.* ch. 1); quite another to say that God *judicially punishes* the innocent for the guilty, which is Grotius's argument. In the one case the Atonement is allowed to have in fact involved the suffering of the innocent for the guilty, in the other its essence is made to consist in vicarious and penal suffering.

blindness or prejudice or corruption of those who administer it, as though such things were not an abnormal exception tolerated for a while by God, but the rule of His Providence and measure of His attributes, is to cut at the roots of human morality and of trust in a higher than human Justice. It is to say in effect that, because evil exists, it must be eternal, and to make God, if not its Author, its Accomplice. Of all the strange notions that at various times have darkened the revelation of Calvary, it would be hard perhaps to find any more strange than this, which eliminates from the greatest fact in history all real significance, while it dares to interpose between man and God a fiction of misdirected vengeance. Grotius appends to his treatise a long list of extracts from the Fathers, which certainly, whatever else they may contain, do not contain the theory he has invented.

Before we close this chapter, one more writer, of the early part of the eighteenth century, may be mentioned, both as exhibiting the most pronounced antithesis, within the bosom of the Lutheran Church, to the theological system of its founder, and as being the last Lutheran divine of any note who can properly be said to belong to the epoch of the Reformation. Towards the middle of that century, a wholly new movement of religious thought commences with the appearance of the *Wolfenbüttel* Fragments and other publications of Lessing,¹ the quasi-rationalistic theo-

¹ Lessing (*Werke*, vol. x. p. 322) explains the Atonement to mean that the moral law was given by God for the discipline of man, the imperfections of his obedience being condoned in regard of the absolute perfections of the Son.

logy of Semler, and the philosophy of Kant. From thenceforth the contest in Germany is between the assailants and the champions of the traditional Protestant orthodoxy. The latter for the most part adopt, with modifications, Grotius' manner of explaining the Atonement, as is done by Michaelis, Seiler, and Storr, while the leading writers on the opposite side more or less openly repudiate its historical truth and significance. Into that controversy it would be beyond the scope of this treatise to enter, nor could it be done to any purpose without a discussion of the principal schools of later German philosophy, as those of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling.¹ There is one other writer, however, who may fairly be included in our review of the various phases of Reformation doctrine on the work of Christ. John Dippel, the Christian Democritus as he was called, comes before the commencement of the Rationalistic period, and, while standing on the professed ground of Lutheran orthodoxy, represents the widest departure from the original standard of Lutheran belief.²

The Redeemer, he observes, is not only a High-priest, to reconcile His people through prayer and sacrifice; He is also a Prophet, to instruct the fallen in the way of righteousness, and a King, to break the chains of the realms of darkness and set free the crea-

¹ For some account of the successive Rationalist schools of German theology, the reader may be referred to Farrar's *Bampton Lectures On the History of Free Thought*, lect. vi. and vii. with the Notes.

² *Eröffneter Weg zum Frieden*. Amsterdam, 1706. *Vera Demonstratio Evangelica*, 1729.

ture from the power of sin. His work of mediation, as the Second Adam, is not complete till all this is accomplished in the soul of the redeemed. God is Love, and has ever loved us; it is we who need to be reconciled to Him, not He to us. And this reconciliation cannot be effected by a mere external fiction of imputed righteousness, but only through the real implanting of a righteous principle within us by the life-giving Spirit, whom Christ bestows, and by whose aid we overcome sin. Punishment is either the natural consequence of sin, or is inflicted by God for the discipline and correction of the sinner, and in either case is a dispensation of His love. Spiritual death can as little be separated from sin as warmth from fire, for sin is itself a conversion to the creature and a turning away from our chief Good. Hell, therefore, is no arbitrary creation of God, but the inevitable result of sin; sin means separation from God, and that separation is spiritual death. From this Christ sets us free, not by a mere judicial acquittal, but by releasing us from the power of sin. From corrective chastisement He has not released us, but has taught us how to bear it; for by such chastisements alone, with the assistance of indwelling grace, can the affections of the great multitude of men be withdrawn from earthly things and from their inherent concupiscence. We are therefore placed under a discipline of love for our renewal and sanctification. Neither Heathen, nor even Jewish, sacrifices are properly types of the Sacrifice of Christ, nor were they so designed by God, though the latter

are so explained 'by accommodation' in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Lastly, Dippel rejects as blasphemous the Lutheran notion, that Christ endured the actual curse and punishment of God, which must in fact imply that He shared the actual sin.

It is obvious how far even professed Lutherans had by this time drifted from their master's teaching, for the most part in a reactionary direction, towards the creed it was intended to supplant.

It is not necessary to introduce here any lengthened notice of English divines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, partly as being better known, partly because they have not originated any special theory on the Atonement itself, while on its application to us, or the doctrine of Justification, their opinions incline more or less, according to individual bias, in a Catholic or Lutheran direction. Nor do the more eminent of them *insist* on any particular view of justification, with the exception of Hooker who, in his Sermon on the subject, not only lays down an extreme doctrine of imputation, but implies that to deny it is to "pervert the truth of Christ," and "gainsay the very ground of apostolic faith;" yet his opinion stops considerably short of Luther's, and in the very same discourse he says that Lutheran teaching is damnable, and by implication "overthrows the very foundation of faith." It may be added that the Sermon on Justification was among his earlier writings, and was not published during his lifetime. The Atonement is scarcely touched upon in the famous exposition of the patristic

doctrine of the Incarnation in the fifth book of the *Ecclesiastical Polity*, which however has the following passage on the question of its necessity. "The world's salvation was, without the Incarnation of the Son of God, a thing impossible, *not simply impossible*, but impossible it being pre-supposed that the will of God was no otherwise to have it saved than by the death of His own Son." So also Pearson, in expounding the fourth article of the Creed, which he does in much the same manner as the Tridentine Catechism, though at greater length, contents himself with observing; "Salvation is impossible unto sinners without remission of sin; and remission *in the decree of God* impossible without effusion of blood." Butler, the great ornament of Anglican theology at a later date, while defending, in the fifth chapter of the *Analogy*, the doctrine of Christ's mediation and Atonement against current infidel objections, expressly disclaims any idea of speculating on the abstract necessity of Atonement, or of attempting to explain the manner of its efficacy. He considers that "Scripture has left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed," and that accordingly "all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, at least uncertain."

The well-known work of Archbishop Magee, on the *Scriptural Doctrine of Atonement and Sacrifice*, like many others, is mainly directed against Unitarian objections. He enters at great length into the universality and Divine origin of the institution of animal sacrifice and the belief in its expiatory virtue, tracing

it from the time of Abel. But his argument is drawn in great measure, like Butler's, from natural analogies, and, with Butler, while insisting on the *fact* of the Atonement, he disclaims speculations on the reason or manner of its efficacy, viewing it as a means ordained by God, not as the cause of His forgiveness. The notion of the necessity of an infinite Victim for an infinite sin he indignantly repudiates, treating it as an Unitarian misrepresentation. His work, though displaying considerable learning on many detailed points, can hardly be said to throw much new light on the subject as a whole.

Far deeper, though less systematic, and by no means free from his habitual obscurity, is Coleridge's treatment of the subject in the *Aids to Reflection*. He declines, however, to inquire into what he calls "the causative act of redemption"—that is, the atonement in relation to God—not at all as denying its existent reality, but because he regards it as "a spiritual and transcendent mystery that passeth all understanding." The efficacy of redemption in relation to man—that is, justification—is the point dwelt upon. And this he makes to consist in our renewal or being born again, which is expressed in many different forms in the New Testament. It is often difficult to grasp his precise meaning, but the general tenor of what he says is in substantial accord with the Catholic doctrine of justification rather than the Lutheran.¹

¹ Coleridge's view is given in a clearer form, if the analysis of it may be accepted as correct, in Shairp's *Studies in Philosophy and Poetry*, than in his own words.

NOTE TO CHAPTER V.

ON BAXTER'S VIEW OF IMPUTATION.

A CONTROVERSY on imputed righteousness arose in England during the sixteenth century, chiefly among the Dissenters, in which Baxter's name is prominent. His matured views, together with a short history of the controversy from the beginning, will be found in his *Treatise On the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness to Believers*, (London, 1675), with which the reader may compare some extracts from his *Life of Faith* in Newman's *Lect. on Justif.* pp. 427, 428. His teaching on the subject in the *Treatise* just mentioned, differs little, if at all, except in manner of expression, from that of the Fathers and later Catholic divines; and this he repeatedly implies, though feeling bound to insert frequent protests against language used, or said to be used, by 'the Papists,' evidently more from educational misapprehensions than from any real difference of sentiment. Even the 'merit of good works' is expressly admitted, 'according to the law of grace through Christ.' The Lutheran notions of Christ's *vicarious* obedience being imputed to us, and of our sins being imputed to Him, so that He took on Himself the *person* of the sinner, and endured, as such, the wrath and curse of God and the torments of the damned, are explicitly repudiated; and original sin is accordingly explained in a sense widely different from Luther's extravagant theory. On the whole, I conceive that Baxter, prejudices apart, would have found little to quarrel with in the Tridentine doctrine of justification. It need scarcely be observed that, while his style is somewhat technical and archaic, he is one of the clearest and most learned theological writers in our language. In his scrupulous can-

dour, and Christian courtesy and moderation of tone towards opponents too often conspicuous for the absence of such qualities, including those to whom he owed his thirteen years' imprisonment, he reminds us of the great and large-hearted Athanasius who is a model for controversialists.¹ After Baxter's death, the controversy was carried on by a Dr. Williams, also a Dissenter, who takes the same side, but does not profess to be 'in all things of the same judgment' with him, and is by no means his equal in clearness of statement or correctness of information.

¹ The bitterness of his opponents may be inferred from a statement made by Dr. Williams, after his death (*Discourses*, vol. i. p. 431): "There be of them that say publicly, 'Mr. Baxter is in Hell!'"

CHAPTER VI.

LATER CATHOLIC THEOLOGY.

THE Atonement did not, as has been before remarked, become a subject of direct controversy at the Reformation, nor has it, except in some few instances in Germany to be noticed presently, been distinctively handled by later Catholic theologians. For the most part they either follow the patristic method, as Thomassin and Petavius, or, more generally, the Scholastic, adopting either the Thomist or Scotist system under various modifications. Among Thomists may be reckoned Suarez, Vasquez, Gregory de Valentia, Dominic à Soto, and Tournely; among Scotists, Medina, De Lugo, Frassen, and Henno. All alike introduce the doctrine as falling under that of the Incarnation. Petavius, out of sixteen books on the Incarnation, devotes one chapter only to the satisfaction and three to the priesthood of Christ. Thomassin gives half of one book to His satisfaction and the whole of

the next to His priesthood, which, however, includes an exposition of the doctrine of the Eucharist. To examine these writers in detail would be to go over again the ground we have already traversed. But one or two specimens shall be given both of the scientific and devotional treatment of the subject during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, as the Parisian Sorbonne was at that time the great theological school of the Church, they shall be taken from the works of French divines, most of whom were among its professors.

And first we may notice a famous controversy carried on in France between two of the most distinguished writers of the seventeenth century. Among the many questions, philosophical and theological, on which Malebranche and Arnauld were opposed to each other, one was that so often alluded to in these pages, on the motive of the Incarnation.¹ In his *Treatise on Nature and Grace*, the great Oratorian maintains that Jesus Christ, though His birth among men occurred in the fulness of time, is, in the eternal counsels, the Beginning of the ways of God, the Firstborn of all creation, and the predestined Model whereon our humanity was formed after the image of His. The Word and Wisdom of God, foreseeing among all possible creatures none other that was worthy, offered Himself, to establish as Sovereign Priest an everlasting worship

¹ Malebranche, *Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce*. Arnauld replied in his *Réflexions Philosophiques et Théologiques*.

in honour of His Father and to present a Victim deserving of His acceptance. The world was created for the sake of the Church, that is of Christ who is its Head, and man was formed after the image of Christ to be the ornament of this visible temple. So far Malebranche said no more than had often been said before him. But he goes on to observe, that it was requisite for the fulfilment of this design that man should be subject on earth not only to trials and afflictions, but to the movements of concupiscence, in order to illustrate the victories of grace; and that the sin of the first man was *necessary*, because for making the elect merit that glory which shall be one day theirs, no means could be comparable to leaving them for a while immersed in sin (*de les laisser tous envelopper dans le pèche pour leur faire à tous miséricorde en Jésus Christ*), inasmuch as the glory they acquire by resisting concupiscence through the grace of Christ is greater than any other. This need not, and perhaps did not, mean more than St. Paul's statement, that God has concluded all under sin, or in unbelief, that He may have mercy upon all;¹ or than the somewhat poetical exclamation of the Roman ritual, *O certe necessarium Adæ peccatum quod Christi morte deletum est*. Indeed Malebranche seems to have moulded his language on such expressions as these. Still he certainly laid himself open to the retort, which was actually made, that

¹ Rom. xi. 32; Gal. iii. 22.

on this theory the Fall was not simply permitted but predestined by God, and that "humanity was sacrificed for Christ, not Christ for humanity." Arnauld, however, by no means contented himself with objecting to this part of his opponent's system. He appealed to the authority of Aquinas—which is of course on his side—against the Scotist idea of the Incarnation as independent of the Fall; and, with less prudence, asserted in reliance on Thomassin—what is unquestionably incorrect—that the Fathers are unanimous in making the decree of the Incarnation depend on the prevision of sin. It was not to be expected that theologians, whose characteristic principle it was to grudge the universality of redemption, should appreciate what must have appeared to them the very superfluous charity of assuming a nature which did not need to be redeemed. And Arnauld, highly as we may and must respect him as a man and a writer, was, unhappily, deeply imbued with the theological idiosyncracies of his school. He seems on some points to have had the better of his antagonist, whose antipathy to the Jansenistic scheme of predestination did not preserve him from starting another theory, on the relations of grace to the human Soul of Christ, equally arbitrary and in its results equally objectionable.¹ But, on the whole, we may fairly consider Malebranche as representing in this dispute the patristic and Catholic tradition, while

¹ Some account of the controversy may be found in Sainte Beuve's *Port Royal* (Paris, 1859), tom. v. ch. 6. The author seems, strangely enough, to imagine that Malebranche *first invented* the idea of the Incarnation being predestined independently of the purpose of redemption.

the great champion of Jansenism, like the Lutherans and Calvinists before him, adopts the narrower system which had found favour with some of the Schoolmen, and which till of late has generally prevailed in the more orthodox Protestant theology.

Tournely, the last of the great writers mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, lived in the last century. He was a vigorous, not to say bitter, controversialist. On the doctrines of grace he was vehemently opposed to Thomist opinions, but he adopts the Thomist view of the atonement in its extremest form, treating the question throughout, like Grotius, in reference to the Socinians.¹ Indeed he candidly informs us, that out of the many opinions debated among Catholic divines he has chosen that which appeared to him best adapted "for repressing Socinian impiety." With the great multitude of theologians, he denies any antecedent necessity for the Incarnation, either in itself or assuming the creation or the fall of man. But on the hypothesis of the restoration of fallen man, while admitting in words that by the extraordinary power of God we might have been saved without condign satisfaction, he yet insists that by the ordinary power of God this was impossible; and the ordinary power is explained to mean the laws of Divine justice, which are part of the Divine Nature. And, as he also agrees with the Thomists that there could be no condign satisfaction except that of Christ, we may regard him

¹ Honoratus Tournely, *Praelect. Theol. de Incarn. Verbi Divini*. Parisiis, 1727.

as accepting practically the Anselmic view of an absolute necessity for the Incarnation, assuming the restoration of fallen man. He maintains, with Grotius, that the punishment of Christ was strictly and literally substituted for ours, and that He endured the vindictive justice of God in our place, though not, as Lutherans inferred, the torments of the damned. It follows of course that it was not a matter of mercy, but of strict justice, on God's part to accept the satisfaction offered for us, and that He could not do otherwise. Under the term satisfaction, Tournely comprehends the payment of a debt, the appeasing of Divine wrath, and the expiation of the liabilities of sin.

Le Grand, a disciple and continuator of Tournely, follows on the whole his master's teaching, and, like him, directs his argument mainly against the Socinians. But in simplicity of method, moderation of tone, and absence of controversial asperity, his *Treatise on the Incarnation*¹ contrasts very favourably with Tournely's *Prælections*, and in some important points their conclusions are different. Moreover, Le Grand is always very careful, which Tournely is not, to distinguish between his own opinions and the doctrine of the Church. He not only rejects any absolute necessity for the Incarnation, either antecedently or after the Fall, but adds that fallen man might have been otherwise restored, though there could not have been any other condign satisfaction, nor could God have otherwise "expressed His vindic-

¹ *Tractatus de Incarn. Verb. Divini.* Parisiis, 1750.

tive justice;" but then it was not necessary to express it, for, while it gives Him the *right* to punish sin, it only *binds* Him not to pardon the sinner without true repentance. The Incarnation was therefore, as the Fathers had taught, not the only but the fittest method of redemption. Le Grand accepts the Thomist view of its motive as the most probable; satisfaction he defines, with Tournely, as "the voluntary rendering of equivalent honour and reverence out of what is one's own, and not otherwise owed, to compensate an injury done to another;" adding, that all these conditions were fulfilled in the satisfaction of Christ, which was not only equivalent but superabundant and such as God was bound in strict justice to accept. But he is careful to explain that all which the Catholic faith requires us to hold is, that it was such as God could fittingly accept for the sins of men. Le Grand admits pointedly, what Grotius had almost seemed inclined to deny, that the grounds assigned by Socinians for the death of Christ are true and valid, as far as they go, though inadequate; and he answers their objection about the innocent suffering for the guilty, not altogether satisfactorily, but in a very different manner from the ingenious special pleading of the great jurist. While insisting on the fact, as ascertained from Scripture, that it was not God's will to remit sin without atonement, he confesses that his explanations of it are little more than conjectural, and that there are causes of the mystery which in this life we cannot hope to discover. It is probable that both these writers were largely in-

fluenced in their particular way of looking at the question—clearly Tournely was—by the exigencies of the Socinian controversy, as was also the case with some English divines such as Stillingfleet. Yet any dispute about the office and work of the Redeemer was in fact beside the mark in dealing with those who rejected His Divinity. The root of the difference lay deeper.

One later specimen shall be adduced, also from a professor of the Sorbonne, of the theological treatment of the subject.¹ Robbe, the author of a *Treatise on the Mystery of the Incarnate Word*, after successively repudiating Wicliffe's notion of an absolute *à priori* necessity for the Incarnation, Raymund Lully's of a necessity assuming the Fall, and that of the Calvinists (borrowed from St. Anselm) of a necessity assuming the restoration of fallen man, decides, against Scotus, that it was necessary for *condign* satisfaction, because no other could be equivalent or *ex alias indebitis*. He adds, against the Socinians, that it was a true and proper satisfaction. Nor was it only sufficient but superabundant. Any act of Christ, or any single drop of His Blood, would have been *sufficient* for our redemption, from the dignity of His Person, but not *efficient* unless He had so designed it. The sacrifice was really offered *ad alterum*, because offered to the whole Trinity. The author further argues, against Vasquez, Medina, and others, that it was *ex propriis* and *ex alias indebitis*, because acts belong to the per-

¹ *Tractatus de Mystério Verbi Incarnati*, auctore J. M. Robbe. Parisiis, 1762.

son, not the nature of the agent. Under this last head the question is asked, whether the satisfaction of Christ required any agreement on God's part to accept it, or whether He was bound as a matter of justice to do so? The necessity of an agreement is denied by St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others (among whom must be reckoned Tournely), but affirmed by Suarez, whose opinion Robbe adopts, considering it clear from Scripture (Heb. x.) that there was in fact such an agreement, and thinking further that it was requisite, because the offending parties might have been fairly called on to make satisfaction themselves. Christ was our Head by arrangement (*pacto*) and not, like the first Adam, by nature. He satisfied in strict justice, inasmuch as His satisfaction was adequate and more than adequate, but to accept it for us was a matter not of justice but of mercy.

And now let us give two examples, from the same century, of the hortatory and devotional rather than scientific treatment of the subject, which for that very reason will be in one sense a surer test of the habitual manner of looking at it. They will be found, like the theological treatises of Petavius and Thomassin, to bear out the remark made in an earlier chapter, that, while the scholastic formula of satisfaction was retained as one method of expressing the mystery of atonement, the idea of sacrifice was that most predominant in Catholic teaching and devotion.

My first illustration shall be taken from a *Treatise on the Priesthood and Sacrifice of Jesus Christ*, in four

books, by Leonard de Massiot, a French Benedictine of the learned Congregation of St. Maur.¹ The author begins by tracing out the idea and obligation of sacrifice, as the supreme act of homage to God, and as including, since the introduction of sin into the world, an additional character of reparation; and shows how both the interior and exterior sacrifice are most perfectly realised in Christ. The second book deals with the sacrifice and priesthood of Christ, in its unity, perpetuity, and continuation in the Eucharist. The whole mystical Body is offered with Him on the Cross, which is the common altar of all mankind. In the third book the effects of His sacrifice are considered, under the classification of satisfaction, merit, overcoming the power of sin and Satan, and confounding pride by humility. The last half of the book is occupied with the treatment of the Eucharist, as an abiding memorial of the benefits wrought by Christ, a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, a mystery of unity, a sign of the union of the faithful, and a mystery of faith. The fourth book, which is much the longest, continues in detail the consideration of the priesthood of Christ, as communicated to His Church in the Eucharist. To return to the chapter on satisfaction. The writer relies chiefly on Anselm's argument for the impossibility of man making satisfaction for himself, and on Aquinas for the sufficiency of that wrought by Christ, as giving to God something more pleasing than what

¹ *Traité du Sacerdoce et du Sacrifice de Jésus Christ.* Par L. de Massiot. Poitiers, 1708.

He had lost by sin, owing to the charity with which Christ endured the pains of His passion, the excellence of His life, and the dignity of His Person. His voluntary temporal death, it is added, was of far greater value than our eternal death could be. Our personal satisfactions are not superseded by His, but must be united with it.

Not very different is the treatment of the subject by a later author, Plowden, who, though an Englishman, was a resident in France and, like Massiot wrote his *Treatise on the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ* in French.¹ While rejecting the notion of any absolute necessity, he dwells on the congruity of a satisfaction and reparation being made for the disorder caused by sin, either by all men in common, or by some representative of the race. He proceeds to discuss the qualities and conditions essential for a mediator, who must not only be able to pardon sin but to infuse holiness. These conditions can only be found united in the God-Man. It was fitting, again, that He should accomplish His work by sacrifice, which is the highest of all acts of satisfaction, though any, the least, intercession of His would have been sufficient, from its infinite value. The effects of His sacrifice are three-fold; to reconcile or reunite us with God, to unite us with each other by charity, and to incorporate us into the mystical body, which He offered up with his natural Body on the Cross. Plowden's work is divided into five parts. The first examines the pre-announcement of the great

¹ *Traité du Sacrifice de Jésus Christ.* Paris, 1778.

Sacrifice in the written and unwritten law, the Jewish and Heathen rituals. The second exhibits the perfect fulfilment of the sacrificial idea in the life and death of Christ. In the third is considered its perpetuation, for communicating its effects to us, in the Mass, considered chiefly as the centre of Christian worship. The fourth part insists on the reproduction of the idea in all members of the mystical body through self-sacrifice and imitation of the virtues of their Head, while the fifth carries on the idea to its final consummation in the offering up of the entire body of the elect reunited with their Head in heaven. Of the three last parts no more need be said here. In the first, the interior sacrifice of the heart, and the outward sacrifice which is its proper expression, are contrasted and explained, with constant reference to St. Augustine's *City of God*. The outward expression was needed for men composed of body and soul and having to live in society, even during the state of innocence; still more after the Fall, when the idea of expiation was added to that of homage, and hence animal sacrifices came into use. Those of the Jewish ritual are examined in detail. In the second part the immense superiority of Christ's sacrifice to all others is dwelt upon. It consists of the oblation of His Body, Soul, and will, that is of His whole Being, together with those of His members; of His prayers and other acts, together with theirs; and of His sufferings and death, and theirs united with His.

It will at once be seen, that with these writers—and

they are but a specimen of many more—the dominant idea, as with the Fathers, is that of Sacrifice, which comprehends more than the notion of satisfaction only, or of the payment of a debt. It includes and exhausts them, but it includes a great deal more. We may further observe that this idea is habitually viewed in connection with its perpetuation in the Eucharist. And this suggests an aspect of the doctrine of the Atonement already more than once referred to, in the chapters on patristic teaching, and which requires distinct recognition, though a separate volume would be required for its adequate treatment. A few words must suffice here, not to prove but to indicate the inseparable union between the sacrifice of the altar and the sacrifice of the Cross.

On the last night of His earthly ministry, when the shadows of death were closing in upon the chosen few, and the dark designs of the conspirators were even now shaping themselves into act within the walls of the apostate city, Jesus, having loved His own, loved them unto the end. He was about to die. And therefore He gathered His disciples around Him in that upper room at Jerusalem, for a last farewell. “When the evening was come, He sat down with the Twelve.” He had washed their feet; He had addressed to them those words of thrilling import, which run through four chapters in the narrative of the last Evangelist; He had eaten the Paschal supper. And then, as at a marriage feast He had begun His ministry by changing water into wine, so at the feast which closed it He

transmuted, by a signal miracle, the shadow to the substance, the figures of the law into the realities of the Atoning Sacrifice. He sanctified Himself. He offered the great Eucharistic intercession (John xvii.), which embraced all future ages and contained in germ all possible liturgies of Christendom. He rehearsed before the Twelve in mystery that Sacrifice which on the morrow was to be offered in tears and blood. He took of the pure wheat flour which is given for man's nourishment, and the fruit of the vine which maketh glad his heart, and consecrated them to be for all time the symbols, the vehicle, the transparent veils, of that sacred Flesh and that redeeming Blood which He had assumed in the Conception and was to offer on the Cross. What He did then His Church was to continue always, till He should return again, for a memorial of Him. As every Christian prayer must be offered in His Name, so all Christian worship must be centred in the one great act which perpetuates for ever the 'new rite' of that last Paschal Supper, not in empty sign but in spirit and in truth. From the rising to the setting sun, wherever His Name is known among the Gentiles, He has bidden that pure oblation to be laid continually on His altar. The Incarnation and the Passion are no mere incidents of bygone history, but a presence of abiding power. The Blood that flowed on Calvary flows indeed no more, but the Lamb slain before the worlds were made is offered still, Himself the Victim, Priest, and Shrine. And through the might of that Atonement, the Sacrifice

one and indivisible pleaded on ten thousand altars, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, is the Church's prayer fulfilled; *Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata mundi, dona nobis pacem.*¹

I proceed to give some notice of German Catholic divines in the present century, who are now stepping into the place occupied before the French Revolution by the doctors of the Sorbonne. In 1807, Klüpfel and Dobmayer published dogmatic works in Latin.² They agree in regarding the Atonement as a mystery, which we cannot explain on antecedent grounds of reason and must therefore be content to accept as a revealed fact: *Consultius igitur ducimus rem arguere ex eventu.* The Son of God has made satisfaction, inasmuch as He has done all that was necessary for our eternal welfare, for removing sin and its consequences, and re-establishing the kingdom of God. In what sense this satisfaction was necessary we cannot know, but we must infer from the event that there are reasons why it was so. Dobmayer adds, that the Atonement must not be regarded as a punishment inflicted on Christ, but as an act done by Him for the benefit of the human race; not as a substitute for our personal service, but as a supplement of our weakness and encouragement to our energy. A more famous name is that of Klee, who wrote thirty years later, in German,

¹ See Note I. at the end of the Chapter, "On the Connection between the Sacrifice of the Cross and the Eucharist."

² Klüpfel, *Instit. Theol. Dogmat.* Wien, 1807. Dobmayer, *Systema Theol. Cathol.* Sulzbach, 1807.

on Catholic doctrine.¹ He understands by the satisfaction of Christ, that, through His bodily death, He has removed the grounds of our spiritual death and softened (*gemildert*) its consequences, as to intention and efficacy for all, and actually for those who are so united with Him as to be able to appropriate His sufferings. We cannot say that He has formally endured our punishment, as such, for it is impossible for the innocent to be justly punished; nor materially, for He was not made subject to spiritual death, as neither to ignorance or evil desire. Neither, again, has He in such sense suffered in our place, and by substitution, as that by His satisfaction all our debt and sin is in fact remitted. Bodily death, the sorrows of life, ignorance and concupiscence remain, and we are then first released from our debt, when we have fulfilled all the conditions requisite for partaking of the benefits of the redemption wrought for us. This satisfaction of Christ is in itself superabundant, for, while sin is finite, the acts of the God-Man, as proceeding from His Person, not from His finite human nature, are infinite. Another Catholic writer of the same date, Brenner, also protests against the notion of substituted punishment, as hard and unreasonable and inconsistent with the nature of God.² We cannot pass over in silence a still greater name, that of Günther; but with his philosophical system, which is said to be very obscurely expressed, I have no acquaintance, nor indeed would this be the place for examining it if I

¹ Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik*. Mainz, 1835.

² Brenner, *Kathol. Dogmat.*, p. 36.

had. I shall content myself with giving, as simply as I can, his account of the Atonement.¹ We shall have occasion presently to notice the writings of Pabst, who, if he represents the same theological school, is at least a much clearer and more intelligible exponent of its principles. Günther's system implies, if I understand him rightly, the Scotist idea of the Incarnation being decreed before the prevision of the Fall. Its primary object is the infusion of divine life into man, or his regeneration to eternal life. The death of Christ is "not the moving but the mediating cause" of redemption; or, in other words, God is not gracious to us because Christ died, but Christ died for us because God is gracious. The juristic view of vicarious satisfaction is rejected, on the ground that justice requires the punishment of the guilty, and can least of all be satisfied by the supreme injustice of punishing the innocent instead. That would be a direct contradiction. Some other explanation must therefore be found for the Sacrifice of the death of Christ. God will only forgive sin to those who are willing to be reformed; but for this man needs a practical proclamation of the heinousness of sin, which is given, as in a picture, by the death of Christ. But the ground of sin lies not only in ignorance or unbelief, but in the infirmity of a perverted will, and the work of redemption, therefore, must be something beyond a mere outward exhibition; it must consist in the real communication and im-

¹ Günther, *Die Incarnationstheorie*. Wien, 1829. His Philosophical Works were placed on the Roman Index.

planting of a new nature, to reunite the soul with God. The redeeming power must, then, be sought in the *life* of Christ, but it can only be imparted through His death. The Son of God took, in His Incarnation, a human body under the conditions of fallen nature transmitted from Adam, though without sin. This body of death He offered up to God, pouring out the earthly blood and animal soul or life;¹ and thus He satisfied justice and opened the hands of love. The necessity for His death does not rest on any attribute of the Divine nature, for God is Love, but on some quality of human nature, which as yet we cannot fully comprehend but which is indicated by the statement of Scripture, that "without shedding of blood there is no remission," for the soul is in the blood and the blood is that which atones for the soul. It is clear that this theory lays a special stress on the Incarnation, and views the death of Christ chiefly as a channel for conveying the benefits of the Incarnation to us, but the precise meaning of the latter portion of it I do not profess to understand. We may compare with it the following considerations of the philosopher Baader on the nature of human sinfulness.² The soul of man, subjected through the Fall to the bondage of matter, can only through the medium of matter be restored to the freedom of spiritual life. But the blood, as the special organ of animal life, is also the organ of sin.

¹ This may remind the reader of some similar expressions of Origen's, previously referred to.

² Baader, *Vorlesungen über eine künftige Theorie des Opfers oder Kultus*. Münster, 1837.

By the oblation of the outpoured blood the spiritual powers of man were set free, and the impure influences, which held him in thralldom, passed from him into that which was offered up, while the blood thus offered and consecrated in the death of Christ returned as a life-giving and fruitful principle into the substance of those for whom it was offered. This view of Baader's seems, at least in language, to come very near the Manichean notion of the impurity of matter.

And now let us turn to a theologian already mentioned, who is comparatively free from the lengthy periods and needless periphrasis often so perplexing in German writers, and speaks with a clearness at times almost rising into eloquence. A brief account of his general system will best introduce his exposition of the doctrine of Atonement.¹ The idea of God, as the *Ego*, or absolute Being, implies from eternity the idea of the creature, the *non ego*, or conditioned being, as its necessary correlative. But the actual realisation of the *non ego*, as *natura naturata Dei quâ naturæ naturantis*, is not necessary, as the pantheistic scheme implies. Creation is a 'free act of God, implying a beginning, as the absolute nature is essentially neces-

¹ This sketch is drawn mainly from Pabst's *Der Mensch und seine Geschichte* (Wien, 1830), but I have also compared with it a later work of his, *Adam und Christus* (Wien, 1835), where the subject is treated as introductory to an elaborate dissertation on the seven sacraments, and especially marriage, viewed in its sacramental character, to which the author attaches a crucial importance as marking the distinction between Catholicism and various forms of imperfect or unchristian belief. It would be impossible to give each reference separately here; the reader will have no trouble in verifying them, if he pleases, for himself.

sary and eternal; but the conditioned, once actually brought into existence, must last for ever, as the creaturely reflection of the absolute Being of God. There was no theoretical necessity for Him to create, but there was an ethical ground in His own nature, and that ground was love. As then by His free love He created us, so by love alone can the creature gain or preserve its union with Him. Creation is God's eternal revelation of Himself. The creature cannot attain to a real consciousness of its own being, without thereby becoming conscious of the absolute Being or Creator. As in the unity of God there are Three Persons, so creation, which is His image, is threefold also. There is free spirit, nature or the physical universe which is unfree, and man in whom both are combined, spirit and nature standing to each other in the relation of substance and accident. Man constitutes the organic unity of the two; he is at once distinct from each and partakes of both; in him the life of nature puts forth its most perfect bloom, while he is also a member of the spirit-world, and thus creation, as the outward revelation of God, becomes the perfect reflexion of the Divine consciousness. As the organic unity of nature and spirit, man is the coping stone of creation, the creature of all creatures, the ultimate realisation and representative of the creaturely idea and perfect antithesis of the Creator. Or, as the author says elsewhere, he is the last and most glorious fruit of the mighty increase of the earth, the wondrous fabric (*Gebilde*) wherein God by a new and special

creative act has bound the two worlds of spirit and matter into organic unity.

From this idea of creation is deduced the idea of sin, as consisting in a refusal on the creature's part to recognise its creatureliness and consequent dependence on the absolute Being of God. It involves an infinite debt (*Schuld*) incurred by the creature, and an infinite offence against the Creator whom it directly tends, so far as in it lies, to dethrone, because it is a negation of His self-existent Being. By thus denying God, it also denies the very basis of all creaturely existence and turns the life of the spirit into a lie, corrupting its whole nature and marring, though it cannot destroy, the image of God. It involves an eternal enmity between the creature and the Creator, as being a wilful aversion from the Highest Good; in a word, it involves Hell, not as an infliction of the Divine wrath, but as the inevitable sequel of its own act in choosing self-love rather than the love of God. Such are the effects of sin on the spirit-world; its effects on the world of man are further modified by the conditions of his composite nature, which is not mere spirit but formed of spirit and matter combined, each individual being part of an organic whole, the member of a race. Hence it follows, that the sin of the first and typical man becomes, not personally but generically, the heritage of all his children; for though God creates each soul separately, He creates it with reference to the particular body it is destined to inhabit, not for a separate existence, but to become part of the composite man who

is a member of the race.¹ Sin, then, has a direct effect in dissolving, *ipso facto*, the organization of humanity. The parts lose their proper relationship and union with each other, and both are accordingly dishonoured, the spiritual enslaved to the material, the material itself made subject to a law of decay and death extending over the whole physical creation. The earth is cursed for man's sake.

But in the very ground of the curse lay also the possibility of redemption. The generic transmission of our fallen humanity, compounded of free spirit and unfree matter, which was the channel of sin, might prove the means of restoration, whenever a sinless descendant of the first Adam should appear, to become the Second Head and Father of the race, the Source to them of original merit (*Erbverdienst*) instead of original sin (*Erbsünde*). But this could only be One who was God as well as man. The Spirit, who is the Bond of Love in the Holy Trinity and had been at first the Principle of union between the creature and the Creator, immediately departed on the entrance of sin into the world. But the Divine Logos, by whom all things were made, as immediately took His place, and began at once to speak with authority in the conscience, so that man's life, amid manifold errors and darkness, remained a religious one, and was never wholly cut off from God even amid the deepest gloom of Heathendom.² Conscience, as was shown in the case of Corne-

¹ The author alludes to 'Creationism' as opposed to 'Traducianism.'

² I need hardly remind the reader of the famous argument for the supremacy of conscience in Butler's *Sermons on the Constitution of Human Nature*.

lius, contained in itself the germ of redemption, and indeed of the future Church. We may say with Justin Martyr, "Those, like Socrates and Heraclitus, who lived according to the Logos (inwardly revealed) were Christians." Or, in the author's own words, "Conscience in its objectivity is the beginning of the external Church, and the Church is the objective perfection of conscience, having attained its outward fulfilment." But, inasmuch as this inward revelation to the individual conscience proved insufficient, an outward revelation was added, and that, being addressed to fallen man, could only be a revelation of the Redeemer. It was given first in the Covenant with Abraham, then in the Law of Sinai, which "fixed the categorical imperative of conscience in tables of stone." In the life of His chosen people God revealed a type of His dealings with mankind, and their history exhibited, as in a picture, the history and the judgment of the world. The Levitical priesthood recalled the reality of sin, the Prophetic Order spoke out with growing distinctness, as time went on, the promise of redemption.

We have seen that the created spirit had realised its creaturely freedom in the choice of evil, through what must be considered a second creative act. Restoration, therefore, could only be brought about through a new creative act, not to annihilate the first, which in itself is irreversible, but to abolish its results (*dass sich dieselbe.....obschon nicht in ihrem Seyn, doch in ihrem Daseyn aufhebt und auslöscht*). And this

was a fresh revelation of God, not, like the first, as absolute Being, but as the Redeemer and Atoner who came to renew that life, originally derived from Himself, which the creature had lost by sin. It was to be at once an act of satisfaction wrought out through the perfect obedience of a sinless Child of the fallen race, and an act of creation and revelation vouchsafed by God; therefore only the God-Man could accomplish it. This double work of restoration has necessarily a gradual development, with various epochs and periods, and this, as we have seen, was actually the case. First the still small voice of God spoke, 'as from afar,' to the conscience of man; next He revealed Himself more intimately through the covenant with Abraham, and the Jewish ritual; and at last in the fulness of time the Divine fiat went forth, and the Word made Flesh proclaimed Himself the Way, the Truth, and the Life. He by whom all things were made at the beginning, came to remake them. The union of God and man in One Person finds a type and analogy in the union of spirit and material nature in man, which is also an organic union of life; and in the God-Man each nature remains perfect and entire.¹ In His birth

¹ I omit the author's account of the hypostatic union, which does not materially differ from that in the ordinary manuals. He rejects, as inconsistent with the perfection of manhood, the common opinion of a full infusion of beatific and other knowledge into our Lord's Human Soul from the first, and holds, with the majority of the Fathers, that there was a real growth in wisdom, not only in its outward manifestations. The question will be found discussed in Wilberforce's *Incarnation*, ch. iv., Kuhn's *Leben Jesu*, i. 5. See also Petav. *De Incarn.* xi. 2-4, with the notes of Alethinus, who takes the same view as Pabst, and on the same grounds, as most consistent with the entire *κένωσις* of

of a Virgin we read both His identity with our common humanity and His distinction from it. He is a member, not a product, of the race. The Second Adam, like the first, is (as Man) an immediate creation of God, but, unlike the first, takes root in the soil of humanity, as not being formed from the ground, but from the consecrated substance of a virgin daughter of Eve. The thirty years of His hidden life represent His fellowship with our nature, as Son of Man; the three years of His public ministry represent His manifestation, as the Son of God with power, in His threefold office of King, Priest, and Prophet. In His character as Second Adam and Head of the race, He passed, like the first Adam, through the trial and probation of free-will, not for Himself but for us. The first man was placed for probation in the 'Paradise of pleasure,' where every need was satisfied; the Second was driven into the wilderness which brought forth thorns and thistles, the heritage of Adam's sin, to be tempted of the devil after fasting forty days. Each of the three Temptations was an attempt in different forms to make Him deny or doubt, if but for a moment, the perfect union of His human will with God. In His victory over the Tempter through the free exercise of that human will, though He was impeccable by virtue of the hypostatic union, He asserted, what

the Incarnation. This certainly appears to have been the general opinion of the Fathers. Cf. Klee, *Dogmengeschichte*, ii., 4, 7. The question does not, of course, relate to *omniscience*, which can in no case be ascribed to our Lord's Human Soul, being inconsistent with the conditions of human nature. Cf. Klee, *Dogmatik*, p. 511.

Adam's sin had denied, the absolute dependence of the creature on the Creator, and proclaimed before Heaven and Hell the entire conformity of His creaturely will with the will of God. And thus the work of redemption was begun.¹

Since man by wilful disobedience had incurred the debt of sin, only through willing obedience of the whole life and being could that debt be paid. And in order to profit the whole race, the payment must take the shape of what in man is the natural consequence and fruit of sin. The entire life of the Redeemer, in great things as in small, must fulfil the ideal of penance, which in mankind is an inevitable necessity, but in Him was a voluntary sacrifice. This self-oblation, inaugurated in John's baptism of repentance, was consummated in the dereliction and the Cross. But His merit (*Erbverdienst*) can only be applied to His members individually by their own co-operation. Redemption is universal, justification depends on the human will; and as all are lost, whether under the law of nature, or of Moses, or of grace, who by personal act make the common sin of the race their own, so those alone can partake of the common merit who by voluntary union with the life of Christ, the ideal Man, make His merit theirs; so that what before were fruitless sufferings become in them a meritorious

¹ There is an interesting discussion in *Adam und Christus* (pp. 76-83) on the relations of the freedom of Christ's human will to His impeccability, but it would take us too far from our proper subject to introduce it here. Cf. Kuhn's *Leben Jesu* (Mainz, 1838), vol. i. ch. 4.

satisfaction. This double connection of humanity with the first Adam and the Second explains that strange intermingling of good and evil, sorrow and joy, which would else be the great riddle of life. For redemption as little destroyed our freedom as the Fall, and those who are led of the spirit of Christ must be content to share in this world the common penalties of the race, just as those who in heart reject Him are still, as yet, His brethren after the flesh. When, lastly, Christ had made by the Sacrifice of the Cross an overflowing redemption (*copiosa redemptio*), and gone down into Hades to pay to the uttermost the debt of sin, He rose transfigured from the grave and ascended into heaven, to send back the Spirit, who had been chased away by sin, as the Teacher of all truth and Comforter in all trials and temptations. Thus was the work of redemption perfected, and summed up in the baptismal formula in the name of the Holy Trinity. The Divine Spirit had, as we have seen, at the beginning united the dependent creature with the self-existent God, and now that same Spirit came once more to sanctify and re-unite the ransomed race with Him. As the work of re-creation is properly allotted to the Son who is the Creative Word, so is the work of re-union assigned to the Spirit who is the Bond of Love.

The Church of the Old Dispensation was the representative of the coming Christ, the Church of these latter days is the representative of the Word made Flesh, who must be ever present in it as the infallible Interpreter and great High Priest with His abiding

Sacrifice. His life-long obedience to God and His life-long toil for man were concentrated and sealed in the act of death, the "bright bloom of the world-redeeming work of Christ." Therefore, that sacrificial act must continue to be the supreme and characteristic worship of God on earth, from which all other kinds of worship derive their consecration and their worth. Mankind cannot celebrate its solemn Easter without the Easter Lamb. It was impossible but that the Cross should become an altar, the material sacrifice of Christ offered up in blood be perpetuated in an unbloody rite, that is in the sacrifice of the Mass. But the Mass is a Sacrament as well as a sacrifice; the sacrifice sets forth the death of the Son of Man in its relation to God, in the Communion is shown the death of the Second Adam in its relation to humanity; in the former He is present as representative of the race, in the latter as the Fountain of their new life. As in the Mass there is offered with the Body and Blood of Christ the whole family of believers, so in Communion the redeemed are made partakers of that Body and Blood, that they may have life in themselves. And thus are His words fulfilled; "If I be lifted up, I will draw all things unto Me."

With these specimens of recent Catholic theology, our record of the past may be closed.¹ For the future, since the fall of the old Sorbonne, and during the pre-

¹ See Note II. at the end of the Chapter, for some examples of 'Recent Lutheran Theology.' The subject of justification will be treated in the next volume of Kuhn's *Katholische Dogmatik*, which is promised to appear shortly.

sent lull of theological energy in Italy and Spain, we look with anxious hope to the Catholic thinkers of Germany, that nation once the sovereign power of Christendom, but into whose hands in these later days the torch of sacred as of secular science has been committed, and which, like Greece of old, in the decay of political greatness is conquering for itself a nobler and more enduring empire in the leadership of European thought. We turn to the land where Boniface preached and suffered, the cradle of the Anglo-Saxon race, and ask its people to repay their kinsmen in the fruits of sanctified intellect, from whom in earlier days they received the heritage of faith.

NOTE I. TO CHAPTER VI.

ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SACRIFICE OF THE CROSS AND THE EUCHARIST.

It has been already observed that Sacrifice, that is, the self devotion of the whole being, is the rightful homage due from the creature to the Creator, and therefore was from the beginning the proper idea of divine worship (*λατρεία*.) It is what constitutes, in technical language, the *differentia* of the supreme worship of God, as distinguished from all subordinate and derivative kinds of worship, some of which may also be offered to our fellow-creatures, whether living or departed. Thus, incense is not only presented at the altar, but to the officiating clergy and congregation also ; so, again, we may ask the Saints at rest or friends on earth to pray for us, which is a kind of worship ; or, to take another instance, outwards acts of devotion, as bending the knee, are paid to earthly sovereigns. But to offer sacrifice, if only by an internal act of the mind, to any created being is the essence of idolatry, and a sin against the first and great commandment. The true worship of God, then, always consisted in sacrifice, both internal and external ; though the outward expression might vary according to time and circumstances, and was in fact essentially changed by the Sacrifice of Christ. Meanwhile the idea itself had been modified by the introduction of sin into the world, which gave it a new character of reparation (cf. *supr.* p. 196), and made all human sacrifice imperfect. One alone could now offer a full and perfect satisfaction and oblation : in the life and death of Christ the idea received not merely its highest, but its sole adequate fulfilment. In the eternal purpose of God He was “the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,” and all acts of human worship were accepted, so far as they were accepted, in and through that One spotless Sacrifice, though the worshippers knew it not.

But when in the fulness of time the Lamb had been slain not in predestination but in fact, that One Sacrifice once offered became, from the nature of the case and in reality, not in symbol, the true and characteristic worship of the Catholic Church. Types were necessarily abolished; commemorations there might be, but they are not properly sacrifice, and are therefore insufficient; to repeat the One Sacrifice is impossible; to attempt a supplement or a substitute would be both useless and profane. Therefore the *same* Sacrifice must abide for ever in the Church.

Two things then are clear: (1) that the distinctive and supreme worship of the Church must still, as of old, be a worship of sacrifice, or it would not, strictly speaking, be worship at all; (2) that since the One great Oblation has been actually offered, to which nothing can be added, and which cannot be repeated, the Christian Sacrifice must be, not prefigurative like those of the law, or commemorative merely, but *identical* with that of the Cross. For no other sacrifice is henceforth possible or conceivable. Every Christian prayer, indeed, commemorates the Sacrifice of Christ, and is accepted through it; but the central act of worship must be that very Sacrifice itself, though offered in a different manner on the altar and on the cross. It is not repeated but *continued* in the Church on earth, through the ministry of His representatives, as in the courts of Heaven directly by Himself. And from this follows also the reality of His Presence. The same Body and Blood which were offered on Calvary must be offered in the Christian Sacrifice (though the manner of the Presence as of the oblation differs), or the Sacrifice could not be the same. Bread and wine, however sacred from consecration to a sacred use (like the water of baptism or the oil of confirmation or of the last unction), could never become the material of more than a commemorative rite. If the oblation is the same, the thing offered must be the same too. And therefore the Real Presence of the Divine Victim is essential to the reality of the Sacrifice.¹

¹ This is not the place to enter on the doctrine of the Real Presence. The philosophical side of the question is discussed with great acuteness in Dalgairns' *Holy Communion* (Duffy, 1862); Cardinal Wiseman has exhibited the scriptural argument, with special reference to Oriental languages, in his *Lectures on the Blessed Eucharist* (Dolman, 1836); and the patristic argument is drawn out in Wilberforce's *Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist* (Mozley, 1853). See also Cobb's *Kiss of Peace*, 2nd ed. (Hayes, 1868).

Hence, again, it follows, that the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews, often quoted against the truth of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, in fact confirms it. For what is the drift of that argument? That the One Sacrifice of Christ has superseded and abolished all types and shadows of the Law, and is itself incapable of supplement or iteration. He has, we are told, an unchangeable Priesthood, and is "a Priest *for ever* after the order of Melchisedec." What is this but to say that His Sacrifice abides for ever in the Church, and remains for all time the supreme act of creaturely adoration and centre of all Christian worship?¹ Or, in other words, that glorified Body, which He presents continually before God in heaven, He presents no less truly, though 'in a mystery,' on our altars, in whose sight the visible and invisible Church are not two but one Kingdom of God. What Christ really offered by anticipation in the upper room at Jerusalem, He offers really now by perpetuation in heaven and on earth.

In illustration of what has been said, I subjoin a passage from a great living theologian, forming the close of a dissertation on the Eucharist, as a Sacrament and a Sacrifice, the whole of which is well worth perusal; "Thus the Christian Sacrifice is at once permanent, and single. Its unity does not contradict its duration, nor its duration prevent its being ever one and indivisible."² The offering of that Sacrifice is indeed divided into numberless acts, according to the conditions of time and space in this earthly life; but they are brought into unity and held together through the Person of Christ, in whom and with whom His ministers do all their acts. It is precisely in this multiplicity of the oblation, by which the One ever-living Victim is offered, and the Sacrifice of the Cross constantly applied anew in its effects to the whole body and to its individual

¹ See note at the end of Preface to Second Edition.

² A writer in the *Westminster Review* (Oct. 1865), remarks on this, "If the unity of the sacrifice be pressed,.....it not only carries with it the doctrine of the transubstantiation of the sacramental elements, but, as far as we can see, the transubstantiation of the priest;" and he then quotes, in support of this strange criticism, the latter portion of the extract given above from the Tridentine Catechism, which really contains the answer to it. Christ is Himself present in the Eucharist, both *as Priest and Victim*, by virtue of that "transubstantiation of the elements" of which His earthly minister is the appointed instrument.

members, that the perfection and indissoluble power of that Sacrifice reveals itself. To the retrospective glance of the Christian the number of sacrificial acts on the altars of the Church at once take their place, as dependent on that one heavenly offering, which again depends on that of the Cross, as one single celebration of sacrifice. "For Jesus is entered into heaven itself, to appear now for us before the presence of God." It is no new immolation that takes place; only that once offered on Golgotha is shown to the Christian people in a symbolic act, sensibly representing the separation of body and blood in death. The Cross has developed into a living Tree, ever green and ever fruitful, overshadowing the Church of all times and all places."²

Lastly, I will give, as it stands, the statement on this subject in the Tridentine Catechism; "Unum igitur et idem sacrificium esse fate-mur, et haberi debet, quod in missa peragitur, et quod in Cruce oblatum est; quemadmodum una est et eadem Hostia, Christus videlicet Dominus noster, qui Se Ipsum in ara Crucis semel tantummodo cruentum immolavit. Neque enim cruenta et incruenta Hostia duæ sunt Hostiæ, sed una tantum; cujus sacrificium postquam Dominus ita præcepit, 'Hoc facite in Meam commemorationem,' in Eucharistia quotidie instauratur. Sed unus etiam atque idem Sacerdos est, Christus Dominus; nam ministri, qui sacrificium faciunt, non suam, sed Christi Personam suscipiunt, cum Ejus Corpus et Sanguinem conficiunt. Id quod et ipsius consecrationis verbis ostenditur. Neque enim sacerdos inquit, 'Hoc est Corpus Christi,' sed 'Hoc est Corpus Meum;' Personam scilicet Christi Domini gerens, panis et vini substantiam in veram Ejus Corporis et Sanguinis substantiam convertit."¹

It is superfluous to add passages from the Fathers in evidence of their well-known and unanimous teaching on the Eucharistic Sacrifice. Still more important is the testimony of the early liturgies, the essential portions of which are certainly older than many parts of the New Testament.

¹ Dollinger's *Christenthum und Kirche* (ut supr.), p. 256. (*First Age of the Church*, pp. 245, 6.)

² *Cat. ad Par.* Pars II., cap. iv., Q. 74, 75.

NOTE II. TO CHAPTER VI.

RECENT LUTHERAN THEOLOGY ON THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION.

It has been observed more than once, that the Scotist view of the motive of the Incarnation was foreign to the ideas of the Reformation. It was indeed maintained by Osiander, as we have seen, but the exception is exactly of that kind which proves the rule, for here, as in many other points, Osiander felt himself and was felt by his coreligionists to be out of harmony with the general Lutheran sentiment of his day. With him began that reaction against the first Reformers, which has been traced out in an earlier chapter, and which lasted till the Reformation merged into the Rationalist movement in Germany. A similar spirit has however reappeared in our own day in some of the more eminent Lutheran divines of the orthodox school, and their adoption of the Scotist view as an integral part of their system is an illustration of it. It may be worth while to give a few instances of this.

Martensen, a Danish Lutheran bishop, whose work, *Die christliche Dogmatik* (Kiel, 1850), I quote from a German translation, teaches as follows. Man is created after the image of the Divine *Logos*. The 'supralapsarian' view of Calvin, that redemption, and therefore sin, was predestined from eternity is met by saying that the Incarnation was predestined from eternity as the true ideal of humanity, but not the Passion and death of the God-Man. It resulted from our wilful sin, that "the divine revelation of love actually took place as a revelation of redemption." Christ can only become our Redeemer because He is by an eternal purpose our Mediator. We must not say that "without sin there would have been no place in the human family for the glory of the Only-begotten." He, who would anyhow have been the Mediator of an imperfect race, has humbled Himself yet further to become the Redeemer of a sinful race. (*Christ. Dogm.* pp. 157, 193-5, 294.) The author, while accepting generally

the language of the Lutheran formulas, gives them an interpretation widely different from that of their founders. The shocking exaggerations of Luther and Calvin on the nature and consequences of original sin are softened down to a sense little, if at all, different from that of Catholic tradition. The satisfaction of Christ is explained through His redemption, and justification as implying the gift of a new principle of holiness implanted in the soul. The appeasing the wrath of God, and the 'active obedience' of Christ, which play so important a part in earlier Protestant theology, are reduced to conformity with the teaching of the Fathers: while many Lutheran *opinions* are expressly rejected, as the ubiquity of Christ's Body, and the Lutheran gloss on the descent into Hell. An intermediate state of purification between death and judgment is maintained, nor does Martensen object to call it Purgatory; he prefers the mediæval opinion to that of the Reformers as to the age of the resurrection body. The book is interesting in itself, and as marking the contrast between earlier and later Lutheranism. It closes with a remarkable discussion on the future condition of the wicked, with scriptural and patristic authorities.

Thomasius, a professor at Erlangen, of narrower views than Martensen, whose work on Origen has already been referred to, discusses the motive of the Incarnation at some length in his *Christi Person und Werk* (Erlangen, 1853), urging the authority of Scripture, Fathers, and Schoolmen against Martensen's view, which he rejects as well on that account as from thinking that it derogates from the love of Christ and refers His taking our nature to an internal necessity in the being of God, not to compassion for man—an objection which would be at least equally applicable to the Anselmic and many Protestant theories of satisfaction; but in fact it does not really apply at all here, for the intention of taking our humanity in order to unite us with God is itself one free act of love, the further purpose of suffering for our redemption is another. Thomasius considers the decree of the Incarnation to be included in the decree of creation, modified through the entrance of sin foreseen though not predestined by God. He says that in Christ the archetype of humanity is bodily fulfilled. He quotes Dorner, as holding the opposite (Scotist) view; but the purely historical character of Dorner's work does not give scope for the direct discussion of such questions.

Nägelsbach, in his work, *Der Gottmensch* (Nürnberg, 1853), devoted to showing, as against atheism and pantheism, that the God-Man is "the fundamental idea of revelation in its unity and historical development," maintains that the union between God and man, which love requires, can only be realised by God taking on Himself not abstract but actual humanity, *i. e.* becoming man. His Incarnation cannot be accidental. It is opposed, as Kurtz says, to all Christian feeling and consciousness, that we should owe it, and the deification of our nature, only to sin. It is implied in the very principle of love, that this was from the first the end and scope of human history. Its first prophecy is not Gen. iii. 15, but Gen. i. 26. The First Adam implies the Second. All previous history was an education of the world for His coming, all Christian history springs from Him as its Root, whose appearance is the centre-point in the life of the world. (*Der Gottmensch*, vol. i. pp. 28-32.) Liebner, in his *Christologie* (Gottingen, 1849), argues at length, that the Incarnation and the consequent deification of our nature were involved in the original act of creative love, as the archetype and proper term of humanity. He answers in detail the objections of Thomasius.

Rothe, one of the greatest Lutheran divines of the day, in his *Theologische Ethik* (vol. ii. pp. 252-338), treats of the redemption wrought by Christ. He does not expressly touch on the probabilities of the Incarnation, as antecedent to sin; but he considers redemption to be involved in the original act of creation, though requiring a fresh creative act or new beginning of the race, proceeding from the race itself, but by a supernatural origin: *i. e.* a Second Adam. The author traces out the preparation for Christ's coming under the Old Law by the moral education of mankind, and by miracle and prophecy, leading up to the final revelation in His personal appearance, the end of which is redemption, or restored communion between God and man, by the removal of sin which divided them. In order to mediate between God and man, He must share the nature of both perfectly, and must make a free and complete self-oblation of His whole being for the honour of God and for love of man; and this in a sinful world, hating holiness and truth and under the dominion of Satan, can only be consummated through the sacrifice of His life. To impart the fruits of His redemption, He has founded a spiritual kingdom or family among men, whereof He is the Head and Heart

from which the life of the whole body is derived. For the redemption of sinful humanity, wrought fully once for all by Himself, must be applied separately to individual members of the race. Only so can actual redemption and propitiation before God be accomplished for them, through the removal of sin and of the debt and punishment which are its consequences. Pardon cannot be bestowed unless there is a guarantee for the actual casting out of sin. When the sinner is thus reconciled with God, a gradual process of renewal follows, in which the moral and religious elements are constantly tending to become identified. For cases of death-bed conversion, and even for those who die unconverted, there still remains till the end of the present world and the general judgment an intermediate state of trial, probably by fire (for which Mark ix. 49 is quoted). But a time comes sooner or later, when the being is wholly turned to evil (*dämonisirt*) and no further change is possible. Conversion after death is harder than before, and the higher position once forfeited can never be regained. (Ib., pp. 190-2, 484, 488.)

Similar specimens of modern Lutheran teaching might easily be multiplied; these are taken as a sample, from some of the principal contemporary divines of that body.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MORAL FITNESS OF THE ATONEMENT.

AND now that we are come to the end of our inquiry, does it not almost seem as if we were still at the beginning? Are we not tempted to exclaim, with the philosopher of old, that the end of all knowledge is the consciousness of our ignorance? Doubtless what Coleridge said of philosophy is even more true of theology, that it begins in wonder and ends in wonder. Indeed, this is but to repeat the language of the ritual, that He, who has wonderfully created our nature, has yet more wonderfully redeemed it.

"Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind."¹

After all has been said, much must ever remain unsaid. Our deepest feelings are precisely those we are least able to express; and, even in the act of adoration, silence is our highest praise. Still, without attempting to dogmatize on points beyond the sphere of revelation, we may gather up some results, both negative and positive, from what has been recorded of the past.

Not to dwell on minor undercurrents of opinion or belief, we have seen the successive waves of two great

¹ Göthe, *Faust*.

theories of satisfaction pass over the surface of theology, and again retire, but not without leaving indelible traces behind them. First came the Origenist notion of a ransom paid to the Evil Spirit, which found its latest utterance in Peter Lombard, but was then already merging into the broader and more spiritual conception of a victory over sin, and therefore over him who is its author. After this followed the Anselmic conception of the necessity of an infinite satisfaction for an infinite debt, discussed in all its bearings throughout the scholastic period, and almost universally rejected, but finding new advocates at the Reformation, and becoming in their hands the basis of a system which has served first to distort, and then to alienate, the moral and religious convictions of a large section of Christendom. The scholastic controversy brought out with peculiar clearness that, while we have no right to assume that an adequate satisfaction was *necessary*, a satisfaction not only sufficient but superabundant has certainly been made, owing to the infinite worth, by virtue of the hypostatic union, of those human acts and sufferings which the Redeemer offered for the sins of His brethren as the Head and Representative of our race.

We cannot, again, say, except by a figure of speech, that our sins were imputed to Him, or that He who was sinless endured the wrath of God; still less, in the blasphemous language of several Lutheran divines, that He suffered the torments of the damned. Yet it is certain that His mental sufferings, which greatly ex-

ceeded the bodily pains of the Passion, had an expiatory virtue, and that they were chiefly, though not exclusively, supernatural. As was said in a previous chapter, He was offering to the Eternal Father the one perfect act of contrition for the sins of His brethren, whose nature He had assumed; He was making a general confession of the iniquities of all mankind, which He had taken upon Him, as though they were indeed His own. Nor is this true only of those incidents of the Passion which are crowded into the last twenty hours of His earthly ministry. Every act of that spotless life had a sacrificial power. It was at once a confession of the sins that had separated man from his Maker, and an intercession for the transgressors. And thus even those sufferings which might seem at first sight purely natural, as the awful solitude of which the Prophet spoke, or the 'contradiction' foretold by Simeon and noticed in the Epistle to the Hebrews, have their supernatural side also. The Agony in the Garden and dereliction on the Cross represent, in the language of prophecy, an 'ocean of sorrow,' on whose shore we may stand, and gaze down upon the waveless surface; but the depths below no created intelligence can fathom. Thus much, however, we may certainly discern; and it is needful to repeat it, because it has not unfrequently been denied—that the bitterness of His spiritual trial lay not merely in the treachery or coldness of His intimates, the foresight of His Passion, and the sorrow for His murderers' sin. The chalice that could not pass from

Him, the agony Gabriel was powerless to console, meant more—far more—than that. The accumulated wickedness of all generations of mankind, in its fulness and its detail, not weighed in the scales of human judgment, but seen in the light of His Countenance before whom the heavens are unclean—the just wrath of the Allholy, not, indeed, against Him who was sinless, but against the sin which for us men, and as our Representative, He had in that supreme agony of meritorious contrition vouchsafed to make His own¹—the sense of unutterable loneliness, as though (if one may venture to say so) the hypostatic union was being dissolved and He was to become one in will, as in nature, with the apostate creature who had forsaken God—these were the rebukes that broke His Heart, and wrung from His parched lips the loud and exceeding bitter cry that startled the gazers on Calvary. It was the hour of the power of darkness. The light of the Beatific Vision was shrouded, for so He willed; and in a sense most real, though passing human comprehension, Jesus received into His sinless consciousness the burden of our guilt, and learnt by experience, as He alone could learn, whose gaze alone could “measure the infinite descent,” what it is to be shut out from the Eternal Love. When He brought in vision before one of His saints a venial sin in all its naked deformity, she swooned beneath the intolerable anguish. What must the contemplation of all sins,

¹ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν. 2 Cor. v. 20.

venial and mortal, of all generations of mankind have been to Him, who is not a Saint but the Living Source of Sanctity? The extremity of His suffering is attested, but not explained, by the cry of dereliction and the Sweat of Blood. We can but adore in silence the inscrutable secret of those 'unknown agonies,' the interior martyrdom sealed at last in death.

The controversies of the Reformation threw a fresh light on the subjective and moral aspects of the doctrine, and exhibited with peculiar distinctness the error of supposing that the Atonement wrought by Christ was to be understood as superseding our own satisfactions or obedience, instead of sanctifying and transforming them. This was in fact the question that lay at the root of the long disputes originated by Luther's teaching on justification, and the nature of justifying faith, while the other great school of Reformers brought into prominent notice the universality of redemption, as opposed to their own cherished theory of a deliverance wrought only for the elected few. The criticism of Socinus helped to expose the hollowness of all merely forensic schemes of satisfaction, and to remind Christian believers of the indissoluble connection between the Sacrifice and the Divinity of their Lord.

Another idea elicited in the course of discussion was, that in all probability the Son of God, 'the Firstborn of every creature,' would have assumed our nature, and sanctified it by personal indwelling, though we had needed no redemption. We could not have argued

à priori that He would come at all, or that, when we had fallen, He would come to die. We could not have told that the Incarnation of Jesus was to be the means of our union with the Godhead, or that our atonement, if atonement was needed, would be wrought out through His death. Nor can we tell with any certainty or completeness *why* it has been so now. The reasons lie deep in the counsels of Eternal Wisdom. We can but gaze, as it were, at the outer fringe of the curtains of His tabernacle, and from what we know of His dealings with us surmise something of that vaster mystery of the Divine Government which as yet is unrevealed. But looking back on what has actually occurred, with the light which revelation throws upon it, we may discern something, if not of the original causes of the Atonement, at least of its adaptation to our needs and the lessons it is designed to teach us. There is a fitness in the belief, that He, who is "the Brightness of the everlasting Light, the unspotted Mirror of God's majesty, and Image of His goodness," would have come to make His delights with the children of men, even if they had persevered in their primal innocence. Still more does it seem natural to us that, when we had sinned, He should come, not only as our Brother, but our Redeemer, to make reparation for our sins, and consecrate afresh our fallen humanity in the baptism of sorrow and blood. Let us gather up some of the reflections which this view of the fitness of His atoning Passion suggests to us.

1. Pain, as has been already said, is the deepest and

truest thing in our nature since the Fall. We feel instinctively that it is so, even before we can tell why. Pain is what binds us most closely to one another and to God. It appeals most directly to our sympathies, as the very structure of language indicates. To go no further than our own, we have English words, such as condolence, to express sympathy with grief; we have no one word to express sympathy with joy. So, again, it is a common remark that, if a funeral and wedding procession were to meet, something of the shadow of death would be cast over the bridal train, but no reflection of bridal happiness would pass into the mourners' hearts. Scripture itself has been not inaptly called "a record of human sorrow." The same name might be given to history. "Man is born to trouble, as sparks fly upward." Friendship is scarcely sure till it has been proved in suffering, but the chains of an affection riveted in that fiery furnace are not easily broken. So much then at least is clear, that the Passion of Jesus was the greatest revelation of His sympathy; "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." "It was *fitting* that God should make the Author of their salvation perfect through sufferings." And hence Fathers and Schoolmen alike conspire to teach, that one reason why He chose the road of suffering was to knit us more closely to Himself. For this He exalted His head, not on a throne of earthly glory, but on the Cross of death. It is, indeed, no accident of the few,

but a law of our present being, which the poet's words express :

"That to the *Cross* the mourner's eye should turn,
Sooner than where the stars of Christmas burn."

For all, in their several ways and degrees, are mourners. The dark threads are woven more thickly than the bright ones into the tangled skein of human life, and as time passes on, the conviction that it is so is brought home to us with increasing force. We begin to discern "the trail of the serpent" over all the flowers of our earthly Paradise. There was a saying among the Greeks that "whom the gods love die young," and the translation of Enoch,² if it does not explain the origin of the proverb, attests its truth, which has received under the Gospel its final and fullest consecration. Our Lord left a special blessing for those children of the first resurrection, who, being perfected in a short time, have fulfilled many times, and are taken in the unsullied freshness of their early bloom, by the wasting of sickness or the baptism of blood, to behold the King in His beauty, and the land that is far away. They are His dearest tokens "from that earth, where He was once a Child." But sooner or later a crisis comes in the lives of the rest of us who linger here, when we are constrained to walk—it may be with backward step and averted eye—up the road that leads to Calvary, and the sun goes down at noon,

¹ *Christian Year*. Good Friday.

² The recorded age of Enoch is, indeed, immense, according to our reckoning, but it does not reach half that of the shortest-lived of his contemporaries, and herein lay his blessing : "he was not, for God took him."

and the stars withdraw their shining, and the Cross stands bare and cold under the darkened heavens, and we must be stretched thereon, whether we will or no. It is well for all in that hour of solitary trial who can patiently, nay, thankfully, embrace their cross, as knowing that indeed they are not alone who are crucified with Jesus. And thus, as St. Paul reminds us, the Cross is a manifestation, not only of His love, but of His power. He was lifted up thereon, not only as the great High-priest and true Melchisedec of a better covenant, not only as the Prophet, who could preach most persuasively from that uneasy death-bed of the bleeding tree, but in vindication of the *regal* office, to which also He was anointed by the Eternal Spirit in Mary's womb. The Cross was an altar of Sacrifice, and a chair of Truth, but it was also, strange as it may sound to say so, the throne of an everlasting kingdom. It was there the Redeemer asserted His double royalty, over the intellects and the hearts of men. It is the fact, as has been justly observed, of His manifesting His love at so great a cost to Himself, and not by a mere act of clemency, that gives to the Atonement its persuasive power.¹ Because he died for our sakes, the love of Christ constraineth us.²

When is it that we most deeply realise the presence of our *King*? Not when the angel brightness shines on the fields of Bethlehem, and the *Gloria in Excelsis* of angel voices rings clear and sweet through the still-

¹ Campbell's *Nature of the Atonement*, pp. 24 sqq. Cf. also *supr.* p. 184.

² 2 Cor. v. 15.

ness of the midnight heavens; not when the Paschal alleluias sound over the open Grave, or the mighty wind is rocking the upper chamber, where the Paraclete descends in tongues of flame on the first believers of the infant Church. No; but in the grave solemnity of the Good Friday procession, when altars are stripped, and bells are hushed, and lights burn dim, and the crucifix is veiled, and for that day alone of all the year the daily sacrifice has ceased, as though the reign of Antichrist were come, and the abomination of desolation set up in the most holy place; it is then the strange unearthly melody of the *Vexilla Regis* breaks on the silence of our supernatural sorrow, with the tidings that He, the Crucified, is Lord and King. *

“The royal banners forward go,
The Cross shines forth in mystic show.”

And, therefore, when scarce four centuries had passed since the Crucifixion, the greatest Father of the Church could openly appeal to the glory of that Cross, “once trampled on by the enemy, but now the brightest ornament of a monarch’s crown.”¹ The foolishness of that preaching of the Cross overcame the world; it subdued the pride of philosophy, and tamed the fire of lust. *Domuit orbem non ferro sed ligno*. He with great power had exalted His chosen people, and they exalted His head on the accursed tree; but from that tree, stained with the blood-red dye of empire and of

¹ Aug. in Ps. liv. 9.

martyrdom, He claimed and conquered the allegiance of mankind. Sacrifice is the grand law of the universe, and the Cross revealed it. In the words of a writer too early snatched away, "All the other bonds that had fastened down the Spirit of the universe to our narrow round of earth were as nothing in comparison to this golden chain of suffering and self-sacrifice, which at once riveted the heart of man to One, who, like himself, was acquainted with grief."¹ In this sense also His sacred limbs

"were nailed,
For our advantage, on the bitter Cross."

What is it, again, that gives to the rolling music of the Psalter, which has echoed for above three thousand years along the corridors of the Jewish or the Christian Church, its peculiar force and charm—a sweetness that never wearies, a power that never fails—and has fitted it to record the most various experiences of individuals and of nations, to syllable the deepest thoughts, whether of joy or sorrow, which have stirred the hearts, and shaped the destinies, of a hundred generations of the chosen people of God? It is not *only* that marvellous fulness and diversity of human utterance, that profound spirituality, that exquisite refinement and tenderness of pathos, which strike a responsive chord in our inmost being, that have made the Psalter our most cherished manual of secret devo-

¹ Arthur Hallam's *Remains*.

tion, the most familiar and universal organ of our public praise. It is this, but it is more than this; their inspired sympathy with every phase of the Redeemer's life-long Passion, with every sentiment of the Heart which gathered up and recapitulated in Itself the collective heart of humanity, has made the songs of Israel the rightful heirloom and common ritual of Christendom.¹ For the history of the Passion is, in one sense, the history of the Church, and in the streets of that "great city, which is spiritually called Sodom and Egypt," our Lord is not once, but perpetually crucified.

2. Once more. Jesus not only drew us to Himself by what in our fallen nature was the most intimate and holiest bond of sympathy; He also transmuted suffering from a chastisement into a means of grace. It became a kind of supplementary sacrament, consecrated in the prayer of Gethsemane, "Thy will be done." He died not, as some have imagined, to supersede our imperfect satisfactions, but to ennoble them and give them worth. Thenceforth they have a true though derivative value, because they are shadows of His Cross, and sprinkled with His atoning blood. They have merit, not in spite of His meritorious Passion, but because of it. Just as His obedience was not to be the substitute, but the pattern and rule of ours,

¹ See a striking passage on the wide appreciation and use of the Psalter in Stanley's *Jewish Church*, vol. ii. pp. 146—162. The author's view is not identical with that taken in the text, for it lays less stress on the Messianic, and especially the Passion element of the Psalter, but is consistent with it.

so too in suffering He left us an example of penance. He did not abolish for His disciples the common doom of sorrow, but sanctified it. He bade them take up their daily cross, but He showed how that cross might be turned from a curse to a beatitude. The cloud of doubt or perplexity has melted away, and His people are free to serve Him, in the spirit not of slaves but sons. We know that our poor satisfactions are accepted, because they are joined with His. We therefore pray Him to help His servants, because He has redeemed them with His precious Blood. The great law of retributive justice, that sin must suffer, δράσαντι παθεῖν, which suggested the grandest and most religious drama of the ancient world, lay as a heavy burden at the poet's heart. The Sacrifice of Calvary assures us that the law of justice is also a law of love. Suffering is as the rough ore embedded in the earth, out of which may be fashioned crowns of glory or chains of bondage. It is ours to make friends of the wages of iniquity, by offering our righteous chastisements in atonement for our sin. The Passion has impressed on every act of Christian service a new power of reparation. Since Jesus lived as a 'Man of sorrows,' the trials of life have attained a meaning and a dignity; since Jesus died, the solitude of death, of which a Christian philosopher has spoken,¹ is less terrible than before, the stone is rolled away from the door of the sepulchre, and a light is shed from the Cross on the

¹ "Je mourrai seul." Pascal. *Pensées*.

cleansing fires of the world beyond the grave. When 'the two voices' are striving in man's soul for the mastery, there are others than Faust whose hand has been arrested by the music of the Easter bells.

3. In the method of the Atonement, and in its abiding presence in the Church, we are taught the spirit of self-sacrifice, which lies at the root of all human excellence and is the true measure of our perfection. When we come to present that great Sacrifice on the altar, we are bidden to say; "We give Thee thanks *because of Thy great glory.*" He who has learnt the meaning of those words, has caught the spirit of the Eucharist and of the Cross.¹ Nor only so. The central act of Christian worship is at once a Sacrifice and a Communion. It teaches us both parts of the precept of charity, self-devotion to God and self-devotion for the good of man. All genuine nobility of character springs from self-oblivion, and self-oblivion is the spirit of sacrifice. The toil of the mission, the zeal of the apostle, the varied ministries of bodily or spiritual consolation, the meekness of endurance, the heroism of action, the patience of confessorship, the courage of martyrdom—all these are fruits and tokens of the Cross. It is the source of their energy, and the rule of their fulfilment. Tender children, like the boy-martyrs of Japan, have rapturously kissed the cross, whereon

¹ "The Mass is the compendium of the Gospel. It is a heresy in doctrine to acknowledge the Sacrament and to deny the Sacrifice. Worldliness is guilty of a similar practical heresy with regard to holiness. It admits the claims of all its obligations but one, and that is the obligation of sacrifice."—Faber, *Precious Blood*, p. 303.

they counted it a joy and an honour to die, as Jesus died. On others His death has seemed to be almost visibly imprinted, who, from intense and continuous meditation on the Passion, have exhibited the marks, and felt something of the bodily pains of the Crucified.¹ But to all His followers, in their measure and degree, must a share be imparted in that communion of sacrifice. It is a contradiction, to be "delicate members of a body whose Head is crowned with thorns." Obedience, poverty, and virginity, which are among the characteristic tokens of the Incarnation, are not, as has sometimes been suggested, the specialities of a particular age or condition of society, though the manner of their exercise may vary. Christianity knows nothing of 'dead virtues,' for in the power and example of the Crucified all graces live. And, even as He came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom, so we too are likest Him, when we lay down our lives for the brethren. Nor is that sacrifice less acceptably offered in an age, like the present, of high civilisation and refinement, when direct persecution is hardly to be thought of, though it may not win the praise of men or attract their notice. The inglorious martyrdom of labour, or weariness

¹ There can be no doubt about the fact of what is called 'stigmatization' as in the case of the Tyrolese 'Addolorata,' and others, though it may often have been simulated. It is perhaps to be explained as the physiological result of a peculiar concentration of mind on the Passion, rather than as strictly miraculous. But it is not always easy to draw the line. The Precious Blood, and the Five Wounds are among the most popular 'special devotions' in the Church. See also 2 Cor. iv. 10; Gal. vi. 17.

ness, or contradiction—"the pang without the palm"—comes nearest His, who on earth was hidden and despised ; there are many Saints uncertified by public recognition here, whose names are written in heaven. The lesson of love is taught at Bethlehem, on Calvary love is crucified ; but the Incarnate Victim is present still, an abiding Sacrifice, in the Eucharist. To understand what that mystery teaches is to understand the scope of our Christian vocation, our highest law of life. For His was a life-long Sacrifice. That is no fanciful picture, with which Overbeck has familiarised us, of the Boy-Christ on the Cross, with the thrilling prophecy written beneath it, *Dolor Meus in conspectu Meo semper*.

And the sacrifice was not only life-long but complete. "He emptied Himself." He willed to suffer to the uttermost, to drain to the last dregs the chalice both of mental and physical agony. He used His omnipotence, not to curtail His sufferings or to restrain the fierceness of His enemies, but to prolong bodily life till they had wreaked their worst upon Him. He would teach us, if I may dare to say so, to measure the infinitude of His Divine attributes by the prodigality of His self-abandonment, the generosity—nay, the 'foolishness'—of His 'Cross. Even the bodily pains of the Passion included, it is thought, every form of suffering to which our mortal frames are subject, except two. The Psalmist had prophesied that a bone of Him should not be broken, and it was not fitting that His sacred Flesh should feel the touch of fire,

which is the instrument or the image of the final chastisement of the impenitent. But, with these two exceptions, the Prophet's words are literally true; *Vere languores nostros Ipse portavit*. He would feel all, that He might pity all, remembering that we are but dust. And as the perfect organization of that Human Body, "made ready for the scourges," which grew as a tender plant from the barren soil of our common nature, constrained Him to feel every pulsation of physical agony more keenly ten thousand fold than is possible to the ruder apprehension even of the most sensitive and finely strung of bodily organisms among His earthly brethren, so, too,—and far more—did the purely natural sufferings of His perfect Human Soul unspeakably exceed in intensity the bitterest sorrows that ever wrung the heart of man. And we must remember that to Him all pains, whether of soul or body, inflicted by others, were aggravated by a love we can but dimly conceive of towards those who smote Him, which reached its culminating point in that last mute appeal to the traitor Apostle, as He knelt on the very night of His betrayal to wash his feet. These were the wounds He was wounded with in the house of His earthly friends. Most of us, indeed, know something of the bitterness of contradiction, ingratitude, deliberate misconstruction, sympathy slighted or betrayed; yet in this element even of His bodily sufferings neither Saint nor Martyr can approach Him, for none can realise the love which made it what it was. But all self-sacrifice involves

suffering of some kind, and what He voluntarily chose for His earthly lot He has made into a privilege for His children. There was a place found for the mourner, the persecuted, the reviled, among the Beatitudes of the kingdom of God.

4. It is a common saying, that cruelty and cowardice go together; so also do self-sacrifice and tenderness. They are different sides of the same idea. And all the delicacy and romance, so to speak, of Christian tenderness is perceptibly an outgrowth of the Cross. If we compare either the characters of holy men, or the broader facts of history, before and since the Crucifixion, there are few contrasts so remarkable as the presence or absence of that special quality which may be called the grace and bloom of sacrifice, which is the chivalry of self-devotion, and gives to heroic patience its winning and attractive power. It seems as though, till Christ had lived and died, that fulness of human sympathy was impossible. Compare Samuel with St. Bernard, or Moses with the Teacher of the Gentiles. The points of resemblance are many and striking, but there is in each case a marked distinction. Moses devoted his life for his people, his brethren after the flesh, and could even pray that his own name might be blotted out of the book of God's remembrance for their sakes; but we seek in vain for that power of world-wide sympathy, at once so universal and so minute, which makes us feel towards the great Apostle even now, as we read his words, as though he were a

personal friend.¹ Samuel did not cease to pray for his royal master, till the day of his death; but we see nothing of that intense feeling which melted Bernard into an agony of tears, when he preached over a brother's grave.² It is the chief Apostle of the Church who bids us be "sympathizing, lovers of the brethren, merciful, courteous."³

Or turn from individual to national characteristics. Pain, deformity, sickness, sorrow, old age, are an heirloom of the Fall, but their cure or consolation is an outflow from that Heart which, for us men and for our salvation, was pierced on Calvary. Rome, Athens, Alexandria, in their palmiest days, took no heed of suffering, or heeded it only as an eyesore to be concealed, or even as a crime to be punished. Our hospitals, refuges, sisterhoods of compassion, and the like, are a shadow cast from the Cross. There have, indeed, in terrible visitations of pestilence been scenes of frenzied selfishness in Christian cities, that do but too well recall the worst moral features of the plague recorded by Thucydides and Lucretius; but there was no Borromeo at Athens to stand, as an angel of mercy, between

¹ See Newman's *Sermons on Various Occasions*, Sermon 7 and 8, on the Character of St. Paul. Cf. also Stanley's *Epistles to Corinthians*, vol. ii. p. 23.

² It is not of course meant to deny, that there are exquisite touches of tenderness to be met with in the Old Testament history, as in the recognition of Joseph by his brethren, and still more in the tender affection which bound together David and Jonathan, to use the words of a distinguished author, "as by a sacramental union;" but the very vividness with which such instances fix themselves in our memory shows that they are rare and exceptional. I hope it is not an over refinement to add, that they mostly occur in the case of persons who are commonly recognised as partial types of Christ.

³ 1 Peter iii. 8.

the living and the dead. There have been in our own day cruel massacres at the barricades of a Christian metropolis, but the gentle self-devotion of Affré was a bequest from the Good Shepherd, whose words hung upon his dying lips. The fierceness of war is not on the whole what it was of old; and, if slavery still unhappily survives in some Christian nations, much at least in its incidents, which the highest public opinion of Rome or Athens allowed, is emphatically condemned by the universal conscience of Christendom.¹

Hence, again, the Passion of Jesus has conferred on childhood, and the child-like temper, a new dignity, and made the love of children—whom He took into His arms and blessed—a reflection and memorial of His own. Even a heathen poet could tell us that the greatest reverence is due to boyhood, but our Lord made children the living types of that temper without which none can enter into His kingdom. Of the seven sacraments that flowed from His riven Heart on Calvary two alone were designed for any special age, and both for the age of childhood. Nay, more, He has vouchsafed to be named, for our abiding devotion, by the lips of Apostles and Evangelists, “the Holy Child Jesus.”² And in the days of His earthly pilgrimage children were drawn to Him as by the spell of an instinctive sympathy. They

¹ See Note at the end of this Chapter.

² Luke ii. 43., Acts iv. 27, 30. It would seem that *παῖς* in these passages of the Acts has its proper meaning of Boy, as well as slave or servant of God, as in the parallel passage of Isaiah liii. 11. There is probably an allusion in both places to the fact that favourite slaves were often boys. It is remarkable, that the classical poets hardly ever refer to their childhood, while few Christian poets have failed to dwell on it.

were the first to welcome Him on His entrance into the world, the last to sing His praise. They form the vanguard of the whiterobed army of Martyrs, "baptized in blood for Jesus' sake" in the cradles of Bethlehem, pursuivants of a long procession from every clime and age. When the representative wickedness of all generations of mankind was concentrated in the crowning act of apostasy which converted the chosen city into a moral wilderness, and seemed, but only seemed, to seal the Tempter's victory, every race, age, sex, condition, but one, conspired to swell his triumph. The purity of the judgment-seat was corrupted, priestly sanctity profaned, the gentleness of woman turned to gall; the crowds who chanted 'Hosanna,' on Palm Sunday afternoon were the same that on Friday morning shouted, 'Crucify.' One class alone, so far as the Gospels tell us, never joined that cry. While priests and scribes were plotting under the very temple roof, the last time He visited it, the death of its Lord, Hosannas rose once more from boyish voices that would not be put to silence, and the mouths of babes and sucklings rebuked the madness of His people.

More than this; there has been a 'tender grace' thrown over all the relations of thought, of literature, and of life, which may no doubt often degenerate into mere idle sentimentalism, but none the less springs from a deeper and truer estimate of the sacredness of that humanity, which Jesus sanctified in sorrow and death. One of the greatest modern writers on physical science has commented on the very different appreciation

of natural scenery exhibited in classical and in Christian literature.¹ There was no subjective poetry among the ancients. "What was evening to the Greek? What was it to the Roman? It was not till Christianity, that true but sadder second thought, had drawn a veil over much that seemed, but only seemed, so clear; till all the light that lay on human life had faded into the hues of twilight, that men began to feel, dimly at first, and as if by instinct, the true significance of that wondrous interval which is not night nor yet day, but more to the heart than either."² Even in mere earthly enjoyments there is nothing pure, or noble or enduring without the sense of mystery and the cost of sacrifice. And both are learnt on Calvary. As the prismatic hues are centred in the sunbeam, the tenderness of affection and the experience of life are summed up and harmonized in the Cross.

5. It follows from this, that the vision of Calvary interprets, while it chastens, our yearning for ideal loveliness. Why has even physical beauty so powerful an attraction for us? Why do we so fondly, so madly, so wildly, so passionately love it? Why is it, as a modern writer has truly said, that no heart is pure which is not passionate, no virtue safe which is not

¹ See Humboldt's *Kosmos*, vol. ii. ch. 1., Eng. Tr. with the quotations from St. Basil and the two Gregories. Cf. Newman's *Church of the Fathers* (London, 1840), pp. 126, 127.

² I am indebted for this passage to the unpublished Essay of a friend. The nearest approach, as far as I am aware, to modern idealism and subjectivity in classical poetry is to be found in the Idylls of Theocritus, which in their way are unique. Virgil is perhaps an extreme case on the opposite side.

enthusiastic?¹ Degraded, indeed, the feeling may easily become into shapes of nameless horror, for there is a blight over all that is loveliest in this fallen world. But in itself it is surely part of our unfallen nature, a relic of primeval innocence and earnest of future beatitude; it is the instinctive cry of the creature for the Creator, the longing of the exiled spirit for the sympathies of an immortal home.² In this ideal sense the poet's words are true:—

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.”³

He was not wrong who taught that the love of Beauty is indeed no other than the love of Eternal Truth. And only in the brightness of the uncreated Vision can that love find its adequate satisfaction.⁴

“ Wir müssen nach der Heimath gehen,
Um diese heilige Zeit zu sehen.”⁵

But the corruption of what is noblest is most base.

¹ *Ecce Homo*.

² See Pascal's *Pensées* (Paris, 1761), 3, 6.

³ Wordsworth, *Ode to Immortality*.

⁴ “ Perhaps no man can attain the highest excellence, who is insensible to sensuous beauty.....it gives conceptions which are infinite, but it never gives or realizes the infinite. Still it leads on to it. To see the King in His beauty is the loftiest and most unearthly attainment. Can anyone be keenly alive to this who has no heart for external beauty? ” Robertson's *Letters*, vol. i. p. 223-4. Cf. vol. ii. p. 54. “ I am quite certain that beauty attracts an unvitiated heart only because it seems, by a law of our thought, the type of mental and moral beauty.”

⁵ Novalis, *Hymn to Death*.

The records of Heathendom tell us into what strange aberrations even religious enthusiasm, when undisciplined, may lead its votaries. He, who is the Flower of humanity, "fairest among the sons of men," is proposed to our adoration, not so much as modern art has striven to represent Him, in that winning brightness of His Boyhood which riveted the gaze of the assembled doctors in the temple, or the grace of maturer years which drew upon Him the eyes of all the worshippers in the synagogue of Nazareth before He had begun to speak, but with countenance "marred more than any man," with "no form or comeliness that we should desire Him," in the dishonour of His Passion, and the cold repose of death. He is lifted on the Cross, a bleeding Victim, to draw all men to Himself. It is the stream that flows from Calvary, whose living waters make glad the city of our God. And thus the Cross is a response to our unfulfilled aspirations, while it consecrates our discipline of sorrow. It is a pillar of fire to lighten our eyes, and the shadow of a great Rock in a weary land; pointing upwards to the thrones on the right hand and on the left, but reminding us of the chalice of agony, the Red Sea of the baptism of blood.

6. It was observed in an earlier chapter, that Heathen sacrifices could scarcely, if at all, be taken as prefigurements of the death of Christ, and that St. Augustine and others regard even the Jewish sacrificial worship more as a concession to temporary exigencies, and a safeguard against idolatry, than as

having any special prophetic value. But it must not be forgotten, that such rites tell much of sin, if they throw no light on its expiation. Sacrifice, even, nay chiefly, in its most revolting and criminal shapes, not only the thousands of rams, the burnt offerings and calves of a year old, but the first-born offered for transgression, "the fruit of the body for the sin of the soul," like other forms of superstition and self-torture, gives unmistakable though distorted expression to man's instinctive sense of guilt, and his dread of punishment.¹ Other meanings it might have besides, sa in the Oriental notion of absorption into the divine essence, or *anima mundi*, through self-annihilation; but still this feeling, however undefined, of remorse and terror is its most radical and universal explanation. The facts of nature and the experience of human history tended to confirm these impressions. Men could at best but feel after God, if perchance they might find Him, and "faintly trust the larger hope," though much in the outward appearance of things seemed to contradict their creed. To assuage this terror, and turn remorse into repentance, some *act*, so to speak, was needed on God's side, which might reveal the depths of His compassion and notify to men, not indeed that He would leave sin unpunished, but that for all who turned to Him with contrite hearts punishment was tempered by mercy. And such an assurance was given in the Incarnation and death of the Eternal Son. "Why Christ's death was requisite for our salvation,

¹ See Butler's *Analogy*, Pt. ii. ch. 5.

and how it has obtained it, will ever be a mystery in this life. But, on the other hand, the contemplation of our guilt is so growing and so overwhelming a misery, as our eyes open on our real state, that some strong act (so to call it) was necessary, on God's part, to counterbalance the tokens of His wrath, which are around us, to calm and reassure us, and to be the ground and the medium of our faith. It seems, indeed, as if, in a practical point of view, no mere promise was sufficient to undo the impression left on the imagination by the facts of Natural Religion; but in the death of His Son we have His *deed*—His irreversible deed—making His forgiveness of sin and His reconciliation with our race, no contingency, but an event of past history."¹ It was the Divine response to the long and exceeding bitter cry of tortured humanity, deepening from age to age in its conscious or unconscious yearning for the advent of a Redeemer, as it rose from the sinning, suffering multitudes of the Patriarchal, or the Hebrew, or the Heathen world; *O Adonai et Dux domûs Israel, O Rex gentium et Desideratus earum, veni et salva hominem quem de limo formâsti!*

Such, then, are some of the *inferences* that may be drawn from the fact of the Atonement wrought by Christ, though we could not, I repeat, have used them beforehand as arguments to show that it was needed, or that it would be vouchsafed. They do not unlock the secret of the divine counsels, but they help to

¹ Newman's *University Sermons*, p. 106.

explain its application to ourselves. We recognise, as through a glass darkly, an utterance of that "Wisdom that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Most High, and reacheth from one end to the other mightily, sweetly disposing all things;" but we do not pretend to understand it. We may not pierce behind the veil. So much our hearts will tell us, that in the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world, but offered in time on Calvary, we have the surest pledge and most perfect revelation of a love that cannot fail. From of old He had loved us with an everlasting love, and therefore, when we rebelled against Him, in the compassion of His sufferings He drew us to Himself once more; and He has vouchsafed to reconcile us by so excellent a method of atonement, that it is at once the source of sanctity to the fallen, whose nature He has assumed, and a perfect satisfaction for their sin. And, further, the voice of tradition combines with the surmises of reason to suggest to us, that the mystery of the Atonement is part of a yet deeper mystery in the eternal purpose of God. He had always meant to make His tabernacle among men, but He had not meant to die. Only in so far as we comprehend the charity of the Incarnation, can we hope to comprehend aright its consummation in the shame and self-sacrifice of the Cross.

NOTE TO CHAPTER VII.

ON CERTAIN CONTRASTS OF CHRISTIAN AND HEATHEN CIVILISATION.

THE view expressed in the last chapter as to the comparative absence from the old heathen civilisation of that gentler phase of humanity, which seems a natural outgrowth from the Cross, may not improbably be considered by many exaggerated or unreal. A few words, therefore, shall be added here, in explanation of what it is intended to convey. It is quite true, that a standard of excellence was attained under the Greek and Roman Republics, which in some respects has never been surpassed, while there are points in which the average morality of Christian States has not unfrequently fallen below it. To dispute this would be as little in the interests of Christianity, as of historical truth. Neither, again, is it to be denied, that many individual characters of heathendom present at least foreshadowings and instalments of the peculiarly Christian virtues, those, I mean, which were not only sanctioned but first distinctly inculcated by the Gospel. To use the words of Tertullian, we discover in many of them *testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ*. Such pre-eminently were Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, and perhaps Seneca;¹ such, in various degrees, were many more who might be named. God never left Himself without a witness among men. On the other hand, it must be confessed, that only in rare and almost exceptional cases is anything like the Christian ideal, as represented by the Sermon on the Mount, realised among ourselves.

¹ Seneca must, at least, be placed on a far lower level than the other three. Even though we may reject the grosser charges of his enemies, there is but too abundant evidence in his own writings of his inordinate avarice, and of a servility as loathsome as it is grotesque. The reader may compare the estimates of his character—which do not indeed materially differ—in Farrar's *Seekers after God*, and the dissertation on "St. Paul and Seneca" in Lightfoot's *Philippians*. I refer the more gladly to Mr. Farrar's interesting volume, from the admirable illustration it supplies of individual and social contrasts in heathen and Christian life, as well as for the nobleness of its teaching.

It is a common remark, that very few lines need be altered in Juvenal's Satires, beyond what is purely local, to make them applicable to the London, or Paris, or Vienna of to-day. Yet it is important to remember, that, after all allowances, certain broad contrasts remain, which fix a moral gulf between the world of Juvenal and our own.¹ We gaze in a rapture of admiration on that marvellous creation of genius, the Athens of Pericles and Socrates and Phidias, of the mighty orators and poets whose words have rung music in the ears of seventy generations of mankind. We do well to gaze; there has not been such another glory upon the earth. But we are apt to forget that the picture has a darker side, over which distance draws a veil; that, in the language of a writer little likely to undervalue its ideal grace, "if the inner life had been presented to us of that period, which in political greatness and in art is the most brilliant epoch of humanity, we should have turned away from the sight with loathing and detestation."² The Plays of Aristophanes tell us something of that inner life; the pages of Petronius Arbiter reveal under the Roman Empire a yet lower depth of pollution. But the reality must have far exceeded anything our imagination can reproduce.

It is not, however, with the impurity but the cruelty of the old civilisations that we are now concerned, as contrasting with the tenderness of feeling, the scrupulous thoughtfulness for others, which has always been more or less a characteristic of Christian society, and never more so than in our own day. If many things were permitted to the Jews 'for the hardness of their hearts,' many more and worse were practised by the Gentiles. The usages of war and slavery have been alluded to in the text. The condition of women and children, and in fact the whole system of family life, which was treated simply as a subordinate department of statecraft, are also cases in point; so is the practice of human sacrifice, wherever it prevailed;³ and the absence,

¹ They are summed up in the Essay "On the State of the Heathen World," in Jowett's *Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. ii., pp. 68, *sqq.*

² *Ib.* p. 71.

³ Mommsen denies the practice of human sacrifice at Rome; others affirm it. In Greece it did not prevail in historical times, but the public taste was not shocked by legends which record it; nor was the Spartan cryptia looked upon with any special horror, though it would have been alien to Athenian habits.

already mentioned, of any public provision for sickness or other inevitable suffering. There is, again, in individuals, even the best of them, a hardness, a want of sympathy and considerateness, of much that falls under the notion of Christian courtesy, which to us would seem almost incredible, if we came across it in real life, at least among the educated classes. There are, of course, exceptions ; but I speak of the general standard, and of what was not found inconsistent with a stainless reputation and distinguished personal excellence. Even a man with all the refinement of Horace never dreamt of regarding slaves as other than mere chattels ; the highest Roman ladies gazed with eager and unpitied enjoyment on the hideous spectacles of the Coliseum. Nor was the stern morality of Juvenal shocked at the gladiatorial shows, but only at the nobles taking part in them. No public sentiment of Rome was outraged when 20,000 slaves were killed in a mock sea-fight for a summer afternoon's pastime to the spectators. But I need not multiply illustrations of what will be readily admitted.

Now it is clearly a fact, that in these and such like matters the common feeling and practice of Christendom is a marked improvement on that of preceding ages. Cruelties no doubt, both public and private, have been perpetrated in Christian countries, some of a kind the heathen never dreamed of. Still it remains true, that the average standard, whether national or individual, is not what it was then. No one questions, for instance, that the influence of the Church contributed in the long run to the abolition of slavery, and softened the horrors of war. Care for the sick and poor was from the beginning a noticeable speciality of Christians ; hospitals, as has been observed, were first erected in Christian cities. It is surely no mere fancy to connect the changed temper of modern society with the great event which has engaged our attention in this volume. There is a sequence of causation, as well as of chronology. An Order was founded by St. Camillus of Lelli in the sixteenth century, under the name of *Cruciferi*, for attending those afflicted with incurable diseases, or at the point of death. May we not say that all who represent the more tender and compassionate spirit of Christian civilisation are so far, in their measure, bearers of the Cross ?

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